Is There Electoral Cycles in Globalization Process? Evidence From 78 Democratic Countries, 1975-2006

I investigate whether timing of the elections impact globalization process or not in democratic countries across the globe. In other words, do elections slowdown globalization process? The theoretical underpinning is that, globalization process lead to economic and social hardships in short run but benefit the economy in the long run. The motto behind slowing down globalization process before elections is that it leads to polarization of voters and thus negatively affects the incumbent government. I make use of Axel Dreherís comprehensive globalization index as proxy for overall globalization process; economic globalization index for economic globalization policies and restrictions index as proxy for removal of trade and financial restrictions. I then construct ëinstrumental electoral cycleí to capture the scheduled and midterm election cycle. Using cross-sectional time series data for 78 democratic countries for the period 1975 ñ 2006, I find that scheduled elections are associated with slow down in all the three forms of globalization process, whereas midterm elections are not. Replacing all three Dreherís indices with our modified indices does not alter the results. I also find that slow down in globalization process is responsive to the propinquity to a scheduled election year. Meaning, as incumbent government nears the scheduled elections, globalization process keeps slowing down, while this is exactly opposite during the early years of incumbent government in office. These results suggest that elections generate ìelectoral globalization cycleî in democratic countries.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64400/1/wp931.pd

Do Elections Slow Down Economic Globalization Process in India? It's Politics Stupid!

I investigate whether timing of the elections impact economic globalization process or not in India. In other words, do elections slowdown economic globalization process? The theoretical underpinning is that, policies of economic globalization lead to economic and social hardships in short run but benefit the economy in the long run. The motto behind slowing down the economic globalization process before elections is that it leads to polarization of voters and thus negatively affects the incumbent government. I make use of Axel Dreherís economic globalization index and construct ëinstrumental electoral cycleí to capture the scheduled and midterm election cycle. Using time series data for India for the period 1970 ñ 2006, I find that scheduled elections are associated with slow down in economic globalization, whereas midterm elections are not. Replacing Dreherís economic globalization index with our modified globalization index does not alter the results. I also find that slow down in economic globalization process is responsive to the propinquity to a scheduled election year. Meaning, as incumbent government nears the scheduled elections, economic globalization process keeps slowing down, while this is exactly opposite during the early years of incumbent government in office. These results suggest that elections generate ìelectoral globalization cycleî in developing democratic country like India.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64406/1/wp929.pd

Impact of Economic Reforms on Poverty Indian Experience

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of economic reforms on poverty levels in India during the period 1975 - 2006. We construct a comprehensive measure of economic reforms index made up of seven subcomponents and percentage of population living below poverty line is used as proxy for aggregate level of poverty levels. The empirical study is conducted within the frame work of unit root, cointegration and Vector Error Correction Method tests. The results display long run equilibrium relationship between the two and the direction of causality flowing from reforms to poverty. Further, it is interesting to find that the current level of economic reforms is having a positive effect on poverty levels. But, the past level of reforms (stock of reforms) has a significant negative effect on poverty levels. Meaning, the immediate adjustment cost of current level of economic reforms is counterbalanced by the negative effects by the level of past reforms during the study period.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64373/1/wp924.pd

Socioeconomic, Institutional & Political Determinants of Human Rights Abuse: A Subnational Study of India, 1993-2002

We conduct an econometric analysis of socioeconomic, institutional and political factors determining government respect for human rights within India. Using time series crosssectional data for 28 Indian states for the period 1993 ñ 2002, we find that internal threat poised by number of social violence events, presence of civil war and riot hit disturbed areas are strongly associated with human rights abuses. Amongst socioeconomic factors, ëexclusiveí economic growth, ëunevení development, poor social development spending,youth bulges and differential growth rates between minority religious groups explain the likelihood of human rights violations. Capturing power at the state and central level by Hindu national partiesí viz., Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Shiv Sena, further help understand the incidence of human rights violations within India. We also address the possible endogenity problem between human development and human rights. Using a system of simultaneous equation, we find that improvement in human development have positive impact on government respect for human rights within India.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64388/1/wp926.pd

Do Choice & Speed of Reforms Matter for Human Rights During Transition?

Conventional wisdom posits absence of systematic relationship between economic reforms and human rights. Taking the case of transition economies, Vadlamannati & Soysa (2008) shows significant positive relationship between economic reforms and various forms of human rights. This brings us to the next question on the impact of choice and speed of reforms on human rights performance. In other words, does speed and choice of reforms increase or decrease government respect for human rights in transition economies? This is the question our paper tries to address. The Anglo-Saxon perspective is that speed of reforms lead to growth and development which inturn generates respect for human rights. While skeptics contend that rushing towards a free market economy would always be destructive as development process tends to be exclusive creating exogenous shocks leading to social and economic unrest. This leads to domestic violence and conflicts, allowing governments to resort to repressive measures. We use a new method to construct ëspeed of reformsí variable for transition economies for the period 1993 ñ 2006 to estimate its impact on all forms of human rights. Further, using the methodology of Wolf (1999) on discrete groupings of choice of reforms of transition economies, we classify the countries under radical, gradual and laggard reformer groups. We measure the impact of speed of reforms on human rights performance conditioned by choice of reforms. Our findings show that speed of reforms significantly improves government respect for all forms of human rights, while volatility in reforms is associated with human rights abuses. But the interesting finding is that, controlling for the speed of reforms attained, the choice with which the country has reformed plays pivotal role in determining human rights performance. While radical reforming countries are associated with better human rights performance, gradualists and laggards share poor human rights performance.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64413/1/wp927.pd

Exploring the Relationship Between Military Spending & Income Inequality in South Asia

The basic objective of this paper is to examine the effect of military spending on income inequality in four major South Asian economies. In the process, we also control for other possible key determinants of income inequality subject to data availability. Using panel regression fixed effects analysis for the study period 1975 to 2005, we find from our estimates that there is a positive effect of military expenditure on income inequality.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64381/1/wp918.pd

DO CHOICE & SPEED OF REFORMS MATTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DURING TRANSITION?

