Study of fragmentation and momentum correlations in heavy-ion collisions

The role of momentum correlations is studied in the production of light and medium mass fragments by imposing momentum cut in clusterization the phase space. Our detailed investigation shows that momentum cut has major role to play in the emission of fragments.Comment: 16 pages, 7 figure

2-(2-Bromo­phen­yl)acetic acid

In the title mol­ecule, C8H7BrO2, the carboxyl group is twisted by 76.2 (3)° from the benzene ring plane. In the crystal, mol­ecules are linked into inversion dimers through pairs of O—H⋯O hydrogen bonds. The dimers are further linked into layers parallel to the bc plane by weak C—H⋯O hydrogen bonds

Efficiency and Market Power in Electricity Markets with Inelastic Demand, Energy Storage, and Hybrid Energy Resources

This thesis studies electricity markets and analyzes market mechanisms - operation rules for participants in achieving supply-demand balance, to understand how competition between resources, e.g., conventional generators, inelastic loads, and new market participants, such as energy storage and hybrid resources, affects market efficiency. We first consider the participation of conventional resources in a two-stage market, i.e., day-ahead and real-time settlement. Although designed to allocate resources efficiently and prevent speculation, price manipulation by strategic participants can undermine these goals. To address price manipulation, some markets have proposed system-level market power mitigation (MPM) policies, which substitute noncompetitive bids with default bids based on estimated generation costs. Using equilibrium analysis, we illustrate that such a policy in the day-ahead stage is more robust to price manipulations than in real-time, which may lead to non-equilibrium solutions. Despite being inelastic, loads can shift their allocation between the two stages to manipulate prices and reduce their payments. Further, heterogeneity in cost coefficients, estimation of dispatch cost in excess, and demand uncertainty tend to benefit generators. Together, system-level MPM policies can have unintended consequences when implemented without accounting for the conflicting interests of participants. We then study how integrating energy storage affects market efficiency. Our analysis indicates that the existing participation mechanism, where energy storage bids power in a market, may diminish market benefits due to its unique operational characteristics, e.g., the operating cost depends on charge-discharge cycles, unlike conventional generators. We propose a novel market mechanism based on an energy-cycling function that maps cycle depth to per-cycle prices. An equilibrium analysis illustrates the efficient competitive equilibrium that aligns with the social planner problem, i.e., net surplus maximization. However, at the Nash equilibrium, storage incurs reductions in profit relative to the competitive equilibrium due to price manipulation by strategic generators. Finally, we study the participation of hybrid resources combining energy storage and renewable energy sources. We use the New York zonal model as an example of a large-scale electricity market to benchmark the performance of the following two types of market models. We consider (i) a granular model, where the market operator manages the operation of constituent energy storage, and (ii) an integrated model, where the owner manages the storage operation. Our analysis shows that granular models lead to lower operating costs but add computational complexity, which may not be desirable from the operator's perspective. Though less computationally intensive, integrated models result in more intervals violating the physical limits of constituent energy storage

Globalisation and Poverty: Human Insecurity of Schedule Caste in India

Abstract Human Security is dominating discourse in present scenario. It is emerges as product of UNDP 1994 Report, produced by Mahbub-ul-ha

A Market Mechanism for a Two-stage Settlement Electricity Market with Energy Storage

Electricity markets typically clear in two stages: a day-ahead market and a real-time market. In this paper, we propose market mechanisms for a two-stage multi-interval electricity market with energy storage, generators, and demand uncertainties. We consider two possible mixed bidding strategies: storage first bids cycle depths in the day ahead and then charge-discharge power bids in the real-time market for any last-minute adjustments. While the first strategy only considers day-ahead decisions from an individual participant's perspective as part of their individual optimization formulation, the second strategy accounts for both the market operator's and participants' perspectives. We demonstrate that the competitive equilibrium exists uniquely for both mechanisms. However, accounting for the day-ahead decisions in the bidding function has several advantages. Numerical experiments using New York ISO data provide bounds on the proposed market mechanism

3-Anilinothio­carbonyl-4-hydroxy­chromen-2-one

The geometrical parameters of the title compound, C16H11NO3S, are in the usual ranges. The two aromatic residues are not coplanar and are twisted by a dihedral angle of 66.63 (6)°. The crystal structure is stabilized by N—H⋯O and O—H⋯S inter­actions

Effectiveness analysis of antipsychotics in schizophrenia using psychometric scales: an observational study

Background: Schizophrenia is a commonest and one of the well known psychiatric disorders. Life expectancy of a patient with schizophrenia may be 20 to 30 years shorter than the general population. Long term antipsychotic therapy is usually required for the management of schizophrenia. It is not currently possible to predict which antipsychotic may be optimal for a given patient because there are still many debates about effectiveness and efficacy of atypical drugs over first generation antipsychotics. So, our aim is to assess the effectiveness of various antipsychotics by using various psychometric scales, which will be helpful to bring out better treatment options for schizophrenia patients.Methods: This was an observational questionnaire based study, conducted on patients of inpatient and outpatient Department of Psychiatry and Department of Pharmacology at VIMSAR, Burla, for a period of 24 months (September 2015 to August 2017). Patients of schizophrenia aged 18 years or above were subjected to clinical global impression – severity scale (CGI-S) and clinical global impression – improvement scale (CGI-I) questionnaire after taking informed consent. Then scores were calculated using non parametric test with Graph pad Prism version 6.0.Results: Out of the 90 cases, majority (60) of patients belonged to the middle (25 to 45 yrs) age group followed by 20 younger (45 yrs) patients. Both scales showed significant improvement with atypical antipsychotics as compared to first generation antipsychotics.Conclusions: Based on these findings, we can conclude that atypical antipsychotics are more effective than first generation antipsychotics. But further studies are needed to assist clinicians in making optimum treatment decisions

Market Power Mitigation in Two-stage Electricity Market with Supply Function and Quantity Bidding

The main goal of a sequential two-stage electricity market -- e.g., day-ahead and real-time markets -- is to operate efficiently. However, the price difference across stages due to inadequate competition and unforeseen circumstances leads to undesirable price manipulation. To mitigate this, some Independent System Operators (ISOs) proposed system-level market power mitigation (MPM) policies in addition to existing local policies. These policies aim to substitute noncompetitive bids with a default bid based on estimated generator costs. However, these policies may lead to unintended consequences when implemented without accounting for the conflicting interest of participants. In this paper, we model the competition between generators (bidding supply functions) and loads (bidding quantity) in a two-stage market with a stage-wise MPM policy. An equilibrium analysis shows that a real-time MPM policy leads to equilibrium loss, meaning no stable market outcome (Nash equilibrium) exists. A day-ahead MPM policy, besides, leads to a Stackelberg-Nash game with loads acting as leaders and generators as followers. In this setting, loads become winners, i.e., their aggregate payment is always less than competitive payments. Moreover, comparison with standard market equilibrium highlights that markets are better off without such policies. Finally, numerical studies highlight the impact of heterogeneity and load size on market equilibrium