Democracy and Protectionism

Does democracy encourage free trade? It depends. Broadening the franchise involves transferring power from non-elected elites to the wider population, most of whom will be workers. The Hecksher-Ohlin-Stolper-Samuelson logic says that democratization should lead to more liberal trade policies in countries where workers stand to gain from free trade; and to more protectionist policies in countries where workers will benefit from the imposition of tariffs and quotas. We test and confirm these political economy implications of trade theory hypothesis using data on democracy, factor endowments, and protection in the late nineteenth century.

Habits of the hearth: parenting, religion, and the good life in America

This dissertation explores visions of the good life in America through the lens of what middle-class parents from Liberal Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Roman Catholic, Muslim, Hindu, and Atheist communities want for their children. In the book Habits of the Heart, Robert Bellah and associates famously posit that the dominant moral language of America today is one of utilitarian and expressive individualism. In this dissertation, I measure the degree to which parents in America are guided by that individualism and the degree to which they speak alternative languages that encourage concern for others and for the common good. Through participant observation, interviews, and a letter-writing task with eighty-three New England parents connected with particular congregations, as well as twelve comparable non-attending parents, I look at religious traditions, some of them with long histories in America, and others more recently prominent on the religious landscape, to see how religion shapes parental values. To what extent do parents from these traditions agree on what a good life looks like? And to what extent do we find divergence based on social location, ethnic background, and the beliefs and practices of their traditions? I find that parents across traditions hold five master values for their children--health, happiness (both in childhood and in adulthood), altruism, groundedness in identity, and autonomy. With a few important exceptions, parents see religion as having relatively little to do with the values of health and happiness, which turn out to be influenced more by social class. Religion plays a much greater role in parents' discussion of altruism, with various traditions expressing different forms of the Golden Rule. Parents from all groups also find that they cannot take for granted the transmission of religious identity within a materialistic, pluralistic, and increasingly secular culture. Religious identity is largely an achieved status, and all contemporary American religious communities are, to some degree, sectarian. Finally, parents want their children to be autonomous, but find that they often have to weigh this against other master values. These findings should encourage researchers to take more seriously both the contextual and the conflicting nature of human values

Trade, Knowledge, and the Industrial Revolution

Technological change was unskilled-labor-biased during the early Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but is skill-biased today. This fact is not embedded in extant unified growth models. We develop a model of the transition to sustained economic growth which can endogenously account for both these facts, by allowing the factor bias of technological innovations to reflect the profit-maximising decisions of innovators. Endowments dictated that the initial stages of the Industrial Revolution be unskilled-labor biased. The transition to skill-biased technological change was due to a growth in "Baconian knowledge" and international trade. Simulations show that the model does a good job of tracking reality, at least until the mass education reforms of the late nineteenth century.

Trade, Knowledge, and the Industrial Revolution

Technological change was unskilled-labor-biased during the early Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but is skill-biased today. This fact is not embedded in extant unified growth models. We develop a model of the transition to sustained economic growth which can endogenously account for both these facts, by allowing the factor bias of technological innovations to reflect the profitmaximising decisions of innovators. Endowments dictated that the initial stages of the Industrial Revolution be unskilled-labor biased. The transition to skill-biased technological change was due to a growth in “Baconian knowledge” and international trade. Simulations show that the model does a good job of tracking reality, at least until the mass education reforms of the late nineteenth century.Endogenous growth, Demography, Trade

Trade, Technology and the Great Divergence

This paper develops a model that captures the key features of the Industrial Revolution and the Great Divergence between the industrializing \North" and the lagging \South." In particular, a convincing story is needed for why North-South divergence occurred so dramatically during the late 19th Century, a good hundred years after the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution. To this end we construct a trade/growth model that includes both endogenous biased technologies and intercontinental trade. The Industrial Revolution began as a sequence of unskilled-labor intensive innovations which initially incited fertil- ity increases and limited human capital formation in both the North and the South. The subsequent co-evolution of trade and technological growth however fostered an inevitable di- vergence in living standards - the South increasingly specialized in production that worsened their terms of trade and spurred even greater fertility increases and educational declines. Biased technological changes in both regions only reinforced this pattern. The model high- lights how pronounced divergence ultimately arose from interactions between specialization from trade and technological forces.

QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR MEASURING IMPACTS OF DEVELOPMENTAL HIGHWAYS IN RURAL AREAS

Quasi-experimental techniques were developed to provide decision-making tools for documenting the impacts of developmental highways in rural areas. Regression discontinuity analysis (RDA) with limited observations was used to compare economic changes in highway counties to those in adjacent and non-adjacent control counties. The RDA models found statistically significant changes in population, per capita income, and taxable sales related to highway development. The study found that some counties benefited from developmental highways, some were unchanged, while some experienced economic decline. RDA models with adjacent controls had better explanatory powers while those with non-adjacent controls were more sensitive to highway-related changes in economic activity. When significant non-highway activities were present, adjacent control models may have understated highway-related impacts, while non-adjacent control models may have overstated these impacts. Arguments for using adjacent and non-adjacent experimental designs are discussed.Community/Rural/Urban Development,

Made in America? The New World, the Old, and the Industrial Revolution

For two decades, the consensus explanation of the British Industrial Revolution has placed technological change and the supply side at center stage, affording little or no role for demand or overseas trade. Recently, alternative explanations have placed an emphasis on the importance of trade with New World colonies, and the expanded supply of raw cotton it provided. We test both hypotheses using calibrated general equilibrium models of the British economy and the rest of the world for 1760 and 1850. Neither claim is supported. Trade was vital for the progress of the industrial revolution; but it was trade with the rest of the world, not the American colonies, that allowed Britain to export its rapidly expanding textile output and achieve growth through extreme specialization in response to shifting comparative advantage.

Luddites and the Demographic Transition

Technological change was unskilled-labor-biased during the early Industrial Revolution, but is skill-biased today. This is not embedded in extant unified growth models. We develop a model which can endogenously account for these facts, where factor bias reflects profit-maximizing decisions by innovators. Endowments dictate that the early Industrial Revolution be unskilled-labor-biased. Increasing basic knowledge causes a growth takeoff, an income-led demand for fewer educated children, and the transition to skill-biased technological change. The simulated model tracks British industrialization in the 18th and 19th centuries and generates a demographic transition without relying on either rising skill premia or exogenous educational supply shocks.

Calculating resonance positions and widths using the Siegert approximation method

Here we present complex resonance states (or Siegert states), that describe the tunneling decay of a trapped quantum particle, from an intuitive point of view which naturally leads to the easily applicable Siegert approximation method that can be used for analytical and numerical calculations of complex resonances of both the linear and nonlinear Schr\"odinger equation. Our approach thus complements other treatments of the subject that mostly focus on methods based on continuation in the complex plane or on semiclassical approximations.Comment: 15 pages, 1 figure, contains MATLAB source code; new version with additional illustration

Made in America? The New World, the Old, and the Industrial Revolution

For two decades, the consensus explanation of the British Industrial Revolution has placed technological change and the supply side at center stage, affording little or no role for demand or overseas trade. Recently, alternative explanations have placed an emphasis on the importance of trade with New World colonies, and the expanded supply of raw cotton it provided. We test both hypotheses using calibrated general equilibrium models of the British economy and the rest of the world for 1760 and 1850. Neither claim is supported. Trade was vital for the progress of the industrial revolution; but it was trade with the rest of the world, not the American colonies, that allowed Britain to export its rapidly expanding textile output and achieve growth through extreme specialization in response to shifting comparative advantage.