Mortgage Broker Regulations That Matter: Analyzing Earnings, Employment, and Outcomes for Consumers

As the role of mortgage brokers in mortgage origination grew from insignificant in the 1980s to dominant in recent years, questions have arisen about whether its services help or harm consumers. In response, states have increasingly regulated the business, largely by creating and tightening occupational licensing requirements for mortgage brokers. The question of whether increased occupational licensing of mortgage brokers improves consumer outcomes is theoretically ambiguous and has been little studied empirically. This study introduces a new database of mortgage broker licensing requirements and assesses the relationships between these requirements and outcomes in both the labor market for brokers and the consumer market for mortgages. We find that one typical regulation—the requirement in many states that mortgage brokers maintain a surety bond or minimum net worth—has a significant and fairly consistent statistical relationship with both labor and consumer market outcomes. In particular, we find that tighter bonding/net worth requirements are associated with slightly higher broker earnings, fewer brokers, fewer subprime mortgages, higher foreclosure rates, and a greater percentage of high-interest-rate mortgages. Although we do not provide a full causal interpretation of these results, we take seriously the possibility that restrictive bonding requirements for mortgage brokers have unintended negative consequences for many consumers. On balance, our results also seem to support the relevance of theories of occupational licensing that stress the importance of financial entry and exit barriers.

Do Industrial Relations Institutions Impact Economic Outcomes?: International and U.S. State-Level Evidence

The impact of government social and labor market institutions on economic outcomes have generated a great deal of attention by economists and policymakers in the U.S. and in other nations. The theoretical model suggests that there are trade offs of higher levels of economic outcomes with more equity-producing labor market institutions. This study examines the impact of national levels of unionization, strike levels, public policies toward labor, and the structure of collective bargaining within a nation on a country's foreign direct investment (FDI). As an additional test of the relationship of labor market institutions and state labor market policies and economic outcomes, we examine the empirical relationship with the economic growth of U.S. states. Examining 20 OECD nations from 1985 through 1995 and all U.S. states from 1990 to 1999, our statistical analysis shows that higher levels of industrial relations institutions are usually associated with lower levels of FDI and slower economic growth for U.S. states. However, within the context of the model the results do not necessarily suggest that a nation or state would be better off trading social equity through fewer restrictive industrial relations institutions for higher levels of economic growth.

International Differences in Lean Production, Productivity and Employee Attitudes

The study examines US-European productivity and worker attitude differences, focusing on changes in incentive structures. We analyze productivity and worker attitudes in five plants in the UK and US belonging to the same multinational producer of automotive sensors and actuators. We examine the firm's efforts to make complementary changes in product strategy and human-resource policies. In particular, we look at the impact of a Value-Added Gainsharing plan (VAG) that was introduced at different times among the four plants. Our analysis draws on multiple plant visits, surveys of almost all of the workforce, and confidential financial data. Our study offers a rare look inside a low-wage, non-union firm. We find that the VAG had an impact on productivity and profitability. We find that the UK plant's productivity and worker satisfaction was well below that of the US plants. However, neither our analysis nor interviews with managers suggest that differences in national institutions play a key role in explaining these results.

The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing

This study provides the first nation-wide analysis of the labor market implications of occupational licensing for the U.S. labor market, using data from a specially designed Gallup survey. We find that in 2006, 29 percent of the workforce was required to hold an occupational license from a government agency, which is a higher percentage than that found in studies that rely on state-level occupational licensing data. Workers who have higher levels of education are more likely to work in jobs that require a license. Union workers and government employees are more likely to have a license requirement than are nonunion or private sector employees. Our multivariate estimates suggest that licensing has about the same quantitative impact on wages as do unions -- that is about 15 percent, but unlike unions which reduce variance in wages, licensing does not significantly reduce wage dispersion for individuals in licensed jobs.occupational licensing; regulation; wages

The Impact Of New Unionization On Wages And Working Conditions: A Longitudinal Study Of Establishments Under NLRB Elections

This study investigates the impact of union organization on the wages and labor practices of establishments newly organized in the 1980s using a research design in which establishments are 'paired' with their closest nonunion competitor. There are two major findings. First. unionism had only a modest effect on wages in the newly organized plants, which contrasts sharply with the huge union wage impact found in cross-section comparisons of union and nonunion individuals on Current Population Survey and related data tapes. Second, in contrast co its modest impact on wages, new unionization substantially altered several personnel practices. creating grievance systems, greater seniority protection. and job bidding and posting. That newly organized establishments adopt union working conditions but grant only modest increases in wages suggests that 'collective voice' rather than monopoly wage gains is the key to understanding what unionism does in the economy.

The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing

This study provides the first nation-wide analysis of the labor market implications of occupational licensing for the U.S. labor market, using data from a specially designed Gallup survey. We find that in 2006, 29 percent of the workforce was required to hold an occupational license from a government agency, which is a higher percentage than that found in studies that rely on state-level occupational licensing data. Workers who have higher levels of education are more likely to work in jobs that require a license. Union workers and government employees are more likely to have a license requirement than are nonunion or private sector employees. Our multivariate estimates suggest that licensing has about the same quantitative impact on wages as do unions – that is about 15 percent, but unlike unions which reduce variance in wages, licensing does not significantly reduce wage dispersion for individuals in licensed jobs.occupational licensing, regulation, wages