The Performance of Knowledge: Pointing and Knowledge in Powerpoint Presentations

Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich.This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.Powerpoint and similar technologies have contributed to a profound transformation of lecturing and presenting information. In focusing on pointing in powerpoint presentations, the article addresses aspects of this transformation of speech into 'presentations'. As opposed to popular attacks against powerpoint, the analysis of a large number of audio-visually recorded presentations (mainly in German) demonstrates the creativity of these 'performances', based on the interplay of slides (and other aspects of this technology), speech, pointing and body formations. Pointing seems to be a particular feature of this kind of presentation, allowing knowledge to be located in space. Considering powerpoint as one of the typical technologies of so-called 'knowledge societies', this aspect provides some indication as to the social understanding of knowledge. Instead of 'representing' reality, knowledge is defined by the circularity of speaking and showing, thus becoming presented knowledge rather than representing knowledge

Spatial Voting with Endogenous Timing

voting;political economy;games;general equilibrium

On the profitability of collusion in location games

In this note we take a first step towards the analysis of collusion in markets with spatial competition, focusing on the case of pure location choices. We find that collusion can only be profitable if a coalition contains more than half of all players. This result holds for location games played in k-dimensional Euclidean space as long as consumers are distributed via atomless density functions. For competition on the unit interval, unit circle, and unit square we also derive sufficient conditions for collusion to be profitable. -- Wir untersuchen Kollusion in Märkten, in denen die einzige strategische Variable der Akteure ihre Ortswahl ist. Für Spiele in k-dimensionalen Euklidischen Räumen mit massepunktfreien Verteilungen zeigen wir, dass Kollusion nur profitabel sein kann, wenn wenigstens die Hälfte aller Akteure kolludieren. Für Wettbewerb auf dem Einheitsintervall, dem Einheitskreis und dem Einheitsquadrat etablieren wir hinreichende Bedingungen für die Profitabilität von Kollusion.

Mobilization of Modern Design: Architects' and Artists' Pursuit of Camouflage during World War II

During World War II, architects and artists mobilized their knowledge of color, light, shadow, material, texture and form to assist the military with camouflage, particularly the protective concealment of targets on the ground. Over twenty schools including the Pratt Institute and the Chicago School of Design offered wartime courses in camouflage to train designers in the theories and techniques of civilian defense, concealing factories and confusing aerial bombers. Students learned to isolate basic principles of visual perception and to use them for camouflage projects including the construction of decoys and the use of various materials to 'garnish' the netting draped over guns, trucks and tanks. They were taught to plant trees to disrupt the shadows cast by an object and to use paint for patterning or 'countershading' to blend equipment and buildings with the natural and urban surroundings. Most importantly, the students were taught that in order to conceal a target on the ground, the camoufleur needed to understand the bombardier's view from the air and the 'process of vision' by which he selected and targeted a site on the ground. This vision was enhanced by new technologies including aerial photography, infrared photography and of course the aircraft itself. Practices for deceiving 'both the eye and the camera' were also displayed in a traveling exhibit curated by the Museum of Modern Art in cooperation with the Pratt Institute and the U.S. Army Engineers Board of Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The principles of perception and strategies of concealment in the show informed the public that camouflage was a job for professionals, and that an amateur could do more harm than good by dabbling in it himself. Similarly, the camouflage courses at the Chicago School of Design gave architects and artists the opportunity to collaborate with experts in the United States Armed Forces and in private industry. In all areas of camouflage, architects and artists combined their artistry with an informed understanding of new technologies of vision to support the effort to win the war. Many camouflage manuals speculated that the lessons learned, about the importance of dispersal and of informal arrangements of buildings and landscaping, would remain useful after the war was won.Conference co-organized by the Institute of Fine Arts; Canadian Centre for Architecture, Montreal; and Princeton University's School of Architecture

Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-as-offer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price competition