Finsler geometry modeling of phase separation in multi-component membranes

Finsler geometric surface model is studied as a coarse-grained model for membranes of three-component such as DOPC, DPPC and Cholesterol. To understand the phase separation of liquid ordered (DPPC rich) $L_o$ and the liquid disordered (DOPC rich) $L_d$, we introduce a variable $\sigma (\in \{1,-1\})$ in the triangulated surface model. We numerically find that there appear two circulars and stripe domains on the surface and that these two morphologies are separated by a phase transition. The morphological change from the one to the other with respect to the variation of the area fraction of $L_o$ is consistent with existing experimental results. This gives us a clear understanding of the origin of the line tension energy, which has been used to understand those morphological changes in the three-component membranes. In addition to these two circulars and stripe domains, raft-like domain and budding domain are also observed, and the corresponding several phase diagrams are obtained. Technical details of the Finsler geometry modeling are also shown.Comment: 18 pages, 11 figure

"The Impacts of "Shock Therapy" on Large and Small Clients:Experiences from Two Large Bank Failures in Japan"

A "shock therapy" might have different impacts between large and small firms. In this paper, we focus on the clients of two large failed Japanese banks - the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) and the Nippon Credit Bank (NCB). We first show that subsequent events after the bank failures allowed the new LTCB to adopt a "shock therapy" but kept the new NCB to face "soft budget constraints". We then show that the different therapies made performances of these two banks' customers very different. Under the shock therapy, large firms showed significant recovery of their profits but small firms did not. In contrast, under the soft budget constraints, large firms did not show recovery and small firms experienced significant decline in their profits when the new bank terminated the banking relationship.

The Impacts of "Shock Therapy" on Large and Small Clients:Experiences from Two Large Bank Failures in Japan (Forthcoming in "Pacific-Basin Finance Journal". )

A "shock therapy" might have different impacts between large and small firms. In this paper, we focus on the clients of two large failed Japanese banks - the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) and the Nippon Credit Bank (NCB). We first show that subsequent events after the bank failures allowed the new LTCB to adopt a "shock therapy" but kept the new NCB to face "soft budget constraints". We then show that the different therapies made performances of these two banks' customers very different. Under the shock therapy, large firms showed significant recovery of their profits but small firms did not. In contrast, under the soft budget constraints, large firms did not show recovery and small firms experienced significant decline in their profits when the new bank terminated the banking relationship.

"The Impacts of "Shock Therapy" under a Banking Crisis : Experiences from Three Large Bank Failures in Japan"

A bank failure can have various adverse consequences for the clients. The adverse impacts might, however, differ depending on who takes over the operation of the failed banks. In this paper, we show that how to manage the new banks is important in mitigating the short-run and long-run consequences of bank failures. In the analysis, we focus on clients of three large failed Japanese banks - Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB), and the Nippon Credit Bank. We examine when the number of bankruptcies increased and how the market valuation changed for the client firms after the banks' operations were taken over by new banks. As for the clients of LTCB, there were dramatic increases of bankruptcies in the short-run but the surviving clients showed significant recovery of their stock prices. In contrast, as for the clients of the other two banks, there was neither dramatic increase of bankruptcies nor significant recovery of their stock prices. The result implies that "shock therapy" or "soft budget constraints" had dramatically different consequences in solving bad loan problems in Japan.

The Impacts of "Shock Therapy" on Large and Small Clients: Experiences from Two Large Bank Failures in Japan

A "shock therapy" might have different impacts between large and small firms. In this paper, we focus on the clients of two large failed Japanese banks - the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB) and the Nippon Credit Bank (NCB). We first show that subsequent events after the bank failures allowed the new LTCB to adopt a "shock therapy" but kept the new NCB to face "soft budget constraints". We then show that the different therapies made performances of these two banks' customers very different. Under the shock therapy, large firms showed significant recovery of their profits but small firms did not. In contrast, under the soft budget constraints, large firms did not show recovery and small firms experienced significant decline in their profits when the new bank terminated the banking relationship.bank failure, shock therapy, soft budget constraints, banking relationship

The Impacts of "Shock Therapy" under a Banking Crisis: Experiences from Three Large Bank Failures in Japan (Subsequently published in "Japanese Economic Review" Vol. 57, No. 2 (Jan. 2006), pp.232-246. )

A bank failure can have various adverse consequences for the clients. The adverse impacts might, however, differ depending on who takes over the operation of the failed banks. In this paper, we show that how to manage the new banks is important in mitigating the short-run and long-run consequences of bank failures. In the analysis, we focus on clients of three large failed Japanese banks - Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the Long-term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB), and the Nippon Credit Bank. We examine when the number of bankruptcies increased and how the market valuation changed for the client firms after the banks' operations were taken over by new banks. As for the clients of LTCB, there were dramatic increases of bankruptcies in the short-run but the surviving clients showed significant recovery of their stock prices. In contrast, as for the clients of the other two banks, there was neither dramatic increase of bankruptcies nor significant recovery of their stock prices. The result implies that "shock therapy" or "soft budget constraints" had dramatically different consequences in solving bad loan problems in Japan.

Bad Loans and Loan Write-Offs

In this paper, we investigate who bears the burden when writing off bad loans in Japan. Traditionally, Japanese main banks bore large burdens in saving their customers. We still find that some main banks bear a large burden in saving their customers. However, in most cases, main banks became very reluctant to bear large burdens when bailing out their customers. In the transition from the bank-based system to a market-based system, traditional implicit rules are collapsing dramatically. We suggest that companies supported by Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan may provide a new scheme for who bears the burden when writing off loans in Japan.

Changes in Corporate Restructuring Processes in Japan, 1981-2007

We analyze a large database collected from newspaper articles that report on major episodes of corporate restructuring in Japan between 1981 and 2007. By linking this database with financial data on public firms, we identify changes in the likelihood that a distressed undergoes restructuring, as well as in some measures adopted during restructuring. We find that the way distressed Japanese firms are restructured has changed during this period. The likelihood that a large distressed firm with high levels of debt undergoes restructuring has declined. Those firms that undergo restructuring continue to adopt more aggressive measures in terms of layoffs and cutbacks than other distressed firms, suggesting that "restructuring", when it happens, involves real adjustments. Banks continue to be important for firms with a clearly identified main bank, and the main bank is more likely to push for more drastic reductions in debt and bank loans than other entities leading a restructuring event

"Bad Loans and Loan Write-Offs"(in Japanese)

In this paper, we investigate who bears the burden when writing off bad loans in Japan. Traditionally, Japanese main banks bore large burdens in saving their customers. We still find that some main banks bear a large burden in saving their customers. However, in most cases, main banks became very reluctant to bear large burdens when bailing out their customers. In the transition from the bank-based system to a market-based system, traditional implicit rules are collapsing dramatically. We suggest that companies supported by Industrial Revitalization Corporation of Japan may provide a new scheme for who bears the burden when writing off loans in Japan.