Formal Analysis of the iKP Electronic Payment Protocols

iKP (i-Key-Protocol, i = 1, 2, 3) is a family of electronic payment protocols, developed in early 1995 by a group of researchers at the IBM Research labs in Yorktown Heights and Zurich, and one of the ancestors of well-known SET standard. In this paper, we analyze iKP with respect that they have a property that buyer and seller always agreed on the payment whenever acquirer authorizes it. As the designers of the iKP protocols point out, the 1KP protocol does not possess the property. We found out, however, that there exists a counter example to the 2KP and 3KP protocols. Threfore we propose modification of the 2KP and 3KP protocols so that they can possess the property. We have formally verified that the modified 2KP and 3KP protocols possess the property. In this paper, we describe the verification that the modified 3KP protocol possesses the property.リサーチレポート（北陸先端科学技術大学院大学情報科学研究科

Authenticity and Provability - a Formal Framework

Authentication and non-repudiation are essential security requirements for electronic commerce applications and other types of binding telecooperation. Symmetric and asymmetric encryption techniques and different types of digital signatures can be used to provide these security services. However, cryptographic algorithms can only provide isolated functionality that has to be integrated into more or less complex cryptographic protocols. It is not always clear which security services the resulting protocol provides, making it hard to use the protocol appropriately. In this paper we present a formal method for the specification of e-commerce protocols and transactions on different levels of abstraction. Based on the notions of formal language theory we introduce formalisations of the security services of authenticity and proof of authenticity that are independent of the abstraction level. Language homomorphisms satisfying particular properties preserve the respective security properties from a higher to a lower level of abstraction

Suitability of a classical analysis method for e-commerce protocols

protocol

The Logic of Authentication Protocols

This paper is based on a course Syverson taught at the 1st International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design (FOSAD'00) in Bertinoro, Italy in September 2000. Cervesato was a student there. The work of the first author was supported by ONR. The work of the second author was supported by NSF grant INT98-15731 "Logical Methods for Formal Verification of Software" and by NRL under contract N00173-00-C-208