Conventional wisdom posits absence of systematic relationship between economic reforms and human rights. Taking the case of transition economies, Vadlamannati & Soysa (2008) shows significant positive relationship between economic reforms and various forms of human rights. This brings us to the next question on the impact of choice and speed of reforms on human rights performance. In other words, does speed and choice of reforms increase or decrease government respect for human rights in transition economies? This is the question our paper tries to address. The Anglo-Saxon perspective is that speed of reforms lead to growth and development which inturn generates respect for human rights. While skeptics contend that rushing towards a free market economy would always be destructive as development process tends to be exclusive creating exogenous shocks leading to social and economic unrest. This leads to domestic violence and conflicts, allowing governments to resort to repressive measures. We use a new method to construct ‘speed of reforms’ variable for transition economies for the period 1993 – 2006 to estimate its impact on all forms of human rights. Further, using the methodology of Wolf (1999) on discrete groupings of choice of reforms of transition economies, we classify the countries under radical, gradual and laggard reformer groups. We measure the impact of speed of reforms on human rights performance conditioned by choice of reforms. Our findings show that speed of reforms significantly improves government respect for all forms of human rights, while volatility in reforms is associated with human rights abuses. But the interesting finding is that, controlling for the speed of reforms attained, the choice with which the country has reformed plays pivotal role in determining human rights performance. While radical reforming countries are associated with better human rights performance, gradualists and laggards share poor human rights performance.

DO CHOICE & SPEED OF REFORMS MATTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS DURING TRANSITION?

Conventional wisdom posits absence of systematic relationship between economic reforms and human rights. Taking the case of transition economies, Vadlamannati & Soysa (2008) shows significant positive relationship between economic reforms and various forms of human rights. This brings us to the next question on the impact of choice and speed of reforms on human rights performance. In other words, does speed and choice of reforms increase or decrease government respect for human rights in transition economies? This is the question our paper tries to address. The Anglo-Saxon perspective is that speed of reforms lead to growth and development which inturn generates respect for human rights. While skeptics contend that rushing towards a free market economy would always be destructive as development process tends to be exclusive creating exogenous shocks leading to social and economic unrest. This leads to domestic violence and conflicts, allowing governments to resort to repressive measures. We use a new method to construct ‘speed of reforms’ variable for transition economies for the period 1993 – 2006 to estimate its impact on all forms of human rights. Further, using the methodology of Wolf (1999) on discrete groupings of choice of reforms of transition economies, we classify the countries under radical, gradual and laggard reformer groups. We measure the impact of speed of reforms on human rights performance conditioned by choice of reforms. Our findings show that speed of reforms significantly improves government respect for all forms of human rights, while volatility in reforms is associated with human rights abuses. But the interesting finding is that, controlling for the speed of reforms attained, the choice with which the country has reformed plays pivotal role in determining human rights performance. While radical reforming countries are associated with better human rights performance, gradualists and laggards share poor human rights performance.Speed & choice of economic Reforms; Human rights; Transition economies

SOCIOECONOMIC, INSTITUTIONAL & POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES: A SUBNATIONAL STUDY OF INDIA, 1993 – 2002

We conduct an econometric analysis of socioeconomic, institutional and political factors determining government respect for human rights within India. Using time series cross-sectional data for 28 Indian states for the period 1993 – 2002, we find that internal threat poised by number of social violence events, presence of civil war and riot hit disturbed areas are strongly associated with human rights abuses. Amongst socioeconomic factors, ‘exclusive’ economic growth, ‘uneven’ development, poor social development spending, youth bulges and differential growth rates between minority religious groups explain the likelihood of human rights violations. Capturing power at the state and central level by Hindu national parties’ viz., Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Shiv Sena, further help understand the incidence of human rights violations within India.

Does Timing of Elections Instigate Riots? A Subnational Study of 16 Indian States, 1958-2004

We investigate whether timing of the elections leads to riots or not within India. In other words, does timing of elections instigate riots? The theoretical underpinning is that an incumbent government and opposition parties exercises control over their agents to instigate communal mob violence and riots during the election years. The motto behind instigating riots is that it leads to polarization of voters and thus benefits the respective constituents (incumbent government & opposition parties). Using time series crosssectional data for 16 major Indian states for the period 1958 ñ 2004, we find that scheduled elections are associated with increase in riots. Also intensity of riots, proxied by rate of growth rate of riots increases in scheduled election years. We also find that riots and intensity of riots are responsive to the propinquity to an election year. Meaning, as incumbent government nears the elections, riots and intensity of riots keeps increasing, while this is exactly opposite during the early years of incumbent government in office. These results suggest that elections generate ìriots cycleî in regionally, ethnically, culturally and socially diverse country like India.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64385/1/wp939.pd