Anesthetics, immune cells, and immune responses

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utrum contingat hominem aliquid scire Henrici de Gandavo Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), a.1, q.1: A Japanese translation with the Latin text, an introduction, and notes

This is the second part of two parts series of a Japanese translation with the Latin text, an introduction, and notes of Henry of Ghent’s Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), a.1, q.1. Henry\u27s Latin text used here is from Henrici de Gandavo Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art.1-5, ed. Gordon A. Wilson (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf-Mansion Centre. Series II: Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia, vol.21), Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005, pp.3-28. I have received written permission to use it from the editor Prof. Gordon A.Wilson with the following words, "The Latin text is copyrighted and is published here with the permission of the editor, and with the knowledge and consent of the De Wulf-Mansion Center and Leuven University Press." I am much obliged to Prof. Wilson and those others concerned.Henry of Ghent (Henricus de Gandavo/ Gandavensis; d. 1293) is a thinker active and most influential at Paris University during the last quarter of the 13th century between the age of Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) and Duns Scotus (d. 1308). The first question (q.1), utrum contingat hominem aliquid scire, in the first article (a.1) on the possibility of human knowledge (de possibilitate sciendi) in Henry\u27s Summa, considers whether it is possible for a human being to know something. This question is very important in the history of Western philosophy because it represents the moment when a medieval scholar took up a questionraised by the ancient sceptics and attempted to defend the possibility of human knowledge. This occurred much earlier than Descartes who in the 17th century claimed to establish a solid basis of certain human knowledge against scepticism by means of what is called "cogito, ergo sum".翻訳（羅和対訳

Possibility and Limit of Quantifying Semantic Information

「情報」という概念は,情報理論の対象としては量的概念であるが,意味論の対象としては質的概念である.一般に自然言語で表現されるものは意味論的(質的)内容をもっているが,このような自然言語の意味論的情報を情報理論によって量化することの可能性とその限界について,「意外性」と「個人の情報空間」という視点から考察することが本稿の意図である.結論的には,量的情報と質的情報は「意外性」という基本概念において通底性があるため,この基本概念を基準として自然言語の量化は可能である.しかし,それが可能なのは,自然言語の(1)音素や文字などの非意味論レベル,(2)形態素,語,文などの意味論レベル,(3)実際の使用という語用論レベルという3つのレベルのうち,(1)のレベルに限定される.(2)と(3)のレベルにおいてそれが困難である理由は,「個人の情報空間」の量化に限界があるからである.Information is both a quantitative concept in information theory, and a qualitative one in semantics. Generally what is expressed in natural languages has semantic, qualitative content. This paper is to describe, from the viewpoint of the notion of novelty and individual information space, the possibility and the limit of quantifying semantic information. In conclusion, it is possible to quantify linguistic information because quantitative and qualitative information has in common a nature of novelty. But it is only possible at the nonsemantic level such as phonemes and letters. At the semantic level such as morphemes, words, and sentences, and at the pragmatic level of practical uses of language, it is quite difficult because individual information space is very hard to quantify

Synthesis of Titanium Dioxide Nanocrystals with Controlled Crystal- and Micro-structures from Titanium Complexes

Selective synthesis of titanium dioxide (TiO2) polymorphs including anatase, rutile, brookite and TiO2(B) by solvothermal treatment of water-soluble titanium complexes is described with a special focus on their morphological control. The utilization of water-soluble titanium complexes as a raw material allowed us to employ various additives in the synthesis of TiO2. As a result, the selective synthesis of the polymorphs, as well as diverse morphological control, was achieved

A Semantic Analysis of Existential Propositions : On G. Frege

In this paper we analyze the nature of existential propositions, such as (1) Socrates is wise. (2) Socrates is not. (Socrates doesn\u27t exist.) (3) There are no dragons. (Dragons don\u27t exist.) (4) There are tame tigers. (Tame tigers exist.) These propositions are called existentialbecause their predicate seems to attribute some kind of being or existence to thereference(s) of their subject. Is this the case? The answer to this question differs in each case. We, critically reconsidering the argument by G. Frege about the nature of existence, try to analyze what is meant by each proposition above. There is no disagreement among observers about the proposition (1) above, which attributesthe property of wisdom to Socrates. The problem is whether the propositions (2), (3),and (4) attribute the property of existence (or non-existence) to what their subjects refer to. According to Frege\u27s view, existence, like number, is not a property of individual things, but a characteristic of concepts which have some instantiations falling under them. We agree with him about the nature of general existential propositions such as (3) and (4), butdisagree about that of singular existential proposition like (2)

utrum contingat hominem aliquid scire sine divina illustratione Henrici de Gandavo Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), a.1, q.2: A Japanese translation with the Latin text, an introduction, and notes

This is a Japanese translation with the Latin text, an introduction, and notes of Henry of Ghent’s Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), a.1, q.2. Henry’s Latin text used here is from Henrici de Gandavo Quaestiones ordinariae (Summa), art.1 5, ed. Gordon A. Wilson (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. De Wulf‒Mansion Centre. Series II: Henrici de Gandavo Opera Omnia, vol.21), Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005, pp.3‒28. I have received written permission to use it from the editor Prof. Gordon A. Wilson with the following words, "The Latin text is copyrighted and is published here with the permission of the editor, and with the knowledge and consent of the De Wulf‒Mansion Center and Leuven University Press." I am much obliged to Prof. Wilson and those others concerned. Henry of Ghent (Henricus de Gandavo/ Gandavensis; d. 1293) is a thinker active and most influential at Paris University during the last quarter of the 13th century between the age of Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274) and Duns Scotus (d. 1308). The second question (q.2), utrum contingat hominem aliquid scire sine divina illustratione, in the first article (a.1) on the possibility of human knowledge (de possibilitate sciendi) in Henry\u27s Summa, considers whether a human being can know something without divine illumination. While many medieval thinkers before Henry assumed that the sincere truth of knowledge requires some divine illumination, most thinkers after him, in particular Duns Scotus, denied this doctrine. So Henry was the last great thinker who defends the theory of divine illumination.翻訳（羅和対訳