How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences

How (not) to argue about is/ought inferences in the cognitive sciences Quintelier, K.J.P.; Zijlstra, L

Individual differences in reproductive strategy are related to views about recreational drug use in Belgium, the Netherlands and Japan

Individual differences in moral views are often explained as the downstream effect of ideological commitments, such as political orientation and religiosity. Recent studies in the U.S. suggest that moral views about recreational drug use are also influenced by attitudes towards sex and that this relationship cannot be explained by ideological commitments. In this study, we investigate student samples from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Japan. We find that, in all samples, sexual attitudes are strongly related to views about recreational drug use, even after controlling for various ideological variables. We discuss our results in the light of reproductive strategies as determinants of moral views

Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between is and ought

Elqayam & Evans (E&E) suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between is and ought. Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism

Varying versions of moral relativism: The philosophy and psychology of normative relativism

Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders and opponents of moral relativism argue that prescriptive moral theories (or normative theories) should be constrained by empirical findings about human psychology. Empiricists have asked if people are or can be moral relativists, and what effect being a moral relativist can have on an individual's moral functioning. This research is underutilized in philosophers' normative theories of relativism; at the same time, the empirical work, while useful, is conceptually disjointed. Our goal is to integrate philosophical and empirical work on constraints on normative relativism. First, we present a working definition of moral relativism. Second, we outline naturalist versions of normative relativism, and third, we highlight the empirical constraints in this reasoning. Fourth, we discuss recent studies in moral psychology that are relevant for the philosophy of moral relativism. We assess here what conclusions for moral relativism can and cannot be drawn from experimental studies. Finally, we suggest how moral philosophers and moral psychologists can collaborate on the topic of moral relativism in the future