(Why) Are Economists Different?

After presenting some casual evidence about the difference between economists and the rest of the population, first the survey and experimental evidence which has been presented on this topic during the last 20 years is discussed. But can these results really be transferred to real world situations? To show this, examples of referenda results in Switzerland are presented where the citizens decided against recommendations of most economists. But what is so particular in economic theory that causes these different convictions? Some explanations are given with respect to positive economic theory and with respect to the normative convictions of economists. The paper concludes with possible consequences which economists might draw. Nachdem an Fallbeispielen Unterschiede in den Auffassungen von Ökonomen einerseits und dem Rest der Bevölkerung andererseits aufgezeigt wurde, wird zunächst die empirische Evidenz zu diesem Faktum aus Umfragen und Experimenten zusammengefasst. Wie weit sind diese Ergebnisse auf Situationen realen Handelns übertragbar? Um dies zu zeigen, wird auf Ergebnisse von Referenden verwiesen, in welchen sich die Bürger entgegen den Empfehlungen fast aller Ökonomen entschieden haben. Dann wird gezeigt, welche Eigenheiten der (positiven) ökonomischen Theorie wie der normativen Überzeugungen der (meisten) Ökonomen zu diesen Unterschieden führen. Die Arbeit schliesst mit Hinweisen zu Konsequenzen, zu denen sich Ökonomen in dieser Situation veranlasst sehen könnten.Cooperative Behaviour, Indoctrination, Self-Selection, Referenda Results, Economic Model of Behaviour, Commitment, Fairness of the Market

The Effects of Fiscal Institutions on Public Finance: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence

This paper surveys the empirical research on fiscal institutions of the last three decades. The main results are: (i) Constitutional or statutory fiscal limitations have in most cases proved to be effective in cutting down public expenditure, revenue, and debt. (ii) Budgetary proce-dures matter as well. They might be less effective than constitutional or statutory rules, but in a situation where it is impossible to introduce such rules they might present a feasible second-best way to reach fiscal sustainability. (iii) Citizens demand fewer public services and a sounder fiscal policy in systems with direct legislation than in purely parliamentary systems. (iv) There is some evidence that fiscal federalism leads ceteris pari-bus to a smaller size of the government. There are also political institutions which have an impact on the public budg-ets, and there are some interactions between the different institutions.balanced budget, budgetary procedures, fiscal federalism, direct democracy, public expenditure, public debt

Tax Morale, Tax Evasion, and the Shadow Economy

Under which conditions is moral justification of taxation possible? This question does not only interest philosophers and economists from a scientific point of view, but can have considerable practical relevance as well because the willingness of citizens to pay taxes may depend upon whether they consider taxation to be morally justified or not. We first consider theoretical arguments on the role of tax morale, and when tax evasion might be considered as justified by citizens or not. Then we ask how tax morale can be measured. Next, we discuss the role of tax morale for the shadow economy, before determinants of tax morale and empirical results for the impact of tax morale on tax compliance are discussed. For a high tax morale, institutional and cultural factors are at least as important as economic incentives.Tax morale, tax evasion, principles of taxation, trust, direct democracy, federalism

The Lost Popularity Function: Are Unemployment and Inflation no longer Relevant for the Bahaviour of German Voters?

Up to now there was a general conviction that increasing unemployment and inflation have a negative impact on the government’s popularity. This was true for Germany as well, but it does not seem to hold any longer. This paper first reviews the results of earlier periods before presenting new results for the last part of the Kohl government after unification and for the Schröder government. While the results for the former show the known pattern, neither unemployment nor inflation is significant in the equations of the Schröder government, the latter has even the wrong sign. The missing impact of unemployment might be due to statistical reasons: the short observation period and the low variance of the explanatory variables. With respect to inflation, however, the citizens might have recognised that they cannot any longer hold the government responsible as the European Central Bank is performing monetary policy in Europe since 1999 and is, therefore, also responsible for price stability in Germany.government popularity, popularity function, Germany, unemployment, inflation

Critical Analysis of Some Well-Intended Proposals to Fight Unemployment

In this paper it is asked whether it is meaningful to state a ‘right to work’ as a basic human right to be written down in the constitution, for example, whether working time should generally be reduced, and whether those who do not have (or find) a job should get a guaranteed minimal income. All three demands have to be rejected, at least in the radical form in which they are often stated. They cannot be realised at all or at least not without impairing other basic human rights. Finally, it is asked what can be retained from these (usually well-intended) demands.Unemployment, Right to Work, Working Time, Negative Income Tax, Basic Income

Econometric Estimates of Deterrence of the Death Penalty: Facts or Ideology

In 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an article claiming that each execution saves more than 70 lives. This example is used to show how easy it is, using simple or advanced econometric techniques, to produce results that do or do not support the deterrence hypothesis. Moreover, we also point to some puzzles which have not been satisfactorily solved so far. We then present a critical survey of the papers published in the last ten years. It is shown how simple changes can produce quite different results using the same data. Finally, we draw some conclusions about the usefulness of statistical arguments in policy debates, but also on the moral questions involved in this particular debate.Death Penalty, Deterrence, Econometric Evidence, Ideology

The Weak Rationality Principle in Economics

The weak rationality principle is not an empirical statement but a heuristic rule how to proceed in social sciences. It is a necessary ingredient of any understanding’ social science in the Weberian sense. In this paper, first this principle and its role in economic theorizing is discussed. It is also explained why it makes sense to use a micro-foundation and, therefore, employ the rationality assumption in economic models. Then, with reference to the ?bounded rationality’ approach, the informational assumptions are discussed. Third, we address the assumption of self-interest which is often seen as a part of the rationality assumption. We conclude with some remarks of handling the problems of ?free will’ as well as ?weakness of the will’ within the economic approach.Rationality, Self Interest, Micro-Foundation, Bounded Rationality

Econometric Estimates of Deterrence of the Death Penalty: Facts or Ideology?

In 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an article claiming that each execution saves more than 70 lives. This example is used to show how easy it is, using simple or advanced econometric techniques, to produce results that do or do not support the deterrence hypothesis. Moreover, we also point to some puzzles which have not been satisfactorily solved so far. We then present a critical survey of the papers published in the last ten years. It is shown how simple changes can produce quite different results using the same data. Finally, we draw some conclusions about the usefulness of statistical arguments in policy debates, but also on the moral questions involved in this particular debate.death penalty, deterrence, econometric evidence, ideology

(Why) Are Economists Different?

After presenting some casual evidence about the difference between economists and the rest of the population, first the survey and experimental evidence which has been presented on this topic during the last 20 years is discussed. But can these results really be transferred to real world situations? To show this, examples of referenda results in Switzerland are presented where the citizens decided against recommendations of most economists. But what is so particular in economic theory that causes these different convictions? Some explanations are given with respect to positive economic theory and with respect to the normative convictions of economists. The paper concludes with possible consequences which economists might draw.cooperative behaviour, indoctrination, self-selection, referenda results, economic model of behaviour, commitment, fairness of the market, economists

Financial and World Economic Crisis: What did Economists Contribute?

In this paper we deal with two questions, (i) what are the origins of the current financial crisis, and (ii) what did economists contribute, or why did economists fail to provide a convincing answer for the origins of the crisis, and possible solutions to overcome it? Apparently, the economics profession was unaware of the looming worldwide financial and economic crisis, and significantly underestimated its global dimensions and consequences. A first and prelimi-nary analysis is undertaken to explore reasons for these failures. We conclude by pointing to some consequences for economics as well as for economic policy.Financial Crisis, Crisis Management, Failure of Economics, Failure of Economic Researchers, Origin of the Crisis.