ラオス「中立化」の崩壊と第二次インドシナ戦争 : 1962年以後のアメリカの対ラオス政策

This study examines U.S. policy toward Laos from the Geneva Conference of 1962 through the beginning of U.S. military intervention in Laos in 1964. The agreement in Geneva ended the civil war and achieved the neutralization of Laos under the interim government of national union headed by Souvanna Phouma. It also stipulated the withdrawal of foreign military personnel from Laos. But the agreement left intact the administrative and military divisions of Laos among the competing forces of the rightist Phoumi, the neutralist Kong Le/Souvanna and the leftist Pathet Lao (PL) groups.The expected political and military integration of these groups soon bogged down after the assassination of Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena in April 1963 and the evacuation of the two PL cabinet members from Vientiane. By the end of 1963, civil war seemed to have resumed in Laos.The U.S. supported the rightist group against the neutralist/PL coalition during the civil war. But it started non-military assistance to the neutralist group by the end of 1962 to lure them into rightist/neutralist cooperation against the PL. After the political crisis in April 1963, the U.S. reexamined its policy under the neutralization scheme and adopted various military measures to aid the rightist/neutralist groups in their renewed fighting against the PL.After the unexpected but failed coup against the Souvanna government led by some military leaders in April 1964, the fighting between Kong Le’s force and the PL force intensified in the critical province of Xieng Khouang. The U.S. increased its military assistance to the rightist and neutralist forces. In May, it started reconnaissance flights over Laos, using U.S. military jet aircraft stationed in South Vietnam and Thailand. However, two U.S. reconnaissance and fighter jets were shot down by the PL in early June.June 9, 1964, became the most symbolic day in U.S. military involvement in the Second Indochina War. On this day, the U.S. jet fighters executed “retaliatory strikes” against the PL’s anti-aircraft sites as well as its headquarters in Khang Khay. This occurred two months before the U.S. carried out retaliatory strikes against targets in North Vietnam after the Tonkin Gulf crisis in August 1964. The wars in Laos and Vietnam increasingly became closely intertwined and the U.S. military continued what they called “reconnaissance strike” missions in Laos in the latter half of 1964.In mid-December 1964, the U.S. started “Operation Barrel Roll” ― the code name given to the continuous U.S. “armed reconnaissance and air strike” missions over the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. This was three months before “Operation Rolling Thunder” against North Vietnam began in March 1965.Most past studies on the “Vietnam War” don’t mention that the air war in Laos preceded the air war in Vietnam. The beginning of U.S. military intervention in Laos in 1964 was not totally secret at the time, but it is still mostly unknown in general, despite the fact that most of its details were disclosed by the early 1970s. We have yet to reexamine the “Vietnam War” in the larger framework of the Second Indochina War

ラオス内戦とアメリカ (1)

