Europe 2020 Strategy, Cohesion Policy and Greek Regions: Are we “smart†enough?

Since the beginning of 2010, European Commission has launched the new strategic framework for Europe, which is now known as the “Europe 2020 Strategyâ€. This new strategy has been set as the successor of the so called “Lisbon-Gothenburg Strategy†which was set in early ’00 as the strategy for Europe in the 21st century. Actually the two strategies have a lot in common. The main driving forces of Europe still remain the same and some rearrangement in the EU-wide strategic targets has been made. Of course the economic crisis that has emerged forced for a new priority that was set in the “EU 2020†strategy, but the main targeting still encompasses the three corners of the well known sustainability triangle, namely economy, environment and society. The setting of a new strategy arises some questions. Why does Europe need a new development strategy? Was the old strategy successful or not? Was every country in Europe adapted in the old strategy properly? Where there any problems in the implementation of the old strategy? What was the overall outcome of the old strategy in EU Level, in each Member State and in the regions of Europe? Is the new strategy better adjusted to cope with the development problems in European, national and regional level? Furthermore, European Commission has already asked MS to comply with the specifications of the “Europe 2020 Strategy†in the planning and implementation of the Cohesion Policy’s programs in the following years (for the remaining of the 2007 – 2013 period and especially for the 2014-2020 period). This article discusses the above questions and tries to find answers on the rationale and prospects of the new strategy. Also, in a second step we give more emphasis in Greece and Greek Regions that have been not well adapted in the “Lisbon Strategy†as shown in the recent 5th Cohesion Report and other studies. Finally, the article closes with policy recommendations regarding the consistency and interaction between the “Europe 2020 Strategy†and Cohesion Policy, and also some policy recommendations for Greek regional policy and Greek regions.

The territorial cooperation policy of EU with third Mediterranean Countries

During the programming period 2007-2013 the Cohesion Policy of EU has adopted and implemented the policy of territorial co-operation between EU Member States but also between EU and third countries. In this framework, the EU co-finances (through the European Regional Development Fund, the pre-accession instrument and the instrument of European neighbourhood policy) a series of cross-border, interregional and transnational co-operation programmes in the Mediterranean Basin. These are programs with economic, political, social and environmental objectives. Specifically, in this area bilateral cross-border co-operation programmes among all EU Mediterranean countries, multinational interregional co-operation programmes (IPA Adriatic, MED ENPI CBC) and transnational co-operation on territorial cohesion of Macro-regions (Programme Med) are implemented. All EU Mediterranean countries and most of the countries of North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean Sea are eligible to the mentioned programmes. The aim of this study is to conduct an interim evaluation of these programs and make suggestions for the new programming period for Cohesion Policy 2014-2020. After the presentation of the theoretical foundation of territorial cooperation we describe the framework and objectives of EU policy of territorial cooperation in the Mediterranean Macro-region as well as the multilateral and transnational cross border cooperation programmes. In a further step we summarize the main achievements and failures of the territorial cooperation programmes in the Mediterranean. We conclude that there are important differences in the path of implementation of the programmes due to many factors like the experience of the partner countries in planning methods and cooperation schemes, the existence (or not) of cooperation structures and clusters, the source of funds (e.g. ERDF, IPA, ENPI, national co-financing), bureaucracy, the culture of cooperation and in some cases political disputes. The evaluation of other aspects like the organization and management of the programmes, the eligibility of expenditure and the approval process of the projects, the monitoring and implementation procedures, the thematic and geographical allocation of the approved projects, highlight many problems that should be solved in the next programming period 2014-2020, in order to improve the effectiveness of the European Territorial cooperation in the Mediterranean Basin and promote economic, social, spatial and environmental cohesion of this macro-region

The Enlargement of EU Towards Eastern, Central and South Europe and Its Impact on the Third Mediterranean Countries

The main purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the latest and forthcoming EU enlargement on the Euro-Mediterranean relations. The answer cannot be simple and it depends on many factors, primary role amongst others has the institutional evolution of EU. For example, will the existing regime of the Euro-Mediterranean relations be sustained after the enlargement? What will the EU discussions for a European Constitution conclude to? The underlying conclusion is that a prediction on the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations is not an easy task. In this direction two main questions are raised. First, if and in what context are the Third Mediterranean Countries and the CEE Countries competitive to each other, in respect to the European Market and second what are the primary dangers for the Third Mediterranean Countries after the EU enlargement. The paper deals with these questions and presents some basic findings for the above

