Information Sharing and Information Acqusition in Credit Markets

Since information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, it may seem that the establishment of information sharing arrangements such as credit registers and bureaus will lead to lower investment in acquiring information. However, banks base their decisions on both hard and soft information, and it is only the former type of data that can be communicated credibly. We show that hard and soft information are strategic substitutes, and that when hard information is shared, banks will invest more in soft information. This can potentially lead to more accurate lending decisions and favor small, informationally opaque borrowers. Higher invest- ment in soft technology offers important implications for borrower switching. We test our theory using firm-level data from 24 countries.Bank competition;credit bureaus;hard information;soft information

A Note on Long non-Hamiltonian Cycles in One Class of Digraphs

Let $D$ be a strong digraph on $n\geq 4$ vertices. In [3, Discrete Applied Math., 95 (1999) 77-87)], J. Bang-Jensen, Y. Guo and A. Yeo proved the following theorem: if (*) $d(x)+d(y)\geq 2n-1$ and $min \{d^+(x)+ d^-(y),d^-(x)+ d^+(y)\}\geq n-1$ for every pair of non-adjacent vertices $x, y$ with a common in-neighbour or a common out-neighbour, then $D$ is hamiltonian. In this note we show that: if $D$ is not directed cycle and satisfies the condition (*), then $D$ contains a cycle of length $n-1$ or $n-2$.Comment: 7 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1207.564

Potassium l-2-nitrimino-1,3-diazepane-4-carboxyl­ate monohydrate

The title compound, K+·C6H9N4O4 −·H2O, crystallizes with the K atoms located on special positions related by pseudocentres of symmetry. Each K atom is coordinated by six O-atom donors. The N and water H atoms are involved in inter- and intra­molecular N—H⋯O, N—H⋯N and O—H⋯O hydrogen bonding. The data indicate inversion twinning