4 research outputs found

    The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules

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    We explore the structure of locally ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (LOBIC) random Bayesian rules (RBRs). We show that under lower contour monotonicity, for almost all prior profiles (with full Lebesgue measure), a LOBIC RBR is locally dominant strategy incentive compatible (LDSIC). We further show that for almost all prior profiles, a unanimous and LOBIC RBR on the unrestricted domain is random dictatorial, and thereby extend the result in Gibbard (1977) for Bayesian rules. Next, we provide sufficient conditions on a domain so that for almost all prior profiles, unanimous RBRs on it (i) are Pareto optimal, and (ii) are tops-only. Finally, we provide a wide range of applications of our results on single-peaked (on arbitrary graphs), hybrid, multiple single-peaked, single-dipped, single-crossing, multi-dimensional separable domains, and domains under partitioning. We additionally establish the marginal decomposability property for both random social choice functions and RBRs (for almost all prior profiles) on multi-dimensional domains, and thereby generalize Breton and Sen (1999). Since OBIC implies LOBIC by definition, all our results hold for OBIC RBRs

    A characterization of possibility domains under Pareto optimality and group strategy-proofness

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    We consider domains that satisfy pervasiveness and top-connectedness, and we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of non-dictatorial, Pareto optimal, and group strategy-proof choice rules on those domains

    On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules

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    We consider collective evaluation problems, where individual grades given to candidates are combined to obtain a collective grade for each of these candidates. In this paper, we prove the following two results: (1) a collective evaluation rule is update monotone and continuous if and only if it is a min-max rule, and (2) a collective evaluation rule is update monotone and consistent if and only if it is an extreme min-max rule
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