'Underlying Energy Efficiency' in the US

The promotion of US energy efficiency policy is seen as a very important activity by the Energy Information Agency (EIA). Generally, the level of energy efficiency of a state is approximated by energy intensity, commonly calculated as the ratio of energy use to GDP. However, energy intensity is not an accurate proxy for energy efficiency, because changes in energy intensity are a function of changes in several factors including the structure of the economy, climate, efficiency in the use of resources and technical change. The aim of this paper is to measure the ‘underlying energy efficiency’ for the whole economy of 49 ‘states’ in the US using a stochastic frontier energy demand approach. A total US energy demand frontier function is estimated using panel data for 49 ‘states’ over the period 1995 to 2009 using several panel data models: the pooled model; the random effects model; true fixed effects model; the true random effects model; and the Mundlak versions of the pooled and random effects models. The analysis confirms that energy intensity is not a good indicator of energy efficiency; whereas, by controlling for a range of economic and other factors, the measure of ‘underlying energy efficiency’ obtained via the approach adopted here (based on the microeconomic theory of production) is

Equilibrium Delay and Non-Existence of Equilibrium in Unanimity Bargaining Games

We consider a class of perfect information unanimity bargaining games, where the players have to choose a payoff vector from a fixed set of feasible payoffs. The proposer and the order of the responding players is determined by a state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by the current state and the identity of the player who rejects the current proposal. This protocol encompasses a vast number of special cases studied in the literature. These special cases have in common that equilibria in pure stationary strategies exist, are efficient, are characterized by the absence of delay, and converge to a unique limit corresponding to an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. For our more general protocol, we show that subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies need not exist. When such equilibria do exist, they may exhibit delay. Limit equilibria as the players become infinitely patient need not be unique

Cap-and-Trade Climate Policy, Free Allowances, and Price-Regulated Firms

Firms subject to cost-of-service regulation cannot withhold windfall profits associated with free emissions allowances. This paper examines the efficiency and distributional impacts of two approaches to transfer free allowances to consumers: output subsidies and lump-sum payments. We employ an empirically calibrated model of the U.S. economy that features regulated monopolies in the electricity sector and many heterogeneous households. Under a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade policy, we find that using free allowances to subsidize regulated electricity prices increases aggregate welfare costs by 40-80 percent relative to lump-sum transfers. These inefficiencies are disproportionately borne by households in the tails of the income distribution