The US role in the Madrid Peace Process: a conceptual approach

The Madrid Peace Process has been dominated since its beginning in October 1991 by the U.S. as the most important extraregional power. Although Russia is the second official co-sponsor beside the US, it was the United States, who has fostered the Arab-Israeli negotiations substantially by preparing a framework for the meeting of the parties or by suggesting bridging proposals on their own. Moreover it has played a crucial role in implementing the reached accords, either by providing the necessary financial means or by offering political and security-related guarantees. Therefore it is the only player in the international system, which has the political power and the necessary capacities to urge the regional parties to compromises and to enhance security in the region. Moreover it offers security not just to Israel, but also to the oil producing, "conservative" monarchies in the Arab-Persian Gulf, mainly Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. (Párrafo extraído del texto a modo de resumen)Mesa 2: Estados Unidos y el conflicto árabe-israelíInstituto de Relaciones Internacionales (IRI

The US role in the Madrid Peace Process: a conceptual approach

The Madrid Peace Process has been dominated since its beginning in October 1991 by the U.S. as the most important extraregional power. Although Russia is the second official co-sponsor beside the US, it was the United States, who has fostered the Arab-Israeli negotiations substantially by preparing a framework for the meeting of the parties or by suggesting bridging proposals on their own. Moreover it has played a crucial role in implementing the reached accords, either by providing the necessary financial means or by offering political and security-related guarantees. Therefore it is the only player in the international system, which has the political power and the necessary capacities to urge the regional parties to compromises and to enhance security in the region. Moreover it offers security not just to Israel, but also to the oil producing, "conservative" monarchies in the Arab-Persian Gulf, mainly Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. (Párrafo extraído del texto a modo de resumen)Mesa 2: Estados Unidos y el conflicto árabe-israelíInstituto de Relaciones Internacionales (IRI

Partnership plus: on the future of the NATO-Ukraine relationship

The aftermath of the political turmoil in February and the Russian annexation of Crimea in March leave Ukraine politically, economically and militarily weakened. A lack of cohesion within Ukrainian society and centrifugal forces in its regions only serve to complicate matters even more. The country will require foreign assistance, not least in guarding its territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Here there is an important role for NATO. It is currently unclear what thoughts should guide the Alliance as it realigns its relationship with Ukraine. (author's abstract

Reforming NATO's partnerships

Since 1994, NATO has created partnerships as an institutional framework for its relations with countries that cannot or do not want to become Alliance members. In the past 20 years, the circle of countries involved has become ever larger, the associated agenda ever more heterogeneous, and the goals pursued by NATO ever more diverse. The institutional proliferation of partnerships contrasts increasingly with what is potentially expected of them. The existing formats are now overdue for an effectiveness check so that they can be prioritised politically. (author's abstract

A European Security Council: added value for EU foreign and security policy?

A European Security Council (ESC) would -so the German government has suggested- make the European Union (EU) better prepared for making decisions about inter­national politics and thus better able to act. It believes that if the EU and its member states do not manage to take and implement coherent decisions more quickly, their ability to (further) enforce European rules and strengthen multilateral formats will be weakened. The EU-27's diplomatic, financial and military resources should there­fore be supplemented by a format for more effective intergovernmental cooperation. However, this idea can only take shape if the German government can demonstrate the added value of such a body, and if it shows more willingness itself to shape for­eign policy within the EU framework. (Autorenreferat

New European security strategy: the transatlantic factor

"A wave of new foreign policy and security challenges have made certain aspects of earlier European Union strategic thinking obsolete. In response, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has announced her intention to prepare a new European Security Strategy (ESS). The process is to proceed in two stages. First, an analysis of the current strategic coordinates within which the EU’s foreign and security policy must operate will be presented to the summit of heads of state and government in Brussels in June 2015. The second stage will comprise an inclusive, pan-European debate on the EU's external and security roles. The results of that discussion will flow into a new European Security Strategy, whose publication is due in 2016. The question for the member states today is what kind of role the EU should play in the world, and in particular what its relationship to the United States should look like." (author's abstract

The EU will not be able to enforce the UN arms embargo in Libya

On 19 January 2020 a high-level conference was held in Berlin to find solutions to the conflict in Libya between the unity government under Fayez al-Sarraj and the troops led by General Khalifa Haftar. A central agreement in the final declaration aims to stop the unimpeded influx of weapons that external actors are making available to the warring parties. The conference participants committed themselves to "unequivocally and fully respect and implement the arms embargo established by United Nations Secu­rity Council Resolution 1970 (2011) and the Council's subsequent resolutions, including the proliferation of arms from Libya, and call on all international actors to do the same". The declaration thus reaffirms the existing resolutions, revealing its basic problem: So far, the United Nations (UN) has not been able to effectively enforce the current embargo for a variety of reasons. (author's abstract

Central African Republic in crisis: African Union Mission needs United Nations support

On 20 January 2014 the foreign ministers of the EU member-states approved EUFOR RCA Bangui. The six-month mission with about 800 troops is to be deployed as quickly as possible to the Central African Republic. In recent months CAR has witnessed growing inter-religious violence, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians and an ensuing humanitarian disaster. France sent a rapid response force and the African Union expanded its existing mission to 5,400 men. Since the election of the President Catherine Samba-Panza matters appear to be making a tentative turn for the better. But it will be a long time before it becomes apparent whether the decisions of recent weeks have put CAR on the road to solving its elementary structural problems. First of all, tangible successes are required in order to contain the escalating violence. That will require a further increase in AU forces and the deployment of a robust UN mission. (author's abstract

Russia's military intervention in Syria: its operation plan, objectives, and consequences for the West's policies

The deployment and use of Russian air forces in Syria could be a turning-point for President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Since the start of the Russian air strikes on 30 September 2015, discussion has been rife in the media and in political circles as to what intentions Russia might be pursuing with its intervention in Syria. However, if one takes into account the force package deployed to Syria, the manner in which the Russian air forces have proceeded, and the Kremlin’s official statements after the Assad visit to Moscow, the main features of an operation plan quickly emerge. It has repercussions far beyond Syria. (Autorenreferat

More German 'Blue Helmets': four reasons the Federal Republic of Germany should show greater commitment to UN peacekeeping

The German Armed Forces contribute to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This is the first time in more than 20 years that Germany has deployed a strong contingent for a United Nations peacekeeping operation, though the UN’s multilateral crisis management is currently required to operate in very different conflict contexts. The Federal Government should scrutinize how Germany can participate more comprehensively and more strategically in these missions than it has done up to now. There are a number of reasons to sustain, prioritize and extend this commitment which pertains to issues of strategy, personnel policy, training and equipment. (author's abstract