Economic, political, and institutional prerequisites for monetary union among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council

The paper reviews the arguments for and against monetary union among the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council - the United Arab Emirates, the State of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar and the State of Kuwait. Both technical economic arguments and political economy considerations are discussed. I conclude that there is an economic case for GCC monetary union, but that it is not overwhelming. The lack of economic integration among the GCC members is striking. Without anything approaching the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons among the six GCC member countries, the case for monetary union is mainly based on the small size of all GCC members other than Saudi Arabia, and their high degree of openness. Indeed, even without the creation of a monetary union, there could be significant advantages to all GCC members, from both an economic and a security perspective, from greater economic integration, through the creation of a true common market for goods, services, capital and labour, and from deeper political integration. The political arguments against monetary union at this juncture appear overwhelming, however. The absence of effective supranational political institutions encompassing the six GCC members means that there could be no effective political accountability of the GCC central bank. The surrender of political sovereignty inherent in joining a monetary union would therefore not be perceived as legitimate by an increasingly politically sophisticated citizenry. I believe that monetary union among the GCC members will occur only as part of a broad and broadly-based movement towards far-reaching political integration. And there is little evidence of that as yet

Intra-industry trade and business cycles in ASEAN

A new resolve for both increased economic integration and monetary and exchange rate cooperation has started to emerge in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), especially since the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. According to the optimum currency area theory, the degree of trade integration is one of the most important criteria for joining a currency union. The large increase in intra-ASEAN trade in recent years raises the question of whether the ASEAN countries are becoming better prepared to form a currency union. This article sets to test whether the recorded increase in intra-ASEAN trade is leading the ASEAN members to closer economic integration and thus to better satisfy the criteria for a common currency. Two separate models are estimated for that purpose. First, a variation of the model of Frankel and Rose (1997) was estimated for the ASEAN members. Next, a new panel data methodology was conducted. The results with our own model were very significant and robust when four of the ASEAN5 countries were considered, and showed a clear positive correlation between intra-industry trade and business cycle synchronization in ASEAN. This result has important implications for the prospects of the creation of a common currency in the region.

Monetary integration in crisis: how well do existing theories explain the predicament of EMU?

Three theories or rationales can be invoked to explain the formation of the monetary union as well as its policy architecture. One sees its rationale as forming an optimal currency area, another as making macroeconomic policies credibly stability-oriented and a last one as overcoming collective action problems of mutually beneficial policy coordination. Each theory also implies an explanation for why the euro area is in crisis now. The article contains a critical assessment of these theories, with a view to how they have informed crisis management of the euro area but have also failed so far to stabilize the monetary union effectivel

Currency unions in prospect and retrospect

We critically review the recent literature on currency unions, and discuss the methodological challenges posed by the empirical assessment of their costs and benefits. In the process, we provide evidence on the economic effects of the euro. In particular, and in contrast with estimates of the trade effect of other currency unions, we find that the impact of the euro on trade has been close to zero. After reviewing the costs and benefits, we conclude with some open questions on normative and positive aspects of the theory of currency unions, emphasizing the need for a unified welfare-based framework to weigh their costs and gains