The Response to Nuclear Proliferation

This paper uses the methods of social network analysis to discover the structural patterns of cooperation that arose in response to a global traditional security problem. It does this by mapping compulsory and institutional power relations (Barnett and Duvall 2005) among actors responding to the proliferation of nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. For the institutional power measure, I use treaty and international agreement membership; and for the compulsory power measure, I use contractual obligations for nuclear expertise, materials, and technology. By mapping the relationships at the system level of world politics, including individual states as well as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational corporations (TNCs), this paper finds a third relation among these actors, namely, structural power. It also demonstrates how a network approach to the constitution of system level world politics can produce knowledge not available to traditional methods

Human Security Networks in the Indian Ocean Tsunami

This paper uses the methods of social network analysis to discover the structural patterns of cooperation that arose in response to a global human security problem. It does this by mapping compulsory and institutional power relations among actors of the construction of a human security transnational cooperative response network—the response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004. By mapping the relationships at the system level of world politics, including individual states as well as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), transnational nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and/or think tanks, and transnational corporations (TNCs), this paper finds a third relation among these actors, namely, structural power. It also demonstrates how a new way of thinking about the constitution of system level world politics can produce knowledge not available to traditional methods by finding two striking results: first, the role played by an organization cannot always be predicted by reference to its attributes, and second, depending on the context, organizations of different types will play similar (structurally equivalent) roles. Finally, this paper compares the network formed in response to this disaster with the network that formed after a disaster of similar magnitude in the past

National Security and Global Financial Governance

One threat in the post-9/11 world that was previously subsumed under the Cold War rubric is the threat of instability in financial markets that can undermine the legitimacy of the governments of states. Understanding the structure of international finance is thus crucial to issues of global governance, the more so because the contemporary structure of finance can threaten any individual state beyond its capacity to cope. All the actors in finance (whether commercial or investment banks, central banks, or other types) are connected by each financial transaction they make, as well as every regulatory or enforcement transaction; all transactions are relationships. All of these relationships together make a network. By examining these relationships using network analysis, we should see how all financial actors are wired together—not just the position of the biggest or most prominent. We should also be able to see second- and third-degree relationships. Network analysis thus allows us to explore a “map” of the financial terrain on which various strategies for security may be employed. These strategies can include checks to stop cascades and regulations to break up actors with high measures of centrality

The Effect of Network Structure on the Provision of Security

The term “security” has many more dimensions in the post-9/11 world than it had during the Cold War. Threats may come from different sources, at different speeds, and have different targets. All the actors involved in the provision of security from a specific type of threat create a network—not just states or states in intergovernmental organizations, but all the actors in the “ecosystem. If we look at the relationships among these actors using network analysis, we should be able to map the structure of the entire network. Contrary to the assumptions in most International Relations literature, networks can be centralized (as in hierarchical states) or not, as in markets. The networks transnational actors have created to meet different threats exhibit different structures, from dense and highly centralized to diffuse and dispersed. The network’s structure may thus have a positive or negative effect on the provision of security, depending on the type of threat that is to be met

Second asymptomatic carotid surgery trial (ACST-2) : a randomised comparison of carotid artery stenting versus carotid endarterectomy

Background: Among asymptomatic patients with severe carotid artery stenosis but no recent stroke or transient cerebral ischaemia, either carotid artery stenting (CAS) or carotid endarterectomy (CEA) can restore patency and reduce long-term stroke risks. However, from recent national registry data, each option causes about 1% procedural risk of disabling stroke or death. Comparison of their long-term protective effects requires large-scale randomised evidence. Methods: ACST-2 is an international multicentre randomised trial of CAS versus CEA among asymptomatic patients with severe stenosis thought to require intervention, interpreted with all other relevant trials. Patients were eligible if they had severe unilateral or bilateral carotid artery stenosis and both doctor and patient agreed that a carotid procedure should be undertaken, but they were substantially uncertain which one to choose. Patients were randomly allocated to CAS or CEA and followed up at 1 month and then annually, for a mean 5 years. Procedural events were those within 30 days of the intervention. Intention-to-treat analyses are provided. Analyses including procedural hazards use tabular methods. Analyses and meta-analyses of non-procedural strokes use Kaplan-Meier and log-rank methods. The trial is registered with the ISRCTN registry, ISRCTN21144362. Findings: Between Jan 15, 2008, and Dec 31, 2020, 3625 patients in 130 centres were randomly allocated, 1811 to CAS and 1814 to CEA, with good compliance, good medical therapy and a mean 5 years of follow-up. Overall, 1% had disabling stroke or death procedurally (15 allocated to CAS and 18 to CEA) and 2% had non-disabling procedural stroke (48 allocated to CAS and 29 to CEA). Kaplan-Meier estimates of 5-year non-procedural stroke were 2·5% in each group for fatal or disabling stroke, and 5·3% with CAS versus 4·5% with CEA for any stroke (rate ratio [RR] 1·16, 95% CI 0·86-1·57; p=0·33). Combining RRs for any non-procedural stroke in all CAS versus CEA trials, the RR was similar in symptomatic and asymptomatic patients (overall RR 1·11, 95% CI 0·91-1·32; p=0·21). Interpretation: Serious complications are similarly uncommon after competent CAS and CEA, and the long-term effects of these two carotid artery procedures on fatal or disabling stroke are comparable