Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Financial Performance: Evidence from Korea

This paper studies the empirical relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate financial performance in Korea using a sample of 1122 firm-years during 2002-2008. We measure corporate social responsibility by both an equal-weighted CSR index and a stakeholder-weighted CSR index suggested by Akpinar et al. (2008). Corporate financial performance is measured by ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q. We find a positive and significant relation between corporate financial performance and the stakeholder-weighted CSR index, but not the equal-weighted CSR index. This finding is robust to alternative model specifications and several additional tests, providing evidence in support of instrumental stakeholder theory.corporate social responsibility; corporate financial performance; KEJI index; instrumental stakeholder theory

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Abstract The gravitational waves (GW170817) produced during a binary neutron star inspiral, followed by a gamma-ray burst (GRB 170817A) and afterglows from X-ray to radio wavelength, were observed. By combining the distance obtained from gravitational waves with the red shift obtained from electromagnetic waves, even the Hubble constant was estimated. This indicates the start of new era of multimessenger astronomy. In addition to the masses of inspiralling neutron stars, the tidal deformability, which depends on the inner structures of neutron stars, has been estimated from gravitational waves. This confirms that even strong interactions can be tested by using gravitational waves. In this article, we review the effect of the tidal deformability of neutron stars on the gravitational waves produced during the inspiral process and discuss the implications of the detected tidal deformability for the neutron star's equations of state

Earnings management surrounding CEO turnover: evidence from Korea

This article examines the empirical relation between CEO turnover and earnings management in Korea using a sample of 317 CEO turnovers and 634 non-turnover control firms during the period of 2001-2008. We classify CEO turnovers into four types depending on whether the departure of outgoing CEO is peaceful or forced and the incoming CEO is promoted from within or recruited from outside the firm. We measure earnings management by both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also control for the potential endogeneity of CEO turnover using Heckman’s two-stage approach. After controlling for corporate financial performance and governance structure, we find upward earnings management by the departing CEO only when the departure is forced and the new CEO is an insider. In this case, the new CEO also engages in downward earnings management using both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also find some evidence that the new CEO recruited from outside the firm manages discretionary accruals upward following the peaceful departure of predecessor. In all other types of CEO turnover, we do not find evidence of significant earnings management by either CEO

Earnings management surrounding CEO turnover: evidence from Korea

This article examines the empirical relation between CEO turnover and earnings management in Korea using a sample of 317 CEO turnovers and 634 non-turnover control firms during the period of 2001-2008. We classify CEO turnovers into four types depending on whether the departure of outgoing CEO is peaceful or forced and the incoming CEO is promoted from within or recruited from outside the firm. We measure earnings management by both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also control for the potential endogeneity of CEO turnover using Heckman’s two-stage approach. After controlling for corporate financial performance and governance structure, we find upward earnings management by the departing CEO only when the departure is forced and the new CEO is an insider. In this case, the new CEO also engages in downward earnings management using both discretionary accruals and real activities management. We also find some evidence that the new CEO recruited from outside the firm manages discretionary accruals upward following the peaceful departure of predecessor. In all other types of CEO turnover, we do not find evidence of significant earnings management by either CEO