When are multinational banks getting a bang for their buck on their subsidiaries abroad?

This paper investigates whether foreign subsidiaries outperform their parent banks in terms of profitability and what determines this outcome. Using a large sample of multinational banks and their subsidiaries in a large number of countries, this study shows that, on average, foreign subsidiaries are less profitable than their parent banks are. At the same time, however, foreign subsidiaries have higher net interest margins but also higher overhead costs relative to their parent banks. One explanation for the results is that parent banks transfer income banks using overhead costs, what may explain the existing results. Moreover, the results show that foreign subsidiaries tend to perform better than their parent banks if the latter are underperforming in the home market. Finally, the results show that the determinants of the profitability of the subsidiary in relation to its parent bank are strongly determined by the origins of the parent bank and, to a lesser extent, by the host market’s characteristics as well as the distance to the home country of the multinational bank.international banking, foreign banks, subsidiary, performance

The Economic Determinants and Engagement Models of Foreign Banks in Central Europe

In the last fifteen years foreign banks have expanded their presence significantly in almost all developing economies. The transition countries are among those economies that have experienced one of the highest levels of banking internationalization in the world. The foreign controlled banking asset in these countries ranges from 70 per cent in Poland to almost 100 per cent in Slovakia. With our study using panel data we examine the economic determinants of foreign bank engagement in the four local banking markets in Central Europe during the period 1994-2004. In addition, we study whether the economic determinants affect different entry vehicles of foreign banks into the Central European markets. Our results show that the most important factors determining foreign bank engagements were (i) large potential of the Central European banking markets and low degree of their financial sophistication (ii) the legal origin of the home country, (iii) the size of the economic growth rates differentials between host and home markets, and (iv) finally the distance between the host country and the foreign bank headquarter. We also find that most foreign banks investments occurred in the period of poor creditor rights protection. Moreover, our results present that the economic determinants had an impact on the decision of the organization form of the foreign banks entering the Central European banking markets. Our results are robust to several controls, including the lack of independence of investment decisions.international banking, foreign direct investment, foreign bank, vehicle of foreign bank entry, Central Europe

Why do Foreign Banks Withdraw from other Countries? A Panel Data Analysis

This paper describes the trends in foreign bank ownership across the world and presents, for the first time, empirical evidence of the causes of multinational banks’ exits from other countries. Using panel data for 149 closed or divested foreign bank subsidiaries across 54 countries from 1997 to 2009, we show that the problems encountered by subsidiaries were not the main cause of divestment by parent banks. Based on data for the parent banks of the closed subsidiaries, our results show that those parent banks reported significant financial weaknesses prior to closing their international operations. Therefore, we assume that a multinational bank’s decision to close or sell a subsidiary in another country is based mainly on problems in the home country, with a lesser factor being the weak performance of the foreign subsidiary.foreign banks, subsidiary, divestment, performance

Why Companies Go Private in Emerging Markets? Evidence from Poland

In recent years the number of going private transactions has sharply increased in emerging markets. The purpose of this study is to establish the financial characteristics of companies that have gone private using a dataset comprising of Polish companies. We use a probit model to distinguish the difference between firms that went private and companies that did not. We find that the probability of going private grew with a rise in the concentration of foreign ownership, an increase in the relative level of free cash flows, a decrease in the level of long term debt, and a decrease in the liquidity of share trading. The results obtained are important both for investors wishing to identify entities characterized by a high likelihood of going private and for governmental authorities evaluating the methods and rationality of privatization mature state- owned enterprises.Going Private, free cash flow, information asymmetry, ownership structure, emerging markets

Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy in Poland

This study examines the relation between corporate governance practices measured by Transparency Disclosure Index (TDI) and dividend policy in Poland. Our empirical approach, constructs measures of the quality of the corporate governance for 110 non-financial companies listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2004. We find evidence that an increase in the TDI or its subindices leads to an increase in the dividend-to-cash-flow ratio. These results support the hypothesis that companies with weak shareholder rights pay dividends less generously than do firms with high corporate governance standards. Therefore, minority shareholders often use power to extract dividends. We also find that large and more profitable companies have a higher dividend payout ratio, while riskier and more indebted firms prefer to pay lower dividends.Corporate governance, dividend policy, agency theory

The Financial System of the EU 25

We present an overview of the financial structure of the enlarged European Union with 25 countries. We start by describing the financial system development in all member states since 1995, and then compare the structure between the old and new countries. Using financial measures we document the prevailing substantial differences in the financial structure between new and old member states after the enlargement in 2004. Finally, we compare the financial structures of an enlarged EU with those of the United States and Japan.Financial System

Divestments in Banking. Preliminary Evidence on the Role of External Factors

Divestment constitutes an important method of corporate restructuring. Despite this fact, the banking literature on divestment is very limited. In this text, we try to remediate partially to the shortcomings of the existing literature by examining empirically the role of external factors. Using a large sample of 313 transactions, we have established that parent companies originate from countries with relatively high accumulated wealth, slow GDP growth, stable macroeconomic situation and dominant bank intermediation in financial system. The acquirers in turn come from poorer countries with faster economic growth and relatively more market-oriented financial systems. Those results broadly conform with the predictions of three hypotheses formulated in the text, namely the weak performance hypothesis, the corporate governance hypothesis and the rebalancing hypothesis

Law and structure of the capital markets

In this paper, we examine whether legal systems affect the structure of capital markets in terms of the development of bond markets versus equity markets. Using a dataset of 42 developed and developing countries, we document that a country's legal system, especially investor protections, determines the structure of the capital markets in a country. Our results indicate that in countries with stronger creditor rights, the bond markets are more developed than the equity markets. Alternatively, in countries with stronger shareholder rights, the equity markets are more developed than the bond markets. Additionally, we determine that the effects of financial reforms are strongly dependent on the strength of investor protections and information disclosure

Law and structure of the capital markets

In this paper, we examine whether legal systems affect the structure of capital markets in terms of the development of bond markets versus equity markets. Using a dataset of 42 developed and developing countries, we document that a country's legal system, especially investor protections, determines the structure of the capital markets in a country. Our results indicate that in countries with stronger creditor rights, the bond markets are more developed than the equity markets. Alternatively, in countries with stronger shareholder rights, the equity markets are more developed than the bond markets. Additionally, we determine that the effects of financial reforms are strongly dependent on the strength of investor protections and information disclosure