What if I Get Busted? Deception, Choice, and Decision-Making in Social Interaction

Deception is an essentially social act, yet little is known about how social consequences affect the decision to deceive. In this study, participants played a computerized game of deception without constraints on whether or when to attempt to deceive their opponent. Participants were questioned by an opponent outside the scanner about their knowledge of the content of a display. Importantly, questions were posed so that, in some conditions, it was possible to be deceptive, while in other conditions it was not. To simulate a realistic interaction, participants could be confronted about their claims by the opponent. This design, therefore, creates a context in which a deceptive participant runs the risk of being punished if their deception is detected. Our results show that participants were slower to give honest than to give deceptive responses when they knew more about the display and could use this knowledge for their own benefit. The condition in which confrontation was not possible was associated with increased activity in subgenual anterior cingulate cortex. The processing of a question which allows a deceptive response was associated with activation in right caudate and inferior frontal gyrus. Our findings suggest the decision to deceive is affected by the potential risk of social confrontation rather than the claim itself

Increased Loss Aversion in Unmedicated Patients with Obsessive–Compulsive Disorder

IntroductionObsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) patients show abnormalities in decision-making and, clinically, appear to show heightened sensitivity to potential negative outcomes. Despite the importance of these cognitive processes in OCD, few studies have examined the disorder within an economic decision-making framework. Here, we investigated loss aversion, a key construct in the prospect theory that describes the tendency for individuals to be more sensitive to potential losses than gains when making decisions.MethodsAcross two study sites, groups of unmedicated OCD patients (n = 14), medicated OCD patients (n = 29), and healthy controls (n = 34) accepted or rejected a series of 50/50 gambles containing varying loss/gain values. Loss aversion was calculated as the ratio of the likelihood of rejecting a gamble with increasing potential losses to the likelihood of accepting a gamble with increasing potential gains. Decision times to accept or reject were also examined and correlated with loss aversion.ResultsUnmedicated OCD patients exhibited significantly more loss aversion compared to medicated OCD or controls, an effect that was replicated across both sites and remained significant even after controlling for OCD symptom severity, trait anxiety, and sex. Post hoc analyses further indicated that unmedicated patients’ increased likelihood to reject a gamble as its loss value increased could not be explained solely by greater risk aversion among patients. Unmedicated patients were also slower to accept than reject gambles, effects that were not found in the other two groups. Loss aversion was correlated with decision times in unmedicated patients but not in the other two groups.DiscussionThese data identify abnormalities of decision-making in a subgroup of OCD patients not taking psychotropic medication. The findings help elucidate the cognitive mechanisms of the disorder and suggest that future treatments could aim to target abnormalities of loss/gain processing during decision-making in this population

Social Closeness and Feedback Modulate Susceptibility to the Framing Effect

Although we often seek social feedback (SFB) from others to help us make decisions, little is known about how SFB affects decisions under risk, particularly from a close peer. We conducted two experiments using an established framing task to probe how decision-making is modulated by SFB valence (positive, negative) and the level of closeness with feedback provider (friend, confederate). Participants faced mathematically equivalent decisions framed as either an opportunity to keep (gain frame) or lose (loss frame) part of an initial endowment. Periodically, participants were provided with positive (e.g., “Nice!”) or negative (e.g., “Lame!”) feedback about their choices. Such feedback was provided by either a confederate (Experiment 1) or a gender-matched close friend (Experiment 2). As expected, the framing effect was observed in both experiments. Critically, an individual\u27s susceptibility to the framing effect was modulated by the valence of the SFB, but only when the feedback provider was a close friend. This effect was reflected in the activation patterns of ventromedial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex, regions involved in complex decision-making. Taken together, these results highlight social closeness as an important factor in understanding the impact of SFB on neural mechanisms of decision-making