420 research outputs found

    "Antiscepticism and Easy Justification" - Ch 5 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

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    In this chapter I investigate epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose this justification simply by reflecting on her seemings. I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this feature, phenomenal conservatism isnā€™t actually afflicted by easy justification problems

    "Phenomenal Conservatism" - Ch 2 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

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    In this chapter I introduce and analyse the tenets of phenomenal conservatism, and discuss the problem of the nature of appearances. After that, I review the asserted epistemic merits phenomenal conservatism and the principal arguments adduced in support of it. Finally, I survey objections to phenomenal conservatism and responses by its advocates. Some of these objections will be scrutinised and appraised in the next chapters

    Re-evaluating diabetic papillopathy using optical coherence tomography and inner retinal sublayer analysis.

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    BACKGROUND/OBJECTIVES: To re-evaluate diabetic papillopathy using optical coherence tomography (OCT) for quantitative analysis of the peripapillary retinal nerve fibre layer (pRNFL), macular ganglion cell layer (mGCL) and inner nuclear layer (mINL) thickness. SUBJECTS/METHODS: In this retrospective observational case series between June 2008 and July 2019 at Moorfields Eye hospital, 24 eyes of 22 patients with diabetes and optic disc swelling with confirmed diagnosis of NAION or diabetic papillopathy by neuro-ophthalmological assessment were included for evaluation of the pRNFL, mGCL and mINL thicknesses after resolution of optic disc swelling. RESULTS: The mean age of included patients was 56.5 (standard deviation (SD)ā€‰Ā±ā€‰14.85) years with a mean follow-up duration of 216 days. Thinning of pRNFL (mean: 66.26, SDā€‰Ā±ā€‰31.80ā€‰Āµm) and mGCL (mean volume: 0.27ā€‰mm3, SDā€‰Ā±ā€‰0.09) were observed in either group during follow-up, the mINL volume showed no thinning with 0.39ā€‰Ā±ā€‰0.05ā€‰mm3. The mean decrease in visual acuity was 4.13 (SDā€‰Ā±ā€‰14.27) ETDRS letters with a strong correlation between mGCL thickness and visual acuity (rho 0.74, pā€‰<ā€‰0.001). CONCLUSION: After resolution of acute optic disc swelling, atrophy of pRNFL and mGCL became apparent in all cases of diabetic papillopathy and diabetic NAION, with preservation of mINL volumes. Analysis of OCT did not provide a clear diagnostic distinction between both entities. We suggest a diagnostic overlay with the degree of pRNFL and mGCL atrophy of prognostic relevance for poor visual acuity independent of the semantics of terminology

    "Cognitive Penetrability" - Ch 3 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

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    In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesnā€™t yield lethal or substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism

    "The Bayesian Objection" - Ch 4 of Seemings and Epistemic Justification

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    In this chapter I analyse an objection to phenomenal conservatism to the effect that phenomenal conservatism is unacceptable because it is incompatible with Bayesianism. I consider a few responses to it and dismiss them as misled or problematic. Then, I argue that this objection doesnā€™t go through because it rests on an implausible formalization of the notion of seeming-based justification. In the final part of the chapter, I investigate how seeming-based justification and justification based on oneā€™s reflective belief that one has a seeming interact with one another

    The protease associated (PA) domain in ScpA from Streptococcus pyogenes plays a role in substrate recruitment

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    Annually, over 18 million disease cases and half a million deaths worldwide are estimated to be caused by Group A Streptococcus. ScpA (or C5a peptidase) is a well characterised member of the cell enveleope protease family, which possess a S8 subtilisin-like catalytic domain and a shared multi-domain architecture. ScpA cleaves complement factors C5a and C3a, impairing the function of these critical anaphylatoxins and disrupts complement-mediated innate immunity. Although the high resolution structure of ScpA is known, the details of how it recognises its substrate are only just emerging. Previous studies have identified a distant exosite on the 2nd fibronectin domain that plays an important role in recruitment via an interaction with the substrate core. Here, using a combination of solution NMR spectroscopy, mutagenesis with functional assays and computational approaches we identify a second exosite within the protease-associated (PA) domain. We propose a model in which the PA domain assists optimal delivery of the substrate's C terminus to the active site for cleavage

    Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence

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    According to the Rational Threshold View, a rational agent believes p if and only if her credence in p is equal to or greater than a certain threshold. One of the most serious challenges for this view is the problem of statistical evidence: statistical evidence is often not sufficient to make an outright belief rational, no matter how probable the target proposition is given such evidence. This indicates that rational belief is not as sensitive to statistical evidence as rational credence. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we argue that, in addition to playing a decisive role in rationalizing outright belief, non-statistical evidence also plays a preponderant role in rationalizing credence. More precisely, when both types of evidence are present in a context, non-statistical evidence should receive a heavier weight than statistical evidence in determining rational credence. Second, based on this result, we argue that a modified version of the Rational Threshold View can avoid the problem of statistical evidence. We conclude by suggesting a possible explanation of the varying sensitivity to different types of evidence for belief and credence based on the respective aims of these attitudes
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