Ordnungspolitische Defizite des GATT

Zur Überwindung der Defizite des GATT bedarf es einer konsistenten internationalen Ordnungspolitik. Sie setzt ordnungspolitische Reformen in der Binnenwirtschaftspolitik der GATT-Staaten voraus. Weitere Elemente der GATT-Reform könnten sein: Eine striktere Durchsetzung der GATTBestimmungen, z.B. durch Übernahme liberaler völkerrechtlicher Regeln in die nationalen Rechtsordnungen; die Zurückdrängung des Einflusses protektionistischer Interessengruppen; die Abschaffung der sektoralen Sonderregime und die Überarbeitung und Ausweitung der GATT-Bestimmungen. Ansätze zu einer ordnungspolitischen Reform enthält das Programm der 1986 eröffneten Uruguay-Runde des GATT. Die Erfolgsaussichten dieser Verhandlungen sind noch unbestimmt.To overcome these systemic deficits a consistent set of policy reforms should be conceived. It presupposes reforms of the internal economic policy of member states. Other measures include: a better Implementation of GATT law, e.g. by inserting liberal rules of international law into the national legal systerns; the neutralization of organized protectionist interests; the elimination of the sectoral regimes, and a revision of the GATT articles. The programme of the current Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations is an attempt to overcome the deficits of the GATT order. The outcome is yet undecided

Europe 2020 Strategy, Cohesion Policy and Greek Regions: Are we "smart" enough?

Since the beginning of 2010, European Commission has launched the new strategic framework for Europe, which is now known as the "Europe 2020 Strategy". This new strategy has been set as the successor of the so called "Lisbon-Gothenburg Strategy" which was set in early '00 as the strategy for Europe in the 21st century. Actually the two strategies have a lot in common. The main driving forces of Europe still remain the same and some rearrangement in the EU-wide strategic targets has been made. Of course the economic crisis that has emerged forced for a new priority that was set in the "EU 2020" strategy, but the main targeting still encompasses the three corners of the well known sustainability triangle, namely economy, environment and society. The setting of a new strategy arises some questions. Why does Europe need a new development strategy? Was the old strategy successful or not? Was every country in Europe adapted in the old strategy properly? Where there any problems in the implementation of the old strategy? What was the overall outcome of the old strategy in EU Level, in each Member State and in the regions of Europe? Is the new strategy better adjusted to cope with the development problems in European, national and regional level? Furthermore, European Commission has already asked MS to comply with the specifications of the "Europe 2020 Strategy" in the planning and implementation of the Cohesion Policy's programs in the following years (for the remaining of the 2007 - 2013 period and especially for the 2014-2020 period). This article discusses the above questions and tries to find answers on the rationale and prospects of the new strategy. Also, in a second step we give more emphasis in Greece and Greek Regions that have been not well adapted in the "Lisbon Strategy" as shown in the recent 5th Cohesion Report and other studies. Finally, the article closes with policy recommendations regarding the consistency and interaction between the "Europe 2020 Strategy" and Cohesion Policy, and also some policy recommendations for Greek regional policy and Greek regions

Greek economic crisis and its impact on regional development and policy

Greek economic crisis and its impact on regional development and policy In the past 3 decades the main financial support mechanism for the development of Greek Regions was the European Cohesion Policy and less national instruments as the Regional Investment Framework and public investments. Under the provisions of Cohesion Policy, a significant amount of money was given to all countries, including Greece of course, in order to accelerate the development dynamics in Europe. Moreover, this money was spent in specific interventions that were estimated to have positive influence in regional competitiveness and promote regional development. The current economic crisis that has emerged in the Greek economy has already an enormous effect on several national and regional development indicators like GDP growth, unemployment, social exclusion, industrial production, bank credits etc., and also has shrunk the available financial resources for public and private investment through the Community Structural Funds and the national regional policy funds. This is a negative perspective regarding the Greek Regions that still face many structural problems, that have been deteriorated during the current crisis. This article discusses some of the above problems, and focuses on the changes that need to be implemented in Greek Regional Policy under the current situation. Having a fiscal problem that urgently needs to be addressed, the reductions in all public spending can result in the deduction of available resources for regional policy. This will result not only in smaller effectiveness of the interventions, but also Greek Regions will not be able to comply with the requirements and the goals of the Europe 2020 Strategy. Furthermore, not all the Greek Regions have the same economic structure. So, the changes that must be applied must have a diversified character for each region. Also, the provisions for the 2014-2020 Programming Period do not take into account the crisis in the Greek Economy and estimate Greek Regions as having moved from the "Cohesion" goal (with the exemption of 3 Regions) and this implies that the allocated funds will be lesser in the next years. With all that in mind the paper concludes with some proposals for the review of the Greek Regional policy for the remaining of the 2007-2013 period and also some suggestions for the 2014-2020 period, assuming that there cannot be significant changes in the European context of the overall Cohesion Policy

The social dimension and cohesion: Complementary or contradictory?

It is again being argued that the low labour costs and social standards in countries on the periphery of the EC—Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain—jeopardise employment in the northern EC countries and the social safety net they have constructed. A common social policy harmonising employment and social standards to safeguard the social status quo is therefore being advocated. How valid is this argument? What consequences would the implementation of such a “social action programme” have for the economies on the periphery? How are the Community’s objectives with regard to cohesion and social policy to be reconciled