Private Selection and Arbitration Neutrality

This paper examines the effects that the private selection of arbitrators have over arbitrators' incentives in deciding the cases before them over the arbitrators' implied bias. These effects have important implications for the design of Arbitration rules by Arbitration and Dispute Resolution providers as well as by other organizations that rely on arbitration for the resolution of disputes among their members. We show that private selection of arbitrators might adversely affect the accuracy of arbitrators' decisions because arbitrators might want to make an incorrect decision when a correct decision would carry the inference that they are biased. We compare the accuracy of arbitrators' decisions under different arbitrator selection procedures

Private Selection and Arbitration Neutrality

This seminar examines the effects that the private selection of arbitrators has over arbitrators' incentives in deciding the cases before them and over the arbitrators' implied bias. These effects have important implications for the design of Arbitration rules by Arbitration and Dispute Resolution providers as well as by other organisations that rely on arbitration for the resolution of disputes among their members. Professor Klement shows that private selection of arbitrators might adversely affect the accuracy of arbitrators' decisions because arbitrators might want to make a incorrect decision when a correct decision would carry the inference that they are biased. He compares the accuracy of arbitrators' decisions under different arbitrator selection procedures

Private Selection and Arbitration Neutrality

This seminar examines the effects that the private selection of arbitrators has over arbitrators' incentives in deciding the cases before them and over the arbitrators' implied bias. These effects have important implications for the design of Arbitration rules by Arbitration and Dispute Resolution providers as well as by other organisations that rely on arbitration for the resolution of disputes among their members. Professor Klement shows that private selection of arbitrators might adversely affect the accuracy of arbitrators' decisions because arbitrators might want to make a incorrect decision when a correct decision would carry the inference that they are biased. He compares the accuracy of arbitrators' decisions under different arbitrator selection procedures

Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach

We seek to contribute to an understanding of how judicial elections affect the incentives and decisions of judges. We develop a theoretical model suggesting that judges who are concerned about their reputation would tend to "decide against their prior" as they approach elections. That is, judges who imposed a large number of severe sentences in the past, and are thus perceived to be strict, would tend to impose less severe sentences prior to elections, and judges who imposed a large number of light sentences in the past, and are perceived to be lenient, would tend to impose more severe sentences prior to elections. Using data from the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing (PCS), we test, and find evidence consistent with, the predictions of our model

Canine leishmaniosis and its relationship to human visceral leishmaniasis in Eastern Uzbekistan

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The Namangan Region in the Pap District, located in Eastern Uzbekistan is the main focus of visceral leishmaniasis (VL) in Uzbekistan. In total, 28 cases of human VL were registered during 2006-2008 in this region. A study on the epidemiology of VL in this area was carried out in 2007-2008 in the villages of Chodak, Oltinkan, Gulistan and Chorkesar located at elevations of 900-1200 above sea level.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>A total of 162 dogs were tested for <it>Leishmania </it>infection. Blood was drawn for serology and PCR. When clinical signs of the disease were present, aspirates from lymph nodes and the spleen were taken. Forty-two dogs (25.9%) had clinical signs suggestive of VL and 51 (31.5%) were sero-positive. ITS-1 PCR was performed for 135 dogs using blood and tissue samples and 40 (29.6%) of them were PCR-positive. Leishmanial parasites were cultured from lymph node or spleen aspirates from 10 dogs.</p> <p>Eight <it>Leishmania </it>strains isolated from dogs were typed by multi-locus microsatellite typing (MLMT) and by multilocus enzyme electrophoretic analysis (MLEE), using a 15 enzyme system. These analyses revealed that the strains belong to the most common zymodeme of <it>L. infantum</it>, i.e., MON-1, and form a unique group when compared to MON-1 strains from other geographical regions.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>The data obtained through this study confirm the existence of an active focus of VL in the Namangan region of Uzbekistan. The fact that <it>L. infantum </it>was the causative agent of canine infection with typical clinical signs, and also of human infection affecting only infants, suggests that a zoonotic form of VL similar in epidemiology to Mediterranean VL is present in Uzbekistan.</p

The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization

This paper establishes that there may be an inverse relation between the rate of detection and the deterrent effects of stigma. The more people are detected and stigmatized, the less deterrence there may be. This conclusion is based on a search model in which the costs of searching for law-abiding partners increase with the rate of detection. The model distinguishes between willing stigmatizers, who refrain from business or social contacts with someone they believe has committed an offense (whether he is detected or not), and unwilling stigmatizers, whose main concern is not to be associated with the stigmatized yet are indifferent to whether that person has actually committed an offense. The inverse relation between the rate of detection and the deterrent effect of stigma is possible when the percentage of unwilling stigmatizers in the population is sufficiently high.