This study looks at U.S. policy toward Laos after the elections in May, 1958, through the outbreak of the civil war in August, 1960, and examines how U.S. involvement in Lao politics contributed to the deteriorating situation in Laos. This paper constitutes the first part of the study and examines the period through early 1959.The supplementary elections held in May, 1958, were a turning point in nation building in Laos after the Geneva Conference of 1954. The Geneva agreement stipulated the holding of general elections for national integration in Laos. The Royal Government of Laos (RGL) held the elections in December, 1955, but the leftist Pathet Lao (PL) boycotted them and the elections were not held in the two PL-controlled provinces. But, after two years of negotiations, the RGL and the PL agreed on the creation of a coalition government in late 1957. They also agreed to hold supplementary elections in the two provinces in May, 1958.The outcome of the May elections came as a great shock to the RGL and the U.S. leaders. The Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX), the PL\u27s political arm, and the neutralist Santiphab won nearly two-thirds of the national seats contested. The election result prompted the U.S. to exert strong pressure on the Lao conservatives or "old" politicians to form a single conservative party in preparation for the next general elections. The conservative parties merged to form the RPL (Rassemblement du Peuple Laotien) in June. At the same time, U.S. policymakers realized the need for an "intensive search" for "new faces" in Lao politics. Young conservative leaders from the business community, government and the military formed the CDNI (the Committee for the Defense of National Interests) two days after the formation of the RPL. It is not known to what extent U.S. officials were directly involved in its formation, but the CDNI thereafter gained strong support from the U.S.The election result prompted another shift in U.S. policy. U.S. policymakers increasingly saw the importance of the Lao military as "an active political force" in Laos. Some top military leaders were CDNI members and U.S. officials maintained close contact with them.The formation of Phoui Sananikone\u27s cabinet with CDNI members as well as "old" politicians from the RPL after the May elections ushered in another phase in post-Geneva Laos. With strong pressure from the U.S., the Lao leaders excluded the NLHX from the government. Prime Minister Phoui adopted the monetary reform that the U.S. had strongly demanded to correct the abuse of U.S. aid money caused by the unofficial dollar-kip exchange rate. Phoui also changed the "neutralist" foreign policy and introduced a more western-oriented policy by establishing formal consulate relations with South Vietnam and Taiwan.In January, 1959, Phoui requested and was granted 12-month special powers by the National Assembly. This was partly prompted by the border incident with North Vietnam in late December, but there were talks of a coup and Phoui\u27s action may have been taken against such a contingency or under pressure from the more conservative, anti-communist CDNI/military.Gaining special powers did not mean that Phoui consolidated his power in the government. The monetary reform which was detrimental to the interests of his conservative allies and the RPL-CDNI rivalry undermined his influence over Lao politics. Phoui had no choice but to include more CDNI members, including three military leaders, in his new cabinet formed in late January.The U.S. strongly supported Phoui, the RPL and the CDNI/military all along in this shift to the right in Lao politics. In addition, the U.S. expanded its military presence in Laos by increasing ten-fold the number of plain-clothes military advisors for the training of the Lao military. But the widening split among the Lao politicians and the increasing influence of the CDNI/military would plague U.S. policymaking for Laos in later years.The year 1958 was a turning point in both postwar Lao politics and U.S. involvement in Laos. The collapse of the coalition government, the exclusion of the NLHX and the further leaning to the right of the Lao conservatives along with the beginning of the Lao military\u27s involvement in politics paved the way for a later confrontation between the RGL and the PL. The U.S. became further involved in Lao politics, but U.S. support of the conflicting conservative forces in Laos and more emphasis on the role of the military prepared for a quagmire in Laos

ラオス内戦とアメリカ (2)

This study looks at U.S. policy toward Laos after the elections in May, 1958, through the outbreak of the civil war in August, 1960, and examines how U.S. involvement in Lao politics contributed to the deteriorating situation in Laos. This paper constitutes the second part of the study and examines the period from May, 1959, through June, 1960.After the elections in May, 1958, the U.S. government shifted its policy toward supporting a larger role for the military in Lao politics. The leaders of the leftist Pathet Lao (PL) political party were excluded from Phoui Sananikone\u27s cabinet after the elections. In May, 1959, the scheduled integration of the PL force into the royal army, which the Geneva agreement of 1954 had stipulated, failed, and one of the two remaining PL battalions escaped into the jungle. In July, a military clash between the PL force and the royal army occurred, which finally ended the hope for the peaceful integration of Laos.The Royal Lao Government (RLG) accused the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) of sending its army units into Laos to aid the PL force in their fight with the royal army. The RLG brought the matter to the United Nations in August. The U.S. government knew that there was little evidence for the presence of DRV army units in Laos, but did not challenge the RLG\u27s claim. In response to the RLG\u27s request, the U.N. Security Council decided to send a fact-finding subcommittee to Laos. However, the subcommittee\u27s report in November did not prove the presence of DRV units in Laos.The military clash with the PL force alarmed U.S. policymakers. They were particularly disturbed by the inability of the royal army to suppress the relatively small PL force. This prompted the U.S. to decide to increase both the royal army force and the auto-defense force by 4,000. The U.S. also sent about 100 U.S. military training personnel to Laos beginning in July.The inability of Phoui\u27s government in the face of the PL attacks also reignited the political struggle among Lao political leaders. Phoui and his party of traditional conservative politicians were challenged by the Committee for the Defense of National Interest (CDNI). The CDNI originally consisted of younger political and military leaders, but it became increasingly controlled by the army. In December, the army units led by Lieutenant General Phoumi Nosavan staged a bloodless military coup against Phoui\u27s government. U.S. policymakers were given the information of the impending coup beforehand, but it decided to "stand discreetly aloof and let nature take ［its］ course".Despite its acquiescence to a military coup, the U.S. exerted strong pressure on Phoumi and other army leaders to organize a provisional cabinet headed by a civilian leader. A civilian-headed cabinet with army generals was formed, but it was quite apparent where the powe rlay. The provisional government held general elections in May, 1960. Despite the fact that only a few PL candidates could participate in them, the government changed the election rules in favor of the conservatives and the army used strong-arm tactics and intimidation and even rigged elections.The results were so lopsided that even U.S. officials, as well as other western officials and observers, frowned on the behavior of the CDNI/military leaders. Again, the U.S. exerted strong pressure on them to prevent the emergence of a government headed by Phoumi. Phoumi grudgingly gave up the post of prime minister, and another civilian-headed government was formed. However, despite its fluctuating policy toward Laos, the fact remained that the U.S. permitted a military coup and consistently supported the army and the successive army-cntrolled governments. As a result, the influence of civilian leaders in Lao politics was substantially reduced, with ominous implications for future U.S. involvement in Laos

