Collusion through Joint R&D: An Empirical Assessment

This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an oligopolistic setting where firms enter in research joint ventures (RJVs) to lower production costs or coordinate on collusion in the