10 research outputs found
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Should hedge funds be regulated?
The rapid growth of the hedge fund industry has attracted increasing attention from government regulators. In the United States, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) voted in October 2004 to require many hedge funds to officially register with the Commission beginning in 2006. Actions such as this have led to a widening debate over whether(or to what extent) government should play a role in the development of the hedge fund industry. To address this issue, The Program on Alternative Investments at Columbia Business School's Center on Japanese Economy and Business sponsored a symposium entitled "Should Hedge Funds Be Regulated?" which was held at New York's University Club in November 2004. U.S. SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid, currently on leave from Columbia Law School, delivered the keynote speech, arguing in favor of the Commission's October decision. Following Commissioner Goldschmid's address, Program Director Mark Mason moderated a panel of leading experts from the business, government, and academic communities who debated the pros and cons of government involvement in the industry. These panelists included Franklin Edwards, Arthur F. Burns Professor of Free and Competitive Enterprise at Columbia Business School; John Gaine, President of the Managed Funds Association, a leading hedge fund industry group; Sudhir Krishnamurthi, Managing Director of Rock Creek Capital, a Washington, D.C.-based fund of hedge funds; and Nobuyuki Kinoshita, Director at the Financial Services Agency of Japan.This report covers the keynote address by Commissioner Goldschmid, together with the remarks of the expert panelists and selected exchanges with the audience. Columbia Business School Dean Glenn Hubbard and Center on Japanese Economy and Business Director Hugh Patrick delivered opening remarks, which are also reproduced in this report
Unleashing the Power of Consciousness and Mindfulness for Effective Teaching and Learning: A Special Reference to Management Education
A phase I study of rebeccamycin analog in combination with oxaliplatin in patients with refractory solid tumors
A Larger Slice or a Larger Pie? An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining Power in the Distribution Channel
This research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model. We use the Nash bargaining solution to determine wholesale prices and thus how margins are split in the channel. Equilibrium margins are a function of demand primitives and of retailer and manufacturer bargaining power. Bargaining power is itself a function of exogenous retail and manufacturer characteristics. The parties' bargaining positions are determined endogenously from the estimated substitution patterns on the demand side. The more they have to lose in a negotiation relative to an outside option, the weaker the bargaining position.We use the proposed bargaining model to investigate the role of the three main factors that have been blamed for the power shift from manufacturers to retailers in recent years (firm size increases, store brand introductions, and service level differentiation). In our empirical analysis of the German market for coffee, we find that bargaining power varies among the different manufacturer-retailer pairs. This result suggests that bargaining power is not an inherent characteristic of a firm but rather depends on the negotiation partner. We are able to confirm empirically previous theoretical findings that there can be cases where the slice of the pie that goes to one of the channel members may decrease but the overall pie increases and compensates for the smaller share of profits