Transitive compellence, base states, and violent non-state groups

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2014.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (pages 429-440).Violent non-state actors have consistently served as a destabilizing force within the international system. These groups create a base within a state's sovereign territory, the "base state," and utilize this platform to mount conventional attacks, insurgencies, and terrorist campaigns against other states, with or without the support of the base state. Coercion directed at base states has been declared a central tenet of American Foreign policy and one that is shared by many states threatened by these groups. This study examines the efficacy of coercion as a tool to compel a state to halt the basing of violent non-state groups, a strategy which I call "transitive compellence." Empirically, employing transitive compellence has produced a broad range of outcomes. At times, this strategy has achieved its desired objective of inducing a state to contain the violent group, whereas at other junctures, these tactics have backfired. This study offers a theory to explain the conditions under which a base state can be successfully coerced into taking action against a violent group that resides within its borders and addresses why states have varying reactions to transitive compellence over time. I argue that the cost of compliance for the base state is shaped by the foreign policy and domestic political relationship between the violent group and the state. These components define the base state's cost-benefit calculation, which impacts the state's willingness to comply with the coercer's demands. The violent group's cross-border activity necessarily affects the base state's foreign policy, and thus the base state has a stake, positive or negative, in the international dimension of the group's action. Similarly, to the extent that the group resides within the base state, and interacts with its population and political system, the base state has a domestic stake as well. Specifically, acting against the group domestically triggers all of the costs and risks of a protracted political or military conflict with the group. Thus, it is necessary to examine the costs of -containing the violent group across both dimensions. These two distinct elements of the relationship each impose different and often conflicting costs and benefits for complying with the coercer's demands. Analyzing these components yields insights into the complex dynamic between the group and the state, as well as the magnitude of difficulty in severing these ties. This theory is tested with three longitudinal in-depth case studies where transitive compellence was utilized in an attempt to quell violent non-state actor activities: Israel vis-A-vis the Fedayeen in Jordan; Turkey vis-a-vis the PKK in Syria; and Turkey vis-a-vis the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan. A focused, structured comparison of these cases relied on interviews in the field with current and former policymakers, military personnel, journalists, academics, and analysts, in addition to extensive archival research, secondary historical materials, and media accounts. An analysis, within and across these cases, reveals strong support for the theory.by Keren Eva Fraiman.Ph. D