Voluntary Changes in Accounting Principle: Literature Review, Descriptive Data, and Opportunities for Future Research

Voluntary changes in accounting principle represent explicit and fundamental decisions by managers to exercise accounting discretion. This paper develops an organizing framework to review prior literature on voluntary changes, provides descriptive insights on contemporary changes, and identifies opportunities for future research on voluntary changes. The voluntary change literature is robust and has examined many questions using data prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). We find that contemporary voluntary changes often vary across the pre-SOX, post-SOX, and post-SFAS No. 154 periods by the materiality of their income effect, issue type, and justifications provided by managers, suggesting that manager use of voluntary changes has evolved over time. Our future research opportunities consider potential determinants of voluntary changes including strategic incentives, environmental conditions, and manager characteristics, as well as the potential direct or moderating role of corporate governance and auditors on manager use of voluntary changes. They also consider user reactions to voluntary changes. By providing insight into both extant voluntary change research and the contemporary use of voluntary changes, our study informs standards setters who grant managers the ability to exercise this form of accounting discretion, as well as researchers who plan to study accounting choice through voluntary changes

Materiality Judgments and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements: The Role of Managers, Auditors, and Audit Committees

This study investigates how manager and auditor incentives, along with audit committee characteristics, are associated with materiality judgments about detected misstatements. Using data on detected misstatements that occurred between 2003 and 2006, we find auditors\u27 incentives to protect their reputations weaken the effect of managerial incentives associated with the pressure created by analyst following; auditors are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements as audit fees increase. Regarding audit committee characteristics, results reveal that audit committees with greater financial expertise are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements compared to audit committees with less expertise

Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 108 Disclosures: Descriptive Evidence from the Revelation of Accounting Misstatements

The purpose of this paper is to provide a descriptive analysis of companies’ previously uncorrected financial statement misstatements using disclosures recently mandated by Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 108 (SAB No. 108). We analyze 355 companies that disclose and correct 792 misstatements in their financial statements filed from November 15, 2006, to February 15, 2008. We present descriptive evidence on the size and industry distribution of companies who disclose SAB No. 108 adjustments, showing that larger companies and those in the banking/insurance/real estate industries are most commonly represented in our sample. We also describe the types of audit firms that are associated with these companies. The results show that the concentration of sample companies in the banking/insurance/real estate industries are most often audited by the smallest audit firms in the market, and there is considerable variation in the application of quantitative materiality thresholds for SAB No. 108 disclosures across audit firms. Finally, our descriptive analyses reveal insights about the nature, direction, and magnitude of specific misstatements corrected by SAB No. 108. For example, we show that the most common SAB No. 108 misstatement corrections involve current liabilities, deferred taxes, revenue recognition, and leases. In addition, many companies in our sample used SAB No. 108 to correct misstatements identified in the current year to avoid restating prior period financial statements

Audit Committee Incentives and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements

We investigate the role of audit committee economic incentives in judgments involving the resolution of detected misstatements. The results reveal a positive association between audit committee short-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-decreasing misstatements that, if corrected, would have caused the company to miss its analyst forecast. Complementary results reveal a positive association between the audit committee long-term stock option compensation and the likelihood that managers are allowed to waive income-increasing misstatements when the company reports just missing, meeting, or beating its analyst forecast. These findings illustrate agency conflicts that can arise when compensating audit committees with options. We obtain these results while controlling for CEO option compensation and audit committee characteristics, along with indicators of corporate governance, auditor incentives, and company characteristics

Non-Big 4 Local Market Leadership and its Effect on Competition

This study examines local characteristics associated with non-Big 4 local market leadership and the impact of non-Big 4 local market leadership on competition. We identify non-Big 4 local market leaders by collecting accounting firm rankings from business publications for 46 of the largest metropolitan statistical areas from 2005–2010. These rankings are based on the number of local office employees and provide a more holistic measure of office size than measures based on public company audit fees. We find local supply and demand factors are significantly associated with non-Big 4 local market leadership and that non-Big 4 leadership is associated with lower overall audit fees in the local market. We also find that non-Big 4 leaders earn a fee premium over other non-Big 4 auditors. Our results imply that non-Big 4 leaders increase local market competition