ラオス内戦とアメリカ (3)

This study looks at U.S. policy toward Laos from after the elections in May, 1958 through the outbreak of the civil war in 1960, and examines how U.S. involvement in Lao politics contributed to the deteriorating situation in Laos. This paper constitutes the third and final part of the study and examines the period from July, 1960 through December, 1960.On August 9, 1960, the Second Paratroop Battalion of the Royal Lao Army, led by a young officer named Kong Le, staged a successful coup in Vientiane. The conservative Somsanith government resigned, and Kong Le asked Souvanna Phouma, a former neutralist prime minister, to form a new government. The parliament and the king eventually supported the formation of the Souvanna government.Kong Le\u27s coup was a challenge to the power of General Phoumi Nosavan, the unpopular defense minister, and his anti-communist group, who controlled the government and the military in Laos. Kong Le made a harsh criticism of the corruption of government officials and top military leaders and the intervention in Lao politics by the U.S. Phoumi and his group had enjoyed strong support from the U.S. since the elections in 1958. Kong Le also promised to pursue a policy of neutrality for Laos.Phoumi refused to cooperate with Souvanna and Kong Le and moved to his hometown, Savannakhet, in southern Laos. In early September, he started an open rebellion against the Souvanna government with the support of some of the royal army troops.The U.S. policy after Kong Le\u27s coup vacillated between working with and working against the Souvanna government. But one important aspect of its policy never changed－whatever happened, the U.S. supported Phoumi and gave overt and covert military aid to his troops. As soon as Kong Le took over Vientiane, the U.S. started providing arms, money and food to Phoumi\u27s troops, essentially working against the Souvanna government.However, aiding rebels against the formally installed government presented a serious dilemma for U.S. policy. A war between the royal army troops seemed only to help increase the influence of the leftist Pathet Lao (PL) in Laos. There was no Lao politician other than Souvanna who could bridge the gap between the neutralist and the conservative forces against the PL. These considerations prompted the U.S. government to put pressure on both Souvanna and Phoumi to come to terms. Partly because of "a great deal of pressure" by the U.S., a cease-fire was agreed in late September, but there was little progress in reaching a political settlement between the Souvanna government and the Phoumi group. The U.S. tried to persuade Phoumi to join the Souvanna government, but Phoumi refused and insisted on proceeding with his "original plan" to retake Vientiane by force. The U.S. opposed his plan and tried to "work through and with Souvanna Phouma as the legal facade of legitimate government." But Souvanna pursued his own policy of reaching an agreement on a government of national union with the PL and opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.Souvanna opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in early October, and Soviet airplanes carrying military and non-military materials began arriving in Vientiane by the end of the month. At the end of October, Souvanna also announced that his government had reached an agreement on national union with the PL. These actions were taken by Souvanna despite the temporary suspension of U.S. aid and the sending of Washington\u27s special mission to Vientiane to persuade Souvanna. This new development prompted the policymakers in Washington to reach the conclusion that "Souvanna\u27s usefulness in achieving [the] essential U.S. objectives is about at an end."By the end of November, the U.S. withdrew its opposition to Phoumi\u27s military plan to invade Vientiane by taking "the wraps off Phoumi" and providing his troops with heavy artillery and increased military aid. A full-fledged civil war started in Laos. Phoumi\u27s troops successfully took control of Vientiane by December 16. In fact, his military plan for retaking Vientiane was not his own. U.S. military advisors provided the original plan. And they advised and acted together with Phoumi\u27s troops in the invasion of Vientiane.The picture of the conflict in Laos greatly changed. The U.S. policy toward Laos after the August coup contributed to the division of the country and invited the Soviet Union\u27s first military commitment in Laos. The PL increased its control in many parts of Laos during the fiasco after August. The U.S. sided with the rebel force which had little support in and outside Laos. Still, at a White House meeting on December 31, outgoing President Dwight D. Eisenhower emphasized that "we must not allow Laos to fall to the Communists, even if it involves war in which the U.S. acts with allies or unilaterally." But the U.S. was betting on Phoumi and his force despite its successive policy failures in Laos and without much prospect for success

