Job Search with Nonparticipation

In a non-stationary job search model we allow unemployed workers to have a permanent option to leave the labor force. Transitions into non-participation occur when reservation wages drop below the utility of being nonparticipant. Taking account of these transitions allows the identification of the duration dependence in the job offer arrival rate and the wage offer distribution. We estimate the structural model with individual data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and use simulated maximum likelihood. The results show that the presence of significant negative duration dependence in the wage offer distribution causes reservation wages to decrease. The rate at which job offers arrive is constant over the un- employment duration. These findings provide micro evidence that the job search environment of unemployed workers is non-stationairy because of loss of skills.endogenous nonparticipation, non-stationary job search, duration dependence,

Dynamic Evaluation of Job Search Assistance

This paper evaluates a job search assistance program for unemployment insurance recipients. The assignment to the program is dynamic. We provide a discussion on dynamic treatment effects and identification conditions. In the empirical analyses we use administrative data from a unique institutional environment. This allows us to compare different microeconometric evaluation estimators. All estimators find that the job search assistance program reduces the exit to work, in particular when provided early during the spell of unemployment. Furthermore, continuous-time (timing-of-events and regression discontinuity) methods are more robust than discrete-time (propensity score and regression discontinuity) methods.treatment evaluation, dynamic enrollment, empirical evaluation

Carrot and Stick: How Reemployment Bonuses and Benefit Sanctions Affect Job Finding Rates

To increase their transition from welfare to work, benefit recipients in the municipality of Rotterdam were exposed to various financial incentives, including both carrots to sticks. Once their benefit spell exceeded one year, welfare recipients were entitled to a reemployment bonus if they found a job that lasted at least six months. However, they could also be punished for noncompliance with eligibility requirements and face a sanction, i.e. a temporary reducing of their benefits. In this paper we investigate how benefit sanctions and reemployment bonuses affect job finding rates of welfare recipients. We find that benefit sanctions were effective in bringing unemployed from welfare to work more quickly while reemployment bonuses were not.welfare to work, financial incentives, timing-of-events, dynamic selection

Obesity and Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from the British NCDS

We study the effect of obesity on wages and employment, using data from the British NCDS. The results show a significant negative association between obesity and labor market outcomes even after controlling for a rich set of demographic, socioeconomic, environmental and behavioral variables. After instrumenting with parental obesity the associations are no longer significant. We show that the intergenerational correlation in obesity is mainly due to genetic variation. However, the instruments do not always pass the overidentification tests and are sometimes weak. We are therefore somewhat sceptical about using parental obesity as an instrument.obesity, wages, employment, labor, endogeneity

Job Search Monitoring and Sanctions

Arbeitslosigkeit, Arbeitsuche, Workfare, Unemployment, Job search

Labor market prospects search intensity and the transition from college to work

In this paper we develop a structural model for job search behavior of students entering the labor market. The model includes endogenous search effort and on the job search. Since students usually do not start a regular job before graduation but start job search earlier, our model is not stationary. The model explains the common finding that a substantial share of individuals starts working immediately upon graduation. We estimate the model using a unique data set of individuals who completed undergraduate education in the Netherlands between 1995 and 2001. Our estimation results show that 1 percentage point decrease in unemployment rate increases wage offers on average with 3 percent and that there are substantial returns to work experience. Employment rates at graduation could be increased from 40 percent to 65 percent if alls students start job search 6 months prior to graduation.Job search behavior; structural model

The e ect of financial rewards on students achievement: Evidence from a randomized experiment

This paper reports about a randomized field experiment in which first year economics and business students at the University of Amsterdam could earn financial rewards for passing the first year requirements within one year. Participants were assigned to a high, low and zero (control) reward group. The passing rate and the numbers of collected credit point are not statistically di erent across the three groups. We do find some evidence for heterogeneous treatment effects. In particular, high ability students and students from higher social backgrounds have higher passing rates and collect more credit points when assigned to (higher) reward groups. Students in the reward groups, however, do not report to have studied more hours.financial incentives, student achievement, randomized social experiment, heterogeneous treatment effects, university education

On the timing of marriage, cattle, and weather shocks in rural Zimbabwe

The authors focus on the timing of marriages of women in rural Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean marriages are associated with bride welath payments, which are transfers from (the family of) the groom to the bride's family. Unmarried daughters could therefore be considered assets who, at time of need, can be cashed in. The authors investigate to what extent the timing of a marriage of a daughter is affected by the economic conditions of the household from which she originates. They distinguish household-specific wealth levels and two types of shocks--correlated (weather) shocks and idiosyncratic shocks. The authors estimate a duration model using a unique panel survey of Zimbabwean smallholder farmers. The estimation results support the hypothesis that the timing of marriage is affected by household characteristics. Girls from households that experiences a negative (idiosyncratic) shock in their assets are more likely to marry.Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Anthropology,Population&Development,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems,Livestock&Animal Husbandry

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

We investigate the presence of moral hazard and advantageous or adverse selection in a market for supplementary health insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates of the health care utilization models indicate that moral hazard is not important. Furthermore, we find strong evidence for advantageous selection, largely driven by heterogeneity in education, income and health preferences. Finally, we show that ignoring dynamics and unobserved fixed effects changes the results dramatically.advantageous selection, health care utilization, supplementary private health insurance, moral hazard, panel data

The effect of financial rewards on students' achievement: Evidence from a randomized experiment

In a randomized field experiment where first year university students could earn financial rewards for passing all first year requirements within one year we find small and non-significant average effects of financial incentives on the pass rate and the numbers of collected credit points. There is however evidence that high ability students collect significantly more credit points when assigned to (larger) reward groups. Low ability students collect less credit points when assigned to larger reward groups. After three years these effects have increased, suggesting dynamic spillovers. The small average effect in the population is therefore the sum of a positive effect for high ability students and a (partly) off-setting negative effect for low ability students. A negative effect of financial incentives for less able individuals is in line with research from psychology and recent economic laboratory experiments which shows that external rewards may be detrimental for intrinsic motivation.financial incentives, student achievement, randomized social experiment, heterogeneous treatment effects higher education policy