Copyright Arbitrage

Regulatory arbitrage—defined as the manipulation of regulatory treatment for the purpose of reducing regulatory costs or increasing statutory earnings—is often seen in heavily regulated industries. An increase in the regulatory nature of copyright, coupled with rapid technological advances and evolving consumer preferences, have led to an unprecedented proliferation of regulatory arbitrage in the area of copyright law. This Article offers a new scholarly account of the phenomenon herein referred to as “copyright arbitrage.” In some cases, copyright arbitrage may work to expose and/or correct for an extant gap or inefficiency in the regulatory regime. In other cases, copyright arbitrage may contravene one or another of copyright’s foundational goals of incentivizing the creation of, and ensuring access to, copyrightable works. In either case, the existence of copyright arbitrage provides strong support for the classification (and clarification) of copyright as a complex regulatory regime in need of a strong regulatory apparatus. This Article discusses several options available for identifying and curbing problematic copyright arbitrage. First, courts can take a purposive, substantive approach to interpretations of the Copyright Act. Second, Congress can empower a regulatory agency with rulemaking and enforcement authority. Finally, antitrust law can help to curb the anticompetitive effects of copyright arbitrage resulting from legislative capture

Authoring Prior Art

Patent law and copyright law are widely understood to diverge in how they approach prior art, the universe of information that already existed before a particular innovation’s development. For patents, prior art is paramount. An invention can’t be patented unless it is both novel and nonobvious when viewed against the backdrop of all the earlier inventions that paved the way. But for copyrights, prior art is supposed to be virtually irrelevant. Black-letter copyright doctrine doesn’t care if a creative work happens to resemble its predecessors, only that it isn’t actually copied from them. In principle, then, outside of the narrow question of whether someone might have drawn from a preexisting third-party source, copyright infringement disputes would seem to have little doctrinal use for prior art. But that principle turns out to be missing a big part of what’s actually going on in copyright litigation today. In this Article, we identify a surprising trend: parties in cases involving music are increasingly discussing anticipatory earlier works, and judges are increasingly holding it against them if they don’t. The concept of prior art, once for inventors only, is now for authors, too. A major cause for this change, we argue, is the influence of a small cadre of expert witnesses. We interviewed several of the most active experts in music copyright disputes, and we analyzed dozens of reports that they have filed over the last two decades. Our data revealed a group that has been focused on authorial prior art since well before the courts were. These experts’ professional self-understanding, moreover, diverges sharply from the traditionally limited role that experts are supposed to play in evaluating copyright infringement. They view prior art research as a major part of their job. And for many of them, that research is important not just because it can sift between copying and independent creation, but also because it informs their normative view of what expression deserves legal exclusivity in the first place. Because of this expert community, prior art isn’t just for patents anymore

A Reconsideration of Copyright\u27s Term

For well over a century, legislators, courts, lawyers, and scholars have spent significant time and energy debating the optimal duration of copyright protection. While there is general consensus that copyright’s term is of legal and economic significance, arguments both for and against a lengthy term are often impressionistic. Utilizing music industry sales data not previously available for academic analysis, this Article fills an important evidentiary gap in the literature. Using recorded music as a case study, we determine that most copyrighted music earns the majority of its lifetime revenue in the first five to ten years following its initial release (and in many cases, far sooner than that). Our analysis suggests at least two results of interest to legislators, lawyers, and scholars alike. First, it contributes to the normative debate around copyright’s incentive–access paradigm by proposing a more efficient conception of copyright’s term for information goods: namely, one that replaces the conventional “life plus” durational standard with one based on the commercial viability of the average work. Second, it demonstrates that advocates’ and legislators’ tendency to focus on atypical works leads to overprotection of the average work, suggesting that copyright’s term is not nearly as significant for copyright owners as conventional wisdom submits