More Process Than Peace: Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo Accords

The 21st century has inherited a number of bloody and long-unresolved intranational conflicts, including those in Kashmir, Northern Ireland, Burundi, Cyprus, Colombia, the Congo, the Philippines, and the Holy Land. Negotiated efforts to resolve these conflicts through legally binding peace settlements have been attempted from time to time, but without lasting success. Numerous negotiators\u27 memoirs, political science books, and historians\u27 tomes have been devoted to the subject of peace negotiations. But relatively little has been written about peace negotiations from a legal perspective. In particular, the legal literature contains virtually no discussion of what in the contents of a bilateral peace agreement\u27s text can maximize the likelihood that the parties will comply with the peace agreement\u27s terms. There is a recent body of international legal scholarship that seeks to identify those characteristics of a multilateral agreement that can enhance the likelihood that parties will comply with the agreement. The primary focus of such international legal compliance scholarship has been on nonbinding agreements in global issue areas such as environmental protection. This Review expands compliance scholarship from the multilateral into the bilateral realm, and from global issues into the regional-conflict arena

More Process Than Peace: Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo Accords

The 21st century has inherited a number of bloody and long-unresolved intranational conflicts, including those in Kashmir, Northern Ireland, Burundi, Cyprus, Colombia, the Congo, the Philippines, and the Holy Land. Negotiated efforts to resolve these conflicts through legally binding peace settlements have been attempted from time to time, but without lasting success. Numerous negotiators\u27 memoirs, political science books, and historians\u27 tomes have been devoted to the subject of peace negotiations. But relatively little has been written about peace negotiations from a legal perspective. In particular, the legal literature contains virtually no discussion of what in the contents of a bilateral peace agreement\u27s text can maximize the likelihood that the parties will comply with the peace agreement\u27s terms. There is a recent body of international legal scholarship that seeks to identify those characteristics of a multilateral agreement that can enhance the likelihood that parties will comply with the agreement. The primary focus of such international legal compliance scholarship has been on nonbinding agreements in global issue areas such as environmental protection. This Review expands compliance scholarship from the multilateral into the bilateral realm, and from global issues into the regional-conflict arena

Middle East Chemical Weapons Task Force: Overview and recommendations from Tack II technical discussions

A “Track II” Middle East Chemical Weapons Task Force (Task Force) comprised of policy and technical experts from ten countries in the Middle East convened in 2016-17 to discuss chemical weapons acquisition and use in the region and to identify next steps to more effectively address this threat. The Task Force reached agreement on this joint statement and on the attached list of 47 different potential regional capacity building and other cooperative steps to prevent, detect and respond to chemical weapons acquisition and use in the region. The aspirational goal of establishing the Middle East as a region free of chemical weapons is shared in principle by most governments in the region. All but two countries in the region are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the two have expressed interest in joining under certain circumstances. However, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has reported that many countries in the region which are parties to the CWC have yet to adopt the national laws and regulations necessary to implement their CWC obligations. In addition, most countries in the region have yet to implement their relevant legal obligations pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1540.Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC)Grant Agreement no. N00244-15-I-003

Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Losing its Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore it

This Article analyzes from a legal perspective the responses of the international community, and especially the Security Council, to the examples of nuclear proliferation outlined in this Article and the impact of those responses on the vitality of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In doing so, the Article identifies and focuses on two key, interrelated themes. The first theme is the effect on these responses of the NPT\u27s remarkably weak mechanisms for detecting violations of NPT obligations. The second theme is the frequent strong reluctance of the international community, including the Security Council, to impose serious sanctions for proliferation activity when it does come to light

Expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction in the Middle East & North Africa: Law-Related Tools for Maximizing Success

This publication was informed by a full day workshop held in March 2016 at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, DC. Participants included three dozen leading officials and experts specializing in cooperative threat reduction and related issues. The publication was also informed by a workshop held in August 2015 in Europe which included leading nonproliferation officials and experts from a dozen countries in the Middle East and North Africa. These workshops were supplemented with numerous interviews of leading officials and experts from the U.S., Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa Region.This publication results from research supported by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) via Assistance Grant Agreement No. N00244-14-1-0042 awarded by the NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center San Diego (NAVSUP FLC San Diego).This publication results from research supported by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC) via Assistance Grant Agreement No. N00244-14-1-0042 awarded by the NAVSUP Fleet Logistics Center San Diego (NAVSUP FLC San Diego)