Russia: a Euro-Pacific power? Goals, strategies and perspectives of Moscow’s East Asia policy

Russia has been working since the mid-2000s to enhance its political, economic and military position in East Asia and establish itself as a Euro-Pacific power. Behind this development stands the wish to profit from the region’s economic dynamism, modernise Russia’s backward eastern regions and underline its claim to the status of a global power. Moscow can already claim successes for its East Asia policy. It has succeeded in expanding its relations with most of the East Asian nations and in joining important regional forums. Here the Kremlin is pursuing a dual strategy: expanding its “strategic partnership” with China but at the same time diversifying its relationships – rather than continuing to depend on Beijing as a “door-opener” in East Asia as it did in the 1990s. Russia has also succeeded in increasing its trade volume with East Asia, which has become its second trading region after Europe. Yet Russia’s prospects of regaining its great power role in East Asia are limited. Without improving relations with Washington and Tokyo the political diversification strategy remains incomplete, while growing power asymmetry with China could see Russia edged into a junior partner role. But the greatest hindrance to Moscow’s Euro-Pacific ambitions is Russia’s integration into the East Asian economy almost exclusively as a raw material supplier. Faced with increasing tensions with the West, Moscow threatens to play the “East Asia card”. But a substantial eastward reorientation would tend to harm Russia’s economic modernisation and the implementation of its political great power ambitions. (Autorenreferat

Putin's new National Guard: bulwark against mass protests and illoyal elites

A new Russian security organ was created on 3 July 2016. The National Guard takes over the interior ministry's internal troops and police special forces and places them directly under the president's control. The new force's remit ranges from public order through counter-extremism and counter-terrorism to assistance in territorial defence and border protection. This reform represents the most significant restructuring of Russia's internal security organs in more than ten years, and exposes Putin's concerns over the robustness of his political system in face of persistent economic crisis and upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. In this context the National Guard can serve not only as an instrument of repression against possible mass protests, but also as a means of disciplining potentially illoyal elite groups. (author's abstract

Russia's military policy in the post-Soviet space: aims, instruments and perspectives

Since the Russo-Georgian war and the start of military reform in 2008, the importance of military means in Russia’s foreign policy toolbox has in­creased. This is especially true of the post-Soviet space, where Moscow’s vital security interests and regional ambitions converge. Russia is pursuing three goals here: it wants to ward off threats, secure its supremacy over the region and limit the room for manoeuvre of external actors, such as the US, NATO or China. In doing so, it is guided by a three-level approach which consists of strengthening unilateral power projection capabilities and expanding bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The balance of Russian military policy in the post-Soviet space is mixed. It is true that, today, Russia’s significantly modernised armed forces can cover a broad spectrum of operations and exert political pressure through a show of force. On the other hand, Moscow’s attempt to establish one-sided de­pend­encies through military cooperation has proven to be only partially achiev­able. As in the political and economic spheres, it is also evident in the mili­tary sphere that Russia’s desire for a zone of influence clashes with the reality of an increasingly differentiated area. The intervention in Ukraine intensified this trend, as even hitherto close allies of Russia in the CSTO mili­tary alliance now show more scepticism in their cooperation with their large neighbour. (author's abstract

Russia's new military doctrine: NATO, the United States and the "colour revolutions"

Russia’s new Military Doctrine is characterised by its close linkage of foreign and domestic threat perceptions. While the former relate to NATO and the United States, the Kremlin’s concerns over the latter revolve around the spectre of a Russian “Maidan”. To prevent that, and to assert its claims to a zone of influence in the post-Soviet space, Moscow is in particular expanding its “non-linear” warfare capabilities. This is precisely the point to which the West has to date failed to find an adequate response. (Autorenreferat

NATO-Russia relations after the Newport summit: reassurance, cooperation and security guarantees

A key aspect of the NATO summit in Newport (Wales) was the reaction of the alliance to Russia's annexation of Crimea and its destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine. However, apart from the decision to create a high-readiness force, and an action plan for Eastern Europe, heads of state and government did not focus enough on the long-term prospects for NATO's relationship with Russia. (author's abstract

Perspectives for NATO-Russia relations: forms of confrontation dominate - but dialogue not excluded

Institutional relations between NATO and Russia have been suspended since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in eastern Ukraine. Conflicting ideas about Euro-Atlantic security have left the relationship deeply and lastingly damaged. This makes it all the more important to gain clarity about the determining factors and perspectives of the relationship. Its evolution over the coming five to ten years will also be shaped by future events, such as the NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016 and elections in the United States in 2016 and Russia in 2016 and 2018. External developments will play a significant role, too. (author's abstract

Ensuring Ukraine's security: from ad hoc support to long-term security guarantees as NATO member

Since February 2022, Ukraine has been defending itself against yet another Russian war of aggression. Now that immediate support - military, diplomatic, financial and humanitarian - for Ukraine has improved, the country's long-term security needs to be addressed. Looking ahead, security commitments should be built on political, economic and military pillars. NATO membership is essential for Ukraine's security, but it is also in the geostrategic and normative interests of the Alliance, even if it is a risky, long-term and difficult endeavour. At the 2023 summit in Vilnius, NATO recognized that Ukraine’s future is in the Alliance but remained vague about the conditions to join. Yet, other agreements announced on the margins of the summit by the G7 and individual states expand the support for Ukraine. Framed as steps to increase Ukraine’s security, these should accompany the transition from current security support to future guarantees. (author's abstract

Russia: turn to China?

After its relations with the West deteriorated massively in the course of the Ukraine crisis, Russia has been aligning itself increasingly towards China. This shift is most obvious in the strategic spheres of military and energy cooperation. Even if the immediate impacts on Germany and the European Union – caused by the dynamics in the relationship between these two major neighbours in the East – are limited, the development is of great relevance for international relations and the global order. It would therefore be wrong to underestimate the long-term ramifications. Germany and the European Union should counterbalance these nascent tectonic shifts with inclusive and multilateral cooperation and dialogue initiatives in the Euro-Asian region. Regional and global cooperation should be shaped by economic exchange, infrastructure expansion and the search for solutions to global problems. (author's abstract

Russia-Israel relationship transformed by Syria conflict: political interests overshadow social and economic ties

Recent months have witnessed a warming of relations between Russia and Israel. One indicator of the trend is the frequency of high-level meetings, culminating in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s participation – as the only Western state guest – in the military parade on Red square on 9 May. Alongside existing social ties and economic cooper¬ation, the prospect of a recalibration of Russian policy in Syria to take greater account of Israeli security interests has been another important driver. Nevertheless, the Russian-Israeli relationship remains constrained and volatile. For Moscow it is just one element of a multivectoral Middle East policy. (Autorenreferat

Russia's armed forces on modernisation course: progress and perspectives of military reform

In 2008 Russia's Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov launched a mammoth project of comprehensive military reforms, whose objectives his successor Sergei Shoigu has also upheld since his November 2012 appointment. Despite deficits in recruitment, equipment and funding, Moscow's armed forces have already accomplished the organisational transition from mass mobilisation army to modern combat force. Although the reforms will not fundamentally change the balance of power with the United States, increased military muscle-flexing vis-à-vis Europe must be expected. Above all, however, the reforms expand Moscow's ability to project power in the post-Soviet space and militarily reinforce Putin's efforts to tie that region more closely to Russia. (author's abstract