A Review of State Procurement and Contracting

Are states effectively managing contracting and procurement activities? Are they striking the right balance between central administrative control and empowerment through delegation? How effective is training and monitoring? How do these practices compare to the principles of best practice? What role will information technology play in the future for procurement and contracting? As part of the Government Performance Project, budget, procurement, and contracting managers in 48 states were surveyed, providing descriptions of their procurement and contracting practices. There are numerous developments that speak to the practical details of contemporary public management. Five key findings are (1) information technology needs are challenging states, with some responding well, but others struggling, (2) in most states staff training needs to be improved, (3) restrictions prohibiting best value purchasing need to be removed, (4) states can learn from and improve practices by partnering with other governments and private organizations, and (5) most states use a hybrid of both centralized and decentralized management structures when it comes to contracting and procurement

Are City Managers Greedy Bureaucrats?

William A. Niskanen\u27s (1971, 1975) theory of bureaucracy has been a source of much debate and research.^ The theory assumes that utility-maximizing bureaucrats will seek to maximize their agency\u27s discretionary budget. A central implication of this theory is that bureaus will supply output inefficiently or in quantities greater than that desired by citizens. The authors test Niskanen\u27s hypothesis by examining the decision of cities to contract out for services. Their premise is that city managers fit the characteristics of the greedy bureaucrat Niskanen describes. If his theory is valid, then city managers should be expected to avoid contracting out because it would expose their discretionary budget and make it more difficult to use for their own purposes