Insourced: how importing jobs impacts the healthcare crisis here and abroad

About the Book Instead of outsourcing high-paying jobs overseas, as the manufacturing and service sectors do, hospitals and other healthcare companies insource healthcare labor from developing countries, giving the jobs to people who are willing to accept lower pay and worse working conditions than U.S. healthcare workers. As Dr. Tulenko shows, insourcing has caused tens of thousands of high-paying local jobs in the healthcare sector to effectively vanish from the reach of U.S. citizens, weakened the healthcare systems of developing nations, and constricted the U.S. health professional education system. She warns Americans about what she\u27s seeing—a stunning story they\u27re scarcely aware of, which impacts all of us directly and measurably—and describes how to create better American health professional education, more high-paying healthcare jobs, and improved health for the poor in the developing world. About the Author Dr. Kate Tulenko is a physician with degrees from Harvard University, Cambridge University, and the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine. The former coordinator of the World Bank\u27s Africa Health Workforce Program, she currently serves as director of clinical services for a global health nonprofit and resides in Washington, D.C. About the Electronic Publication This electronic publication of Insourced was made possible with the permission of the author. University Press of New England created the PDF file from a scanned copy of the book. Rights Information Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License © Trustees of Dartmouth Collegehttps://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dartmouth_press/1014/thumbnail.jp

Understanding and valuing the broader health system benefits of Uganda’s national Human Resources for Health Information System investment

Background\ud To address the need for timely and comprehensive human resources for health (HRH) information, governments and organizations have been actively investing in electronic health information interventions, including in low-resource settings. The economics of human resources information systems (HRISs) in low-resource settings are not well understood, however, and warrant investigation and validation.\ud \ud Case description\ud This case study describes Uganda’s Human Resources for Health Information System (HRHIS), implemented with support from the US Agency for International Development, and documents perceptions of its impact on the health labour market against the backdrop of the costs of implementation. Through interviews with end users and implementers in six different settings, we document pre-implementation data challenges and consider how the HRHIS has been perceived to affect human resources decision-making and the healthcare employment environment.\ud \ud Discussion and evaluation\ud This multisite case study documented a range of perceived benefits of Uganda’s HRHIS through interviews with end users that sought to capture the baseline (or pre-implementation) state of affairs, the perceived impact of the HRHIS and the monetary value associated with each benefit. In general, the system appears to be strengthening both demand for health workers (through improved awareness of staffing patterns) and supply (by improving licensing, recruitment and competency of the health workforce). This heightened ability to identify high-value employees makes the health sector more competitive for high-quality workers, and this elevation of the health workforce also has broader implications for health system performance and population health.\ud \ud Conclusions\ud Overall, it is clear that HRHIS end users in Uganda perceived the system to have significantly improved day-to-day operations as well as longer term institutional mandates. A more efficient and responsive approach to HRH allows the health sector to recruit the best candidates, train employees in needed skills and deploy trained personnel to facilities where there is real demand. This cascade of benefits can extend the impact and rewards of working in the health sector, which elevates the health system as a whole

Cost-Effectiveness of Rural Incentive Packages for Graduating Medical Students in Lao PDR

Background The dearth of health workers in rural settings in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) and other developing countries limits healthcare access and outcomes. In evaluating non-wage financial incentive packages as a potential policy option to attract health workers to rural settings, understanding the expected costs and effects of the various programs ex antecan assist policy-makers in selecting the optimal incentive package. Methods We use discrete choice experiments (DCEs), costing analyses and recent empirical results linking health worker density and health outcomes to estimate the future location decisions of physicians and determine the costeffectiveness of 15 voluntary incentives packages for new physicians in Lao PDR. Our data sources include a DCE survey completed by medical students (n = 329) in May 2011 and secondary cost, economic and health data. Mixed logit regressions provide the basis for estimating how each incentive package influences rural versus urban location choice over time. We estimate the expected rural density of physicians and the cost-effectiveness of 15 separate incentive packages from a societal perspective. In order to generate the cost-effectiveness ratios we relied on the rural uptake probabilities inferred from the DCEs, the costing data and prior World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that relate health outcomes to health worker density. Results Relative to no program, the optimal voluntary incentive package would increase rural physician density by 15% by 2016 and 65% by 2041. After incorporating anticipated health effects, seven (three) of the 15 incentive packages have anticipated average cost-effectiveness ratio less than the WHO threshold (three times gross domestic product [GDP] per capita) over a 5-year (30 year) period. The optimal package’s incremental cost-effectiveness ratio is $1454/QALY (quality-adjusted life year) over 5 years and$2380/QALY over 30 years. Capital intensive components, such as housing or facility improvement, are not efficient. Conclusion Conditional on using voluntary incentives, Lao PDR should emphasize non-capital intensive options such as advanced career promotion, transport subsidies and housing allowances to improve physician distribution and rural health outcomes in a cost-effective manner. Other countries considering voluntary incentive programs can implement health worker/trainee DCEs and costing surveys to determine which incentive bundles improve rural uptake most efficiently but should be aware of methodological caveats

Preferences for Working in Rural Clinics among Trainee Health Professionals in Uganda: A Discrete Choice Experiment

Background: Health facilities require teams of health workers with complementary skills and responsibilities to efficiently provide quality care. In low-income countries, failure to attract and retain health workers in rural areas reduces population access to health services and undermines facility performance, resulting in poor health outcomes. It is important that governments consider health worker preferences in crafting policies to address attraction and retention in underserved areas. Methods We investigated preferences for job characteristics among final year medical, nursing, pharmacy, and laboratory students at select universities in Uganda. Participants were administered a cadre-specific discrete choice experiment that elicited preferences for attributes of potential job postings they were likely to pursue after graduation. Job attributes included salary, facility quality, housing, length of commitment, manager support, training tuition, and dual practice opportunities. Mixed logit models were used to estimate stated preferences for these attributes. Results: Data were collected from 246 medical students, 132 nursing students, 50 pharmacy students and 57 laboratory students. For all student-groups, choice of job posting was strongly influenced by salary, facility quality and manager support, relative to other attributes. For medical and laboratory students, tuition support for future training was also important, while pharmacy students valued opportunities for dual practice. Conclusions: In Uganda, financial and non-financial incentives may be effective in attracting health workers to underserved areas. Our findings contribute to mounting evidence that salary is not the only important factor health workers consider when deciding where to work. Better quality facilities and supportive managers were important to all students. Similarities in preferences for these factors suggest that team-based, facility-level strategies for attracting health workers may be appropriate. Improving facility quality and training managers to be more supportive of facility staff may be particularly cost-effective, as investments are borne once while benefits accrue to a range of health workers at the facility

Differences in preferences for rural job postings between nursing students and practicing nurses: evidence from a discrete choice experiment in Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Background: A discrete choice experiment was conducted to investigate preferences for job characteristics among nursing students and practicing nurses to determine how these groups vary in their respective preferences and to understand whether differing policies may be appropriate for each group. Methods: Participating students and workers were administered a discrete choice experiment that elicited preferences for attributes of potential job postings. Job attributes included salary, duration of service until promotion to permanent staff, duration of service until qualified for further study and scholarship, housing provision, transportation provision, and performance-based financial rewards. Mixed logit models were fit to the data to estimate stated preferences and willingness to pay for attributes. Finally, an interaction model was fit to formally investigate differences in preferences between nursing students and practicing nurses. Results: Data were collected from 256 nursing students and 249 practicing nurses. For both groups, choice of job posting was strongly influenced by salary and direct promotion to permanent staff. As compared to nursing students, practicing nurses had significantly lower preference for housing allowance and housing provision as well as lower preference for provision of transportation for work and personal use. Conclusions: In the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, nursing students and practicing nurses demonstrated important differences in their respective preferences for rural job posting attributes. This finding suggests that it may be important to differentiate between recruitment and retention policies when addressing human resources for health challenges in developing countries, such as Laos

Foreign Nurse Importation to the United States and the Supply of Native Registered Nurses

Importing foreign nurses has been used as a strategy to ease nursing shortages in the United States. The effectiveness of this policy critically depends on the long-run response of native-born nurses. We examine how the immigration of foreign-born registered nurses (RNs) affects the occupational choice and long-run employment decisions of native RNs. Using a variety of empirical strategies that exploit the geographical distribution of immigrant nurses across U.S. cities, we find evidence of large displacement effects - over a 10-year period, for every foreign nurse that migrates to a city, between one and two fewer native nurses are employed in that city. We find similar results at the state level using data on individuals taking the nursing board exam - an increase in the flow of foreign nurses significantly reduces the number of natives sitting for licensure exams in the states that are more dependent on foreign-born nurses compared to those states that are less dependent on foreign nurses. Using data on self-reported workplace satisfaction among a sample of California nurses, we find evidence suggesting that some of the displacement effects could be driven by a decline in the perceived quality of the workplace environment

Cost-Effectiveness of Rural Incentive Packages for Graduating Medical Students in Lao PDR

Background The dearth of health workers in rural settings in Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR) and other developing countries limits healthcare access and outcomes. In evaluating non-wage financial incentive packages as a potential policy option to attract health workers to rural settings, understanding the expected costs and effects of the various programs ex antecan assist policy-makers in selecting the optimal incentive package. Methods We use discrete choice experiments (DCEs), costing analyses and recent empirical results linking health worker density and health outcomes to estimate the future location decisions of physicians and determine the costeffectiveness of 15 voluntary incentives packages for new physicians in Lao PDR. Our data sources include a DCE survey completed by medical students (n = 329) in May 2011 and secondary cost, economic and health data. Mixed logit regressions provide the basis for estimating how each incentive package influences rural versus urban location choice over time. We estimate the expected rural density of physicians and the cost-effectiveness of 15 separate incentive packages from a societal perspective. In order to generate the cost-effectiveness ratios we relied on the rural uptake probabilities inferred from the DCEs, the costing data and prior World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that relate health outcomes to health worker density. Results Relative to no program, the optimal voluntary incentive package would increase rural physician density by 15% by 2016 and 65% by 2041. After incorporating anticipated health effects, seven (three) of the 15 incentive packages have anticipated average cost-effectiveness ratio less than the WHO threshold (three times gross domestic product [GDP] per capita) over a 5-year (30 year) period. The optimal package’s incremental cost-effectiveness ratio is $1454/QALY (quality-adjusted life year) over 5 years and$2380/QALY over 30 years. Capital intensive components, such as housing or facility improvement, are not efficient. Conclusion Conditional on using voluntary incentives, Lao PDR should emphasize non-capital intensive options such as advanced career promotion, transport subsidies and housing allowances to improve physician distribution and rural health outcomes in a cost-effective manner. Other countries considering voluntary incentive programs can implement health worker/trainee DCEs and costing surveys to determine which incentive bundles improve rural uptake most efficiently but should be aware of methodological caveats