Comment on "Geoeffectiveness of halo coronal mass ejections" by N. Gopalswamy, S. Yashiro, and S. Akiyama

Comment on paper: Gopalswamy, N., S. Yashiro, and S. Akiyama (2007), Geoeffectiveness of halo coronal mass ejections, J. Geophys. Res., 112, A06112, doi:10.1029/2006JA012149 Gopalswamy et al. [2007] studied the geoeffectiveness of halo coronal mass ejections (CMEs) on the basis of solar observations during 1996-2005 and found that the geoeffectiveness of 229 frontside halo CMEs was 71%. Recently for observations of 305 frontside halo CMEs during 1997-2003 the geoeffectiveness was found to be 40% [Kim et al., 2005]. Complex analysis of both solar and interplanetary measurements showed that the geoeffectiveness of frontside halo CMEs is likely to be about 50% [Yermolaev et al., 2005; Yermolaev and Yermolaev, 2006]. Gopalswamy et al. [2007] did not discuss possible causes of this difference and were limited only to the general words: "The reason for the conflicting results (geoeffectiveness of CMEs ranging from 35% to more than 80%) may be attributed to the different definition of halo CMEs and geoeffectiveness." So, here we shall present our point of view on high geoeffectivenees of CME obtained in paper by Gopalswamy et al. [2007]

Physician-prescribed Asthma Treatment Regimen does not differ Between Smoking and Non-smoking Patients With Asthma in Seoul and Gyunggi province of Korea

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors thank Lauren Weisenfluh and Melissa Stauffer, PhD, in collaboration with SCRIBCO, for medical writing assistance. Funding for this research was provided by Merck & Co., Inc. The authors also wish to thank Eric Maiese and Sharlette Everett for their contributions to the design and implementation of the study and the analytic plan. The authors would also like to thank the study investigators who contributed to patient enrollment and data collection: Drs. Young Il Hwang (Hallym University Sacred Heart Hospital), Young Min Ye (Ajou University Medical Center), Joo Hee Kim (Ajou University Medical Center), Heung Woo Park (Seoul National University Hospital), Tae Wan Kim (Seoul National University Hospital), Jae Jeong Shim (Korea University Guro Hospital), Gyu Young Hur (Korea University Guro Hospital), Soo Taek Uh (SoonChunHyang University Hospital), Sang Ha Kim (Wonju Christian Hospital), Myoung Kyu Lee (Wonju Christian Hospital), Soo Keol Lee (Dong-A Medical Center), Jin Hong Chung (Yeungnam University Medical Center), Kyu Jin Kim (Yeungnam University Medical Center), Young Koo Jee (Dankook University Hospital), Kyung Mook Kim (Dankook University Hospital), Young Il Koh (Chonnam National University Hospital), Cheol Woo Kim (Inha university Hospital), You Sook Cho (Seoul Asan Medical Center), Tae Bum Kim (Seoul Asan Medical Center), Jae Myung Lee (Myeong Internal Medicine), Young Mok Lee (Good Friends Internal Medicine), Bong Chun Lee (Namsan Hospital), So Yoen Park (A&A Clinic).Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Su Hyun Kim, Piano

Sonata C Major Hob: HVI:48 / J. Haydn; Rhapsodie Espagnole S. 254 / F. Liszt; Piano Concerto No. 3 Op. 26 / S. Prokofie

Centering the Periphery: Manchurian Exile(s) and the North Korean State

Kim Il sung and other Manchurian guerrilla veterans who came to dominate North Korean politics after 1945 were profoundly influenced by the experience of their anti-Japanese struggle in exile. This influence has shaped the ideology, historiography, and domestic and external policies of the DPRK to the present. At the same time, this exile experience has been given a mythical status in North Korean history, centered on the personality and activities of Kim Il Sung, but reflective of earlier attempts to draw Manchuria into the mainstream of Korean history. The "mythification" of Manchuria has grown steadily over time, and since the early 1970s Kim Jong Il has been closely associated with his father's Manchurian guerrilla struggle, in particular with the image of Mt. Paektu

Structural and optical properties of MOCVD AllnN epilayers

7] M.-Y. Ryu, C.Q. Chen, E. Kuokstis, J.W. Yang, G. Simin, M. Asif Khan, Appl. Phys. Lett. 80 (2002) 3730. [8] D. Xu, Y. Wang, H. Yang, L. Zheng, J. Li, L. Duan, R. Wu, Sci. China (a) 42 (1999) 517. [9] H. Hirayama, A. Kinoshita, A. Hirata, Y. Aoyagi, Phys. Stat. Sol. (a) 188 (2001) 83. [10] Y. Chen, T. Takeuchi, H. Amano, I. Akasaki, N. Yamada, Y. Kaneko, S.Y. Wang, Appl. Phys. Lett. 72 (1998) 710. [11] Ig-Hyeon Kim, Hyeong-Soo Park, Yong-Jo Park, Taeil Kim, Appl. Phys. Lett. 73 (1998) 1634. [12] K. Watanabe, J.R. Yang, S.Y. Huang, K. Inoke, J.T. Hsu, R.C. Tu, T. Yamazaki, N. Nakanishi, M. Shiojiri, Appl. Phys. Lett. 82 (2003) 718

김정은 정권의 권력 엘리트 통치 전략

학위논문 (석사) -- 서울대학교 대학원 : 사회과학대학 정치외교학부(정치학전공), 2021. 2. 임경훈.본 연구는 독재정치 이론의 관점에서 김정은의 권력 엘리트 통치 전략 방식을 밝힘과 동시에 당-국가체제의 ‘정상화’라는 북한 정치체제의 변화를 수령의 정권 안정화 도모라는 맥락 속에서 해석하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 북한 연구에서 권력 엘리트에 대한 기존 연구들은 주로 권력 엘리트 개인의 출신성분과 수령과의 연관성 분석을 중심으로 진행되었다. 본 논문은 이러한 기존 연구들이 이룬 북한 권력 엘리트에 대한 분석과 자료들을 바탕으로 정권 안정화와 체제 유지를 위해 독재자가 엘리트 연합에 대해 어떠한 전략을 사용하는지 분석하고자 한다. 독재정치 이론은 독재자 이외에도 독재체제를 이루는 행위집단을 구별하여 그 관계의 변화를 통해 독재의 작동원리를 밝힌다는 점에서 유용하다. 그 중에서도 선출인단과 승자연합의 규모 변화, 그리고 통치자와 승자연합의 관계를 통해서 통치자의 정권 유지 전략을 설명하는 부르노 데 메스키타의 선출인단이론을 본 연구의 이론적 논의 기반으로 삼는다. 김정은은 1) 실질적인 권력 엘리트의 규모는 축소시키면서 승자 연합에 대한 자신의 통제력을 높이고, 2) 잦은 조직 및 인사 개편을 통해 권력 엘리트들이 독자적인 파벌을 형성하는 것을 막는 전략을 사용하고 있다. 이러한 전략은 독재자가 충성세력에게 적절한 보상을 제공하고 이권을 재분배하는 것을 용이하게 하기 때문에 독재국가에서 쉽게 찾아볼 수 있는 독재자의 전략이다. 그러나 북한의 김정은은 이러한 독재자의 전략을 당-국가 체제의 정상화라는 제도적 변화와 함께 사용했다. 당-국가체제는 원래 사회주의 정치체제의 가장 일반적이고 기본적인 특징이지만, 북한의 경우에는 체제건설과정과 수령독재체제의 공고화를 거치며 당의 영도보다 수령의 영도가 더 우위에 있어왔다. 김정은은 집권 이후 당-국가체제의 ‘정상화’나 혹은 ‘복원’이라고 불릴 만한 제도적 변화를 꾀하면서 강화된 당의 권위를 통해서 권력 엘리트에 대한 통제를 강화했다. 본 연구에서는 이처럼 당-국가체제의 ‘정상화’라는 김정은 정권 하에서 나타나는 북한 정치체제의 변화를 사회주의 당-국가체제의 개념 및 수령제와 함께 구축된 북한 체제의 수립 과정 등과 함께 살펴보면서, 결과적으로 이러한 변화들을 정권 안정화와 체제 유지 및 권력 엘리트 통제를 목적으로 한 독재자의 전략적 측면에서 분석한다.By analyzing the power elite of the Kim Jong-un regime from the perspective of autocratic theory, this thesis reveals Kim Jong-un’s strategy of taming power elites and explores the meaning of the political changes in North Korea. Previous studies on the power elite in North Korea have focused mainly on analyzing the origins and backgrounds of individual power elites or their connection with Suryeong. This thesis interprets the analysis and data on the North Korean power elite achieved by these previous studies from the perspective of autocratic theory. The autocratic theory is useful because it distinguishes between groups of acts that form a dictatorship and reveals the operating principles of dictatorship through changes in their relationships. In particular, the Selectorate Theory of Bueno de Mesquita (BdM) explains the relationship between the ruler and the Winning Coalition through the size of the Selectorate and the Winning Coalition, which is the basis of the theoretical discussion in this thesis. Kim Jong-un diminishes the size of power elites in an effort to consolidate the dictator’s political standing. And he staves off factional coalitions from forming by stirring up organizational structure and frequent cabinet/elite reshuffle. These two strategies are accompanied by an institutional change in the ‘normalization’ of the Party-Sate System. This thesis analyzes the party’s empowerment in North Korea from the perspective of Kim Jong-un’s strategy of maintaining his dictatorship.Chapter 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Research Questions 1 1.2 Research Methods and Materials 5 1.3 Composition of the Thesis 8 Chapter 2. Literature Review 10 2.1 Studies of Party-State System 10 2.2 Studies of Dictatorships. 14 2.3 "Selectorate Theory" of Bueno de Mesquita. 16 Chapter 3. Capitalizing on the Party-State System 18 3.1 Succession Strategy for Kim Jong-un 18 3.2 Reign of Terror under Kim Jong-un. 20 3.3 "Normalization" in Context. 22 Chapter 4. Party over Winning Coalition: Maneuvering the Size 25 4.1 Shrinking of the Winning Coalition 25 4.2 Discussion of the Selectorate in North Korea. 30 Chapter 5. Stirring Up the Elite Coalitions 32 5.1 Revamping the Bureaucracy. 32 5.1.1 The Military. 32 5.1.2 Office No. 39. 39 5.2 Reshuffling the Personnel. 43 Chapter 6. Conclusion 44 Bibliography 46 Abstract in Korean 51Maste