Mathews v. Kidder Peabody Co

USDC for the Western District of Pennsylvani

Greek Debt and American Debt: Graduation Speech at the University of Athens Economics and Business School

This is the graduation speech I gave on receiving an honorary doctorate at the University of Athens Economics and Business School. I talk about my Greek family, about how I got interested in economics, and then how in the 1990s I came to think about default, collateral, and leverage as the central features of the financial/macro economy, despite their complete absence (even now) from any textbooks. Finally I suggest that the Greek debt problem, and on a bigger scale, the American debt problem, can only be cured when lenders are prodded to forgive. That would be better for the borrowers but also for the lenders.Greek, Parents, Mathematical economics, Yale, Mortgage, Collateral, Securitization, Leverage, Foreclosure, Forgive, Principal

The Return of the Rogue

The “rogue trader”—a famed figure of the 1990s—recently has returned to prominence due largely to two phenomena. First, recent U.S. mortgage market volatility spilled over into stock, commodity, and derivative markets worldwide, causing large financial institution losses and revealing previously hidden unauthorized positions. Second, the rogue trader has gained importance as banks around the world have focused more attention on operational risk in response to regulatory changes prompted by the Basel II Capital Accord. This Article contends that of the many regulatory options available to the Basel Committee for addressing operational risk it arguably chose the worst: an enforced selfregulatory regime unlikely to substantially alter financial institutions’ ability to successfully manage operational risk. That regime also poses the danger of high costs, a false sense of security, and perverse incentives. Particularly with respect to the low-frequency, high-impact events—including rogue trading—that may be the greatest threat to bank stability and soundness, attempts at enforced self-regulation are unlikely to significantly reduce operational risk, because those financial institutions with the highest operational risk are the least likely to credibly assess that risk and set aside adequate capital under a regime of enforced self-regulation

Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F. 3d 263 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 1996

Plaintiff-appellant Daniel Chill and appellants (collectively, the plaintiffs ) appeal from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Keenan, J.) dismissing the complaint and denying plaintiffs leave to amend. The district court found that plaintiffs failed to allege facts that supported their claim that defendant-appellee General Electric Company ( GE ) committed securities fraud in reporting the false profits generated by a bond trader at its subsidiary, Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. ( Kidder ). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court

Kathryn Tuck Coats v. Peter M. Coats : Reply Brief

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County Honorable Homer F. Wilkinso

Kathryn Tuck Coats v. Peter M. Coats : Reply Brief

Appeal from the Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County Honorable Homer F. Wilkinso

Kathryn Tuck Coats v. Peter M. Coats : Brief of Respondent and Cross Appellant

Appeal from an Order in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson

Kathryn Tuck Coats v. Peter M. Coats : Brief of Respondent and Cross Appellant

Appeal from an Order in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson