Who Should Pay for Certification?

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device, seller-induced certification as a signalling device. Seller-induced certification maximizes the certifier’s profit and social welfare. This suggests the general principle that certification is, and should be induced by the better informed party. The results are reflected in a case study from the automotive industry, but apply also to other markets - in particular the financial market.asymmetric information, certification, information acquisition, inspection, lemons, middlemen, signaling

Firm dynamics in East Germany: first empirical results

In this paper, we report results of an ongoing empirical analysis of firm dynamics in East Germany. After discussing specifics of a newly available data set with information on more than 100.000 firms, we analyze patterns of business starts and failures. Furthermore, we present preliminary results on employment, revenue and labor productivity growth in East German firms. They suggest that large East German enterprises are characterized by significant labor shedding and small or no nominal revenue growth, resulting in an apparently impressive gain in labor productivity. Small firms turn out to be the carriers of employment growth. On average, they experience the highest revenue growth rates. However, the combination of revenue and employment growth yields labor productivity increases well below those of larger firms. --

Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard

We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers rated poorly prior to the change, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had the choice between exiting—a reduction in adverse selection—and improved behavior—a reduction in moral hazard—, they preferred the latter because of lower cost. Increasing market transparency improves on market outcomes

Competition and trust: Evidence from German car manufacturers

We explore the determinants and effects of trust relationships between upstream suppliers and downstream producers. Using unique survey data on individual supplier-buyer relationships in the German automotive industry, we show, by means of different measures of supplier-buyer trust, that higher levels of trust mitigate relationship-specific underinvestment in a classical hold-up situation. Moreover, contrary to the extant literature, we show that higher levels of supplier's trust are reflected in the buyer's choice of a more competitive procurement strategy among potential suppliers. --trust,hold-up problem,competition,specific investment,suppliers,car manufacturers,German automotive industry

Labor Pooling in R&D Intensive Industries

We investigate firms’ incentives to locate in the same region to gain access to a large pool of skilled labor. Firms engage in risky R&D activities and thus create stochastic product and implied labor demand. Agglomeration in a cluster is more likely in situations where the innovation step is large and the probability for a firm to be the only innovator is high. When firms cluster, they tend to invest more and take more risk in R&D compared to spatially dispersed firms. Agglomeration is welfare maximizing, because expected labor productivity is higher and firms choose a more effcient, technically diversified portfolio of R&D projects at the industry level.

Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

We explore the determinants and effects of trust relationships between upstream suppliers and downstream producers. Using unique survey data on individual supplier-buyer relationships in the German automotive industry, we show, by means of different measures of supplier-buyer trust, that higher levels of trust mitigate relationship-specific underinvestment in a classical hold-up situation. Moreover, contrary to the extant literature, we show that higher levels of supplier’s trust are reflected in the buyer’s choice of a more competitive procurement strategy among potential supplierstrust, hold-up problem, competition, specific investment, suppliers, car manufacturers, German automotive industry

Growth and exit of West German firms: an empirical investigation on the impact of liability statutes

In this paper we discuss determinants of firm survival and growth in Germany within its pre-1989 boundaries. We develop our central hypotheses on the basis of a simple theoretical model describing the self-selection of heterogeneous entrepreneurs into particular legal forms, and the implications for profitability and survival. We also describe institutional details of liability regulation and taxation rules which German entrepreneurs face when choosing a particular legal form for their firms. We then test the predictions of our model by considering the survival chances and employment growth rates of various types of enterprises in a sample of approximately 11000 West German firms in all major sectors of the German economy. in our analysis of firm survival we distinguish between voluntary liquidation without losses to creditors, and bankruptcy as forced liquidation. Firms under limited liability are characterized by higher growth and higher insolvency rates than comparable firm under full liability. We also confirm the previously found negative relationship between employment growth and firm size which persists after controlling for selection biases. The likelihood of insolvencies is a nonmonotonic function of firm size. --

Competition and Trust: Evidence from German Car Manufacturers

We explore the determinants and effects of trust relationships between upstream suppliers and downstream producers. Using unique survey data on individual supplier-buyer relationships in the German automotive industry, we show, by means of different measures of supplier-buyertrust, tha thigher levels of trust mitigate relationship-specific underinvestment in a classical hold-up situation. Moreover, contrary to the extant literature, we show that higher levels of supplier’s trust are reflected in the buyer’s choice of a more competitive procurement strategy among potential suppliers.Trust; Hold-up problem; Competition; Speci?c investment; Suppliers; Car manufacturers; German automotive industry

Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry

We study a differentiated product market in which an investor initially owns a controlling stake in one of two competing firms and may acquire a non-controlling or a controlling stake in a competitor, either directly using her own assets, or indirectly via the controlled firm. While industry profits are maximized within a symmetric two product monopoly, the investor attains this only in exceptional cases. Instead, she sometimes acquires a noncontrolling stake. Or she invests asymmetrically rather than pursuing a full takeover if she acquires a controlling one. Generally, she invests indirectly if she only wants to affect the product market outcome, and directly if acquiring shares is profitable per se.Differentiated products; separation of ownership and control; private benefits of control