THE WIRED SOCIETY: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE

Information Systems Working Papers Serie

CIO's Beware: Very Large Scale Systems Projects

Very-Large Scale Systems (VLSS) play a powerful role in shaping what an organization does and can do in a practical sense. VLSS are deeply embedded in an organization's procedures, business plans, and strategies. These systems evolve over long periods of time, often not according to some rational plan, and for a limited time they provide a significant competitive advantage over other firms. In the long run, however, VLSS become strategic liabilities and must be rebuilt. Many organizations experience great difficulty rebuilding VLSS. Indeed, most organizations attempt to avoid rebuilding VLSS until the last possible moment. Often, the organization is in a state of crisis, a strategic transition. Because of the complexity and size of VLSS, existing methodologies often are not helpful. To make matters worse, the typical management incentive structure discourages rebuilding VLSS. In a typical VLSS effort, participants soon discover that they must rebuild the organization in order to take full advantage of new technologies. A major organizational engineering effort is often required. Senior management as well as systems management routinely underestimate the complexity of the task before them. Consequently, large errors are made in estimating costs and time. Drawing on research in both the private and public sector, this paper examines why VLSS fail, why are VLSS so difficult to rebuild, what are the strategy options, and how can senior management guide the rebuilding process.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

A Prolegomenon to Information Technology Ethics

Information Systems Working Papers Serie

CIO's Beware: Very Large Scale Systems Projects

Very Large Scale Systems (VLSS) play a powerful role in shaping what an organization does and can do in a practical sense. VLSS are deeply embedded in the organizational procedures, business plans, and strategies. These systems evolve over long periods of time, often not according to some rational plan, and for a limited time they provide a significant competitive advantage over other firms. In the long run, however, VLSS become strategic liabilities and must be rebuilt. Many organizations experience great difficulty rebuilding VLSS . Indeed, most organizations attempt to avoid rebuilding VLSS until the last possible moment. Often, the organization is in a state of crisis, a strategic transition. Because of the complexity and size of VLSS, existing methodologies often are not helpful. To make matters worse, the typical management incentive structure discourages rebuilding VLSS. In a typical VLSS effort, participants soon discover that they must rebuild the organization in order to take full advantage of new technologies. A major organizational engineering effort is often required. Senior management as well as systems management routinely underestimate the complexity of the task before them. Consequently, large errors are made in estimating costs and time. Drawing on research in both the private and public sector, this paper examines why VLSS fail, why are VLSS so difficult to rebuild, what are the strategy options, and how can senior management guide the rebuilding process.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

PRODUCTIVITY AND THE ENACTMENT OF A MACRO CULTURE

This paper reports the puzzling results of a study which examined IT capital investment and productivity at three of the largest IT user sites in the U.S. for the period 1970-1990: Social Security Administration (SSA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Based on detailed IT investment, employment, and output data over twenty years, we found that only one agency had achieved significant productivity benefits, a second agency had modest results, and a third agency achieved no results whatever. These results cannot be explained by traditional theories of productivity of how productivity is produced. We argue that IT-induced productivity results not simply from strategic choice, nor the operation of the invisible hand in the market place, nor simply from keen managers adjusting their organizations to an "objective" environment. Instead we propose instead a new theory in which productivity benefits derive from a larger macro-culture enacted by powerful institutions in an organizational field. We extend this analysis to the larger economy and examine how this new theory helps us understand recent claims that IT is finally having positive productivity benefits at the sector level, and also helps us understand how the current fascination with reengineering and downsizing may be a self-fulfilling prophecy.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

