What shall we count when measuring zero tolerance?

In 1998 the Police Foundation held a residential seminar for senior policy makers inside and outside the police service on what zero tolerance might mean for the face of policing in Britain. The Foundation wishes to thank Minerva plc for sponsoring both the seminar and the publication of this book

DNA evidence and police investigations: a health warning

Much has been made of recent advances in DNA science and technology with particular emphasis placed on its bewildering implications for policing and the detection of serious offenders. Operation Phoenix for example, conducted by Northumbria Police in conjunction with the Forensic Science Service (FSS), has seen a total of 42 named DNA matches obtained against the National DNA Database (NDNAD) for more than 400 unsolved sexual offences over a 14 year period, resulting in 14 convictions up to 2005 (Forensic Science Service Annual Report 2004-05). Both technical advances in DNA serology and the infrastructure of analysis and retention bring forensic DNA analysis into the mainstream of detection, with accompanying public interest. For example the development of Low Copy Number techniques (LCN) now render very small samples usable. The size of the National DNA Database (well over three million by early 2006) aspires to cover the active criminal population

Why repeat victimization matters

The basic facts of repeat victimization are well known. Substantial proportions of differences in rates of crime are attributable to differences in their concentration on particular targets, whether those targets are defined in terms of people, organizations or households. Four of the chapters in this collection detail the extent and correlates of such rates in continental Europe and worldwide (by Farrell and Bouloukos, van Dijk, Kleemans, and Mawby). As is evident from these chapters and from other publications, establishing precise levels of repeats is by no means easy. While problems with police data on recorded crime are well-recognized, victimization surveys also have attendant difficulties. Once this is acknowledged and set aside,whether a level of repeats is high or low depends upon the prevalence of crime. Low levels of repeats will be important in countries or re-gions of low crime prevalence. High levels of repetition will always be important, but less remarkable where high crime-prevalence is found

How efficiently can we target prolific offenders?

This report looks at the magnitude of crime perpetrated by the most active offenders in a particular police area and places it in the context of a research programme which seeks to integrate and render locally useful the major findings of applied criminology. The results are contrasting. In terms of all crime, the group of offenders nominated did not appear to contribute substantially to levels of crime. The level of burglary did not bear any relationship to the availability of nominated burglars. The volume of vehicle-related crime (unlawful taking, theft of and theft from a motor vehicle) did vary according to the number of nominated offenders available. Breaking down to neighbourhood level, only one area displayed a relationship between levels of vehicle crime and the availability of nominated offenders to commit crime. Furthermore, there was some evidence that this group accounted for a component of other crime types, namely burglary and criminal damage. Two areas failed to produce any meaningful relationship between nominated offenders and crime levels. The results have major implications for the mechanism used to nominate prolific offenders and the resources used to target such individuals. It is argued that refinement and local application of the kinds of analysis described here would be of great utility in shaping offender-targeting practices

Repeated bank robbery: themes and variations

This study examines all bank robberies, completed and attempted, reported to the U.K.'s Metropciitan Police in the years 1992- 1994. It shows the rate of repetition against the same branches to be high, with each robbed branch suffering an average of 1.54 robberies, and the most robbed branch suffering six. Repeat robberies follow the success of earlier robberies, with the probability of repetition being roughly predictable from average sum taken (with attempts counting zero) at prior robberies of the same branch. Repeat robberies are less successful than first robberies, presumably because of security enhancements or staff training following the earlier event(s). Repeat robberies tend to happen soon after first robberies, and indirect evidence suggests — consistent with more direct evidence from other studies — that repeat robberies are substantially the work of the original robbers. A surprising and potentially important conclusion of the study is that banks differ greatly in their liability to repeat victimisation. Steps should be taken to supplement the data available, so as to confirm this. However, it is suggested that a meeting of senior bank security staff called by the Home Office Crimes Prevention Agency to discuss the data would not be premature

Using DNA to catch offenders quicker: serious detections arising from criminal justice samples.

DNA samples on the national database matching those found at scenes of serious violent or sexual crimes were identified. The earlier offence leading the sample to appear on the database was noted. The bulk (60-84% according to inclusion criteria) involved theft, drug or other offending. The result, indicating offender versatility, is consistent with most research on criminal careers. Its importance for operational police lies in identifying the contribution made by DNA samples taken after less serious offences in clearing subsequent serious crime, and the importance of taking such samples as widely as possible. Examining specific relationships between early and later offences revealed a significant link between providing a DNA sample following a drug offence and subsequently committing murder

Crime victimization: its extent and communication

The criminal justice contexts are identified in which understanding and communicating risks are important. The paper is thereafter exclusively concerned with the probability of crime victimization classified by person and location. Examples of crime risks derived from the British Crime Survey are provided, with instances of where concern about crime diverges from risks of crime. Caution is advocated about seeking to reduce the fear of crime by reassurance. The high levels of concentration of crime by location are noted, together with the fact that particular individuals and households are repeatedly victimized, enabling the prioritization of crime-reductive resources after a crime has taken place. The paper concludes that an emphasis on how the supply of criminal opportunities may be regulated heralds a more systematic approach to the distribution of unavoidable hazard among citizens

Multiple victimisation in Northern Ireland

Multiple victimisation in Northern Irelan

Definition of final crime risk assessment mechanism to measure the risk of theft of electronic products and proof them against theft

This report presents research conducted as part of a two-year European project (Project Marc) which aims to develop a mechanism to assess the risk of theft of electronic products and to take steps to make that mechanism operational. The view of the authors, reflected throughout this report, is that the task of developing such a tool is vital yet daunting. It is vital because of the need to build upon the gains made within other sectors and the need to seize the opportunity presented by the realisation that crime trends can be explained in terms of the supply of opportunities, that reducing the supply of opportunities will reduce crime and that these tasks are not the sole responsibility of the police. It is daunting because in spite of extensive evidence for the efficacy of well-designed and implemented opportunity reduction measures, the problem comes when the crime to be prevented (theft of electronic products) is widespread but not generally devastating to its victims and when opportunity reduction finds itself in tension with commercial interests. The report sets out the process of developing a crime risk assessment mechanism and the justification for pursuing the options taken. Initial consultation with a variety of stakeholders yielded the common view that the crime risk assessment mechanism presented must a) measure both risk and protection (ensuring that the two are commensurate), b) reflect the perspectives of those who would be tasked with implementing it and c) reflect the language of stakeholders from a variety of European states. Taking these views on board, the authors conducted an extensive consultation with stakeholders from four sectors (insurance, consumers’ organisations, law enforcement and manufacturers of electronic products) from ten European member states. Participants were asked to rate a variety of electronic products in terms of both vulnerability and security and to explain the ratings they gave. Their responses were used to develop two checklists which incorporate a variety of factors, weighted according to the frequency with which they were expressed. The authors suggest that the crime vulnerability checklist developed measurement. The security measurement by checklist was concluded to be inappropriate, since it would lead to limited and unimaginative security, and a case-by-case assessment by domain experts is advocated, in the light of measured vulnerability. A two-pronged approach to rating of electronic products (and possibly services) is outlined based upon approaches already deployed in relation to food standards

The probation career of Al Truism

The probation career of Al Truis