Urban Planning: a Game Theory Application for the Travel Demand Management

Urban infrastructure in the developing nations is generating a great number of environmental problems. Therefore, the problem of land distribution among road networks, parking spaces and landscaped parks is to be researched. The passenger behavior depends on traffic congestion, parking search time, public transport frequency, parking fee, etc. The travel mode choice model is described by logit function.A city territory is subdivided into three districts, residential, central and industrial, each of them trying to develop and implement the optimal policy of land use. The district criterion includes residential travel times, congestion and impacts of the parks on the environment. Any district should solve the effective land use problem while the public transport system tries to find the optimal frequency.The travel time depends on road capacity and is described by Greenshields model. The influence of parking capacity upon the parking search time is described by the BPR formula.Participants’ solutions influence one another; therefore, the coalition-free game is constructed. The existence of Nash equilibrium is proved for districts, passengers and public transport. The numerical example shows the impacts of value of time (VOT), population density and parking fee rates on districts land use

An Agent-Based Model for Optimization of Road Width and Public Transport Frequency

An urban passenger transportation problem is studied. Municipal authorities and passengers are regarded as participants in the passenger transportation system. The municipal authorities have to optimise road width and public transport frequency. The road consists of a dedicated bus lane and lanes for passenger cars. The car travel time depends on the number of road lanes and passengers’ choice of travel mode. The passengers’ goal is to minimize total travel costs, including time value. The passengers try to find the optimal ratio between public transport and cars. The conflict between municipal authorities and the passengers is described as a game theoretic model. The existence of Nash equilibrium in the model is proved. The numerical example shows the influence of the value of time and intensity of passenger flow on the equilibrium road width and public transport frequency.</p