ラオス紛争とアメリカ :「ベトナム戦争」前史としてのラオス紛争

This paper is the final part of the author’s study on U.S. involvement in Laos from the end of World War II through the middle of the 1960s. It reviews U.S. policy toward Laos during this period and examines the numerous setbacks and failures that the U.S. had experienced in executing its policy in Laos.U.S. policy toward Laos was characterized by the following features: overemphasis on internal security with abundant military assistance to Laos, lop-sided reliance on the Lao military in influencing the conflict with the communist and neutralist forces and, subsequently, disregard for the democratic process in Laos. The U.S. freely intervened in the internal affairs of Laos, and supported military coups against the civilian government and the rightist military faction in the Laotian civil war. However, the U.S. never succeeded in maintaining the anti-communist conservative government it favored in Laos.The U.S. experienced its successive failures in Laos before its military involvement in Vietnam bogged down in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. The U.S. withdrew its military personnel from Laos when an international agreement on the “neutralization” of Laos was achieved in Geneva in 1962. However, the U.S. began its air war against the communist Pathet Lao force and the Ho Chi Minh Trail within Laos in the middle of 1964 before it started its extensive bombing campaign in Vietnam in 1965. The U.S. involvement in Laos followed the path of an “intervention, failure and withdrawal” pattern, which was to be repeated tragically in Vietnam. The U.S. involvement in Laos could be regarded as a prelude to its involvement in Vietnam

1954年ジュネーブ会議とアメリカの対ラオス政策

This paper looks into U.S. policy toward Indochina before and during the Geneva Conference of 1954, with particular attention to Laos, and examines why U.S. policymakers began to attach such disproportionate importance to this small country in the late 1950s. After the Vietminh invasion of Laos in early 1953, the stepped-up French military effort under the Navarre plan and its failure, U.S. policymakers began to realize the need for a more direct U.S. role in advising and strengthening the indigenous armies and meeting local internal security needs in combating the Vietminh force in Indochina. Controversies also arose over whether or not the U.S. should commit its military force there to help the French war effort against the Vietminh. Secretary of State Dulles\u27 call for "united action" in March 1954 was generally considered to be a request for the U.S. allies to join in joint military action in Indochina. The idea of "united action" had two objectives. One was to call for immediate military intervention by the allies to meet the worsening situation after the siege of Dien Bien Phu. The effort in this respect failed mainly because the British refused to join in any military adventure before the Geneva Conference. The other was the longterm objective of establishing a collective defense structure for Southeast Asia. The British government was not opposed to this idea and agreed with the U.S. to start joint planning for the establishment of SEATO. The Geneva Conference for Indochina began in May 1954. Laos and Cambodia became a controversial and dominant issue as soon as it started. The U.S. and its allies demanded the separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia from that of Vietnam and for the withdrawal of the Vietminh force from the two countries. The communist side opposed and demanded that Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam should be treated in one package and in the same manner, with the leftist fighting groups in Laos and Cambodia given the same status as the Vietminh. A compromise was eventually achievedVietnam was temporarily divided into the north and the south while Laos and Cambodia retained their integrity with the promise of the Vietminh withdrawal. But the two northern provinces in Laos were designated as "regroupment zones" for the leftist Pathet Lao. In Geneva, the Eisenhower administration refused to negotiate with China and the Vietminh, kept its distance from the substantive discussions and did not join in the final declaration of the conference. This does not necessarily mean that U.S. policymakers were totally dissatisfied with its outcome. They may have given up working at the international level, but continued and stepped up their effort at the regional and local levels. At the regional level, during and after the Geneva Conference, U.S. policymakers prepared a draft treaty for Southeast Asian collective defense with their British counterparts. The discussion was widened to include other countries and the Manila treaty was concluded in September 1954. The treaty declared that its members would cooperate against "subversive activities directed from without" as well as against aggression by armed attack. It also had a clause for the "treaty area" that designated Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam as an area of defense for SEATO. At the same time, U.S. policymakers were careful not to make SEATO a NATO-type organization which could have automatically committed the U.S. to the military defense of Southeast Asia where it had little control at the time. This was generally considered a weakness of SEATO. However, part of the importance of SEATO lay in the fact that, because of this weakness, U.S. policymakers began to regard their commitment more in terms of local defense and internal security. It is also important that the Eisenhower and successive administrations used SEATO as a justification for U.S. military intervention in Indochina. At the local level, the final declaration of the Geneva Conference and the agreement on cessation of hostilities in Laos allowed the U.S. to expand its effort for local defense and internal security, which was under consideration before the Geneva Conference. They prohibited foreign troops and bases in Laos, but some clauses could be interpreted not to totally prohibit Laos from seeking military assistance from other countries for its own defense. All these factors contributed to the belief that Laos was a test case for the new U.S. policy after Geneva. Unlike Vietnam, Laos was not divided and the legitimacy of its royal government was not questioned in Geneva. U.S. aid to Laos came to be regarded as even more significant in strengthening and defending the internationally recognized state from internal subversion and aggression from outside

Structural dynamics of cereal mitochondrial genomes as revealed by complete nucleotide sequencing of the wheat mitochondrial genome

The application of a new gene-based strategy for sequencing the wheat mitochondrial genome shows its structure to be a 452 528 bp circular molecule, and provides nucleotide-level evidence of intra-molecular recombination. Single, reciprocal and double recombinant products, and the nucleotide sequences of the repeats that mediate their formation have been identified. The genome has 55 genes with exons, including 35 protein-coding, 3 rRNA and 17 tRNA genes. Nucleotide sequences of seven wheat genes have been determined here for the first time. Nine genes have an exon–intron structure. Gene amplification responsible for the production of multicopy mitochondrial genes, in general, is species-specific, suggesting the recent origin of these genes. About 16, 17, 15, 3.0 and 0.2% of wheat mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) may be of genic (including introns), open reading frame, repetitive sequence, chloroplast and retro-element origin, respectively. The gene order of the wheat mitochondrial gene map shows little synteny to the rice and maize maps, indicative that thorough gene shuffling occurred during speciation. Almost all unique mtDNA sequences of wheat, as compared with rice and maize mtDNAs, are redundant DNA. Features of the gene-based strategy are discussed, and a mechanistic model of mitochondrial gene amplification is proposed

1954年ジュネーブ会議後のアメリカの対ラオス援助体制の構築

The United States embarked on a course of providing direct military assistance to Laos after the Geneva Conference of 1954. This paper examines how U.S. policy toward Laos developed during the first year after the conference. The Geneva agreement on Laos stipulated that the communist Pathet Lao（PL）regroup in the two northern provinces and that general elections be held for its integration into the kingdom in 1955. As soon as the conference ended in July 1954, the Eisenhower administration decided to divert the remaining U.S. aid to the French force in Indochina to the "free states" of Indochina. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff（JCS）and the Defense Department were reluctant to recommend a force level for the Lao army and the total amount of military aid to Laos. This was partly because no foreign troops were allowed in Laos under the Geneva agreement, which meant that the U.S. could not send a Military Assistance Advisory Group（MAAG）to Laos to monitor and control the execution of its military aid.However, the reluctance of the JCS/Defense turned out to be rather symbolic. The provision of direct aid to Laos was already a top-level National Security Council（NSC）decision in July and NSC 5429/5 of December declared that the U.S. should "make every effort... to defeat Communist subversion and influence, to maintain and support friendly non-Communist governments" in Laos as well as in Cambodia and South Vietnam. By the end of December, the Eisenhower administration started providing the Royal Lao Government（RLG）with "cash grants" for the maintenance of its army. This was done even before the administration made a final decision on the amount of U.S. aid to Laos for 1955. The JCS/Defense did not object to providing these "cash grants" for Laos.Moreover, when the JCS finally made its recommendation on the Lao army force level for "political considerations" in late January 1955, it proposed sending Vientiane a group of "civilians with military experience" to administer U.S. aid to Laos. This led to the establishment of the Programs Evaluation Office（PEO）in Vientiane by the end of the year, which eventually functioned as a MAAG in Laos.All through this period, U.S. officials exerted strong pressure on RLG leaders not to make unnecessary concessions in their negotiations with the PL for the upcoming elections. U.S. officials felt that some Lao leaders were naive in believing the widelyshared view among the Lao that Souphanouvong, the top PL leader, and other PL members were not really communist. Whenever they heard of news about the possible inclusion of PL leaders in a united government, they opposed it and even hinted at the suspension of U.S. aid. The negotiations between the RLG and the PL eventually collapsed and the elections were not held in the PL-controlled provinces in 1955.In and after 1955, U.S. aid came to cover most of the military expenditures of the RLG. But American assistance was not limited just to keeping a strong Lao regular army in place. As NSC 5429/5 emphasized, the U.S. also sought to strengthen the internal security capabilities of Laos "to defeat Communist subversion and influence." To achieve this purpose, U.S. military aid to Laos was coupled with other U.S. efforts during 1955.First, U.S. officials in Vientiane proposed the prompt creation of an "effective police-gendarmerie force" in Laos. By the end of 1955, the police-gendarmerie force numbered about 1,000, and the U.S.-sponsored para-military training of Lao officers was also under way in Thailand. The force was expected to increase to 4,000 over the next two years.Another U.S. program was the creation of an "auto-defense" force. It was covertly funded by the U.S. and was begun approximately in June 1955. The Lao army helped its agents and certain hill tribes to organize para-military resistance forces in the PLcontrolled areas. The "auto-defense" force numbered over 10,000 by the end of 1957 and became the major anti-guerrilla unit against the PL.In 1955, the U.S. also proposed the military training of Lao army officers in Thailand. It was believed to have started in 1956. The Lao military training was also done in the U.S. in later years. At the same time, the U.S. encouraged Thai-Lao military planning, helped Laos to receive helicopters from Thailand and contributed to creating an air force in Laos.All in all, U.S. decision-making regarding assistance to Laos after Geneva was a more systematic and organized process than the past studies on Laos often suggest, which tend to emphasize policy differences and the haphazard way of decision-making within the Eisenhower administration. However, this does not mean that U.S. policy toward Laos during this period was "rational." The simplistic and dichotomous approach of U.S. policymakers toward the political settlement in Laos, which rejected negotiations with the PL, coupled with U.S. military and para-military assistance, which laid too much emphasis on internal security, sowed the seeds of problems the U.S. would face in later years