The shape dynamics description of gravity

Classical gravity can be described as a relational dynamical system without ever appealing to spacetime or its geometry. This description is the so-called shape dynamics description of gravity. The existence of relational first principles from which the shape dynamics description of gravity can be derived is a motivation to consider shape dynamics (rather than GR) as the fundamental description of gravity. Adopting this point of view leads to the question: What is the role of spacetime in the shape dynamics description of gravity? This question contains many aspects: Compatibility of shape dynamics with the description of gravity in terms of spacetime geometry, the role of local Minkowski space, universality of spacetime geometry and the nature of quantum particles, which can no longer be assumed to be irreducible representations of the Poincare group. In this contribution I derive effective spacetime structures by considering how matter fluctuations evolve along with shape dynamics. This evolution reveals an "experienced spacetime geometry." This leads (in an idealized approximation) to local Minkowski space and causal relations. The small scale structure of the emergent geometric picture depends on the specific probes used to experience spacetime, which limits the applicability of effective spacetime to describe shape dynamics. I conclude with discussing the nature of quantum fluctuations (particles) in shape dynamics and how local Minkowski spacetime emerges from the evolution of quantum particles.Comment: 16 pages Latex, no figures, arXiv version of a submission to the proceedings of Theory Canada

Shape Dynamics

Barbour's formulation of Mach's principle requires a theory of gravity to implement local relativity of clocks, local relativity of rods and spatial covariance. It turns out that relativity of clocks and rods are mutually exclusive. General Relativity implements local relativity of clocks and spatial covariance, but not local relativity of rods. It is the purpose of this contribution to show how Shape Dynamics, a theory that is locally equivalent to General Relativity, implements local relativity of rods and spatial covariance and how a BRST formulation, which I call Doubly General Relativity, implements all of Barbour's principles.Comment: 8 pages, LaTeX, based on a talk given at Relativity and Gravitation 100 years after Einstein in Prague, June 201

Quantum Inflation of Classical Shapes

I consider a quantum system that possesses key features of quantum shape dynamics and show that the evolution of wave-packets will become increasingly classical at late times and tend to evolve more and more like an expanding classical system. At early times however, semiclassical effects become large and lead to an exponential mismatch of the apparent scale as compared to the expected classical evolution of the scale degree of freedom. This quantum inflation of an emergent and effectively classical system, occurs naturally in the quantum shape dynamics description of the system, while it is unclear whether and how it might arise in a constrained Hamiltonian quantization.Comment: 14 pages, Late

The Economy of Happiness

Happiness in philosophical ethics and utility or satisfaction in economics have much in common. The paper investigates the ethical economy of happiness as a joint topic of ethical and economic theory. It shows that limits of the calculus of utility maximization also apply to concepts of the greatest happiness in philosophy: it is impossible to distinguish the utility or happiness maximizing life strategy. The paper discusses the problem of inter-personal comparisons of happiness and satisfaction and the relevance of the theory of material value qualities developed by Max Scheler’s non-formal, material value ethics for the theory of goods, private and public. Ethics and economics are concerned with rules and duties. It is, however, also necessary to develop a theory of goods and values. Reflections are also made on the relationship between fact and value. Since there are side-effects of facts or experiences on our values, the naturalist fallacy of deriving value statements from experience seems to be less a fallacy than is usually assumed since Hume.