43 research outputs found
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Network Effects in Countries' Adoption of IFRS
If the differences in accounting standards across countries reflect relatively stable institutional differences (e.g., auditing technology, the rule of law, etc.), why did several countries rapidly, albeit in a staggered manner, adopt IFRS over local standards in the 2003–2008 period? We test the hypothesis that perceived network benefits from the extant worldwide adoption of IFRS can explain part of countries' shift away from local accounting standards. That is, as more jurisdictions with economic ties to a given country adopt IFRS, perceived benefits from lowering transactions costs to foreign financial-statement users increase and contribute significantly towards the country's decision to adopt IFRS. We find that perceived network benefits increase the degree of IFRS harmonization among countries, and that smaller countries have a differentially higher response to these benefits. Further, economic ties with the European Union are a particularly important source of network effects. The results, robust to numerous alternative hypotheses and specifications, suggest IFRS adoption was self-reinforcing during the sample period, which, in turn, has implications for the consequences of IFRS adoption
Towards an Understanding of the Role of Standard Setters in Standard Setting
We investigate the effect of standard setters in standard setting: we examine how certain professional and political characteristics of FASB members and SEC commissioners predict the accounting "reliability" and "relevance" of proposed standards. Notably, we find FASB members with backgrounds in financial services are more likely to propose standards that decrease "reliability" and increase "relevance," partly due to their tendency to propose fair-value methods. We find opposite results for FASB members affiliated with the Democratic Party, although only when excluding a financial-services background as an independent variable. Jackknife procedures show that results are robust to omitting any individual standard setter
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A Framework for Research on Corporate Accountability Reporting
This paper provides an accounting-based conceptual framing of the phenomenon of corporate accountability reporting. Such reporting is seen as arising from a delegator's (e.g., a citizenry) demand to hold a delegate (e.g., shareholders) to account. When effective, corporate accountability reporting can internalize certain externalities into firms' resource-allocation decisions, although doing so will not always serve shareholders' interests. I leverage the positive accounting literature's current understanding of properties of financial reports to develop three hypotheses on corporate accountability reporting. I argue that an accountability reporting system is likely to be more useful to a delegator if it (1) mitigates information advantages across delegates and delegators, (2) reports both stocks and flows in the measures of account, and (3) has a mutually agreeable due process to match across periods the actions of delegates and the outcomes of those actions. I show how the successive incidence of these properties in observed corporate accountability reports can be used to determine whether and how those reports create or destroy value for shareholders and other constituencies
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Evidence on the Use of Unverifiable Estimates in Required Goodwill Impairment
SFAS 142 requires managers to estimate the current fair value of goodwill to determine goodwill write-offs. In promulgating the standard, the FASB predicted managers will, on average, use the fair value estimates to convey private information on future cash flows. The current fair value of goodwill is unverifiable because it depends in part on management's future actions (including managers' conceptualization and implementation of firm strategy). Thus, agency theory predicts managers will, on average, use the discretion in SFAS 142 consistent with private incentives. We test these hypotheses in a sample of firms with market indications of goodwill impairment. Our evidence, while consistent with some agency-theory derived predictions, does not confirm the private information hypothesis
The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting : evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2007.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-55).I study the evolution of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) # 142, which uses unverifiable fair-value estimates to account for acquired goodwill. I find evidence consistent with the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issuing SFAS 142 in response to political pressure over its proposal to abolish pooling accounting: pro-pooling firms can be linked-via political contributions-to U.S. Congresspersons pressuring the FASB on this issue. This result is interesting given the proposal to abolish pooling was due in part to the Securities and Exchange Commission's concerns over pooling misuse. I also find evidence consistent with lobbying support for SFAS 142 increasing in firms' discretion under the standard. Agency theory predicts this unverifiable discretion will be used opportunistically. The results highlight the potential costs of unverifiable fair-value accounting.by Karthik Ramanna.Ph.D
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Thin Political Markets: The Soft Underbelly of Capitalism
"Thin political markets" are the processes through which some of the most complex and critical institutions of our capitalist system are determined—e.g., our accounting-standards infrastructure. In thin political markets, corporate managers are largely unopposed—because of their own expertise and the general public's low awareness of the issues. This enables managers to structure the "rules of the game" in self-serving ways. The result is a structural flaw in the determination of critical institutions of our capitalist system, which, if ignored, can undermine the legitimacy of the system. I provide some ideas on how to fix the problem
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Return on political investment in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
Prior literature raises a "puzzle" of high rates of return on corporate political investment, but evidence for this puzzle is largely descriptive in nature. We exploit the setting of the American Jobs Creation Act’s passage in 2004 to provide more robust estimates of political returns based on instrumentation in a two-stage regression model. We find for the median sample firm that an increase of 32.35 million in taxes saved. These estimates, while consistent with a high-returns "puzzle," are nearly an order of magnitude lower than those previously reported via descriptive methods
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The International Politics of IFRS Harmonization
The globalization of accounting standards as seen through the proliferation of IFRS worldwide is one of the most important developments in corporate governance over the last decade. I offer an analysis of some international political dynamics of countries' IFRS harmonization decisions. The analysis is based on field studies in three jurisdictions: Canada, China, and India. Across these jurisdictions, I first describe unique elements of domestic political economies that are shaping IFRS policies. Then, I inductively isolate two principal dimensions that can be used to characterize the jurisdictions' IFRS responses: proximity to existing political powers at the IASB and own potential political power at the IASB. Based on how countries are classified along these dimensions, I offer predictions, ceteris paribus, on countries' IFRS harmonization strategies. The analysis and framework in this paper can help broaden the understanding of accounting's globalization
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Auditor Lobbying on Accounting Standards
We examine how Big N auditors’ changing incentives impact their comment-letter lobbying on U.S. GAAP over the first thirty-four years of the FASB (1973–2006). We examine the influence of auditors’ lobbying incentives arising from three basic factors: managing expected litigation and regulatory costs; catering to clients’ preferences for flexibility in GAAP; and being conceptually aligned with the FASB, particularly on the use of fair values in accounting. We find evidence that auditor lobbying is driven by prevailing standards of litigation and regulatory scrutiny and by support for fair-value accounting. But we find no evidence that catering to clients’ preferences for flexibility in GAAP drives auditor lobbying. Broadly, our paper offers the first large-sample descriptive analysis of the role of Big N auditors in the accounting standard-setting process
What Should GAAP Look Like? A Survey and Economic Analysis
We develop an economic theory of GAAP under the assumption that GAAP’s objective is to facilitate efficient capital allocation within an economy. The theory predicts that GAAP as shaped by the economic forces of demand for and supply of financial information would focus on performance measurement and control through the income statement and balance sheet. In addition, the theory allows us to compare and contrast extant GAAP, as produced in a regulated setting, with a GAAP that might arise endogenously as a result of market forces. We conclude that verifiability and conservatism, while detracting accounting from a valuation objective, are critical features of an economic GAAP. We recognize the advantage of using fair values in circumstances where these are based on observable prices in liquid secondary markets, but caution against expanding fair values to areas such as intangibles where their opportunistic use is predictable. We conclude that the convergence project between the FASB and IASB should be dismantled and that competition between the two bodies would be the most practical means of achieving an economic GAAP