Information Technology and Occupational Structure

A central tenet of much popular and scholarly literature is that computers -and more broadly speaking "information systems"- bring about significant change in organizations. Some scholars focus on changes in organizational structure- the division of labor and its coordination through authority and power (Blau, 1976; Danziger, et. d., 1982; Laudon, 1976; 1986; Keen 1981; Kling and Iacono, 1984; Orlikowski and Robey, 1991; Robey, 1981; Walton, 1989; Barley 1986; 1990) . Others focus on IT induced changes in the design of work (Zuboff, 1984; Bikson, et. al., 1985: Kraut, et. al., 1987; Sproull and Kiesler, 199 1; Turner, 1984; Iacono and Kling, 1987). Still others have argued that IT significantly alters occupational structure in organizations--the distribution of employment among occupations and skill classes of workers (Braverman, 1984; Kling and Turner, 1987; Berndt, et. al., 1992; Howell and W e , 1993; Cyert and Mowry, 1988; 1989). In general, the impact of IT on occupational structure of firms and organizations is a neglected area of empirical research despite the fact that scholars have strong opinions, and convincing theories, about such occupational shifts. In this paper we report the results of a twenty year longitudinal study of occupational structure in three of the largest and most intensive organizational users of IT in the United States. For benchmarking purposes we also examine occupational change at the aggregate society level and in the federal government sector over a twenty year period. The results of our research question the claim that IT brings about significant change in occupational structure. While the organizations we examine did experience significant change in occupational structure during periods of intense computerization, these changes did not conform to theoretical predictions and they were inconsistent from one organization to another. We conc1ude that organizational occupational structures are quite stable in the face of massive IT change and claims that IT brings about "revo1utionaryâ changes in organizational structure have little empirical foundation even though there may be isolated cases where such rapid and drastic changes do occur.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

Information Systems Working Papers Serie

MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, INVESTMENT IN IT, AND PRODUCTIVITY

Previous literature on IT and productivity does not take into account different organizational goals and different management strategies for achieving these goals. But productivity and ROI relationships can easily differ as organizational goals and management strategies differ. Therefore, we argue, it is no longer appropriate to ask, "Does IT lead to productivity enhancement." or "Is the ROI on IT investments large or small or nonexistent? The better question is under what conditions of organizational climate and management choice does IT enhanced productivity result. To illustrate the powerful effect of organizational goals and management strategy on IT-productivity relationships, we examine the twenty year history of two of the largest IT users in the world: the Internal Revenue Service and the Social Security Administration. And we find that these two very similar agencies experienced very different results from massive investments in IT despite sharing a similar production function. There is nothing in micro economics however to explain the different strategies pursed by these managers. Instead we must turn to political and sociological models of organizations to understand the social construction of productivity results.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

A GENERAL MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONS

The purpose of this paper is to develop a general model of the process by which large organizations develop information technology over long periods of time. A special focus of the paper concerns the question how "social impacts of computers" are produced by management decisions, organizational exigencies, accidents, and environmental forces. The model is clearly situated in the broader behavioral literature on organizations and organizational innovation. Major streams of behavioral research and assumptions are reviewed. The model assumes an eclectic position: organizational innovation results from both internal institutional factors as well as powerful environmental forces. "Social impacts of computers" filter out from a reasonably complex interaction between the organization and the environment. Our goal from the outset was to develop a general model of information technology development which was not a "special" purpose, narrowly framed theory typical of prior management information system research. In addition, we hope to set straight popular misconceptions created by vendors, consultants, and others concerning the question, how do computers "impact" organizations.Information Systems Working Papers Serie

CIO's Beware: Very Large Scale Systems Projects

Very-Large Scale Systems (VLSS) play a powerful role in shaping what an organization does and can do in a practical sense. VLSS are deeply embedded in an organization's procedures, business plans, and strategies. These systems evolve over long periods of time, often not according to some rational plan, and for a limited time they provide a significant competitive advantage over other firms. In the long run, however, VLSS become strategic liabilities and must be rebuilt. Many organizations experience great difficulty rebuilding VLSS. Indeed, most organizations attempt to avoid rebuilding VLSS until the last possible moment. Often, the organization is in a state of crisis, a strategic transition. Because of the complexity and size of VLSS, existing methodologies often are not helpful. To make matters worse, the typical management incentive structure discourages rebuilding VLSS. In a typical VLSS effort, participants soon discover that they must rebuild the organization in order to take full advantage of new technologies. A major organizational engineering effort is often required. Senior management as well as systems management routinely underestimate the complexity of the task before them. Consequently, large errors are made in estimating costs and time. Drawing on research in both the private and public sector, this paper examines why VLSS fail, why are VLSS so difficult to rebuild, what are the strategy options, and how can senior management guide the rebuilding process.Information Systems Working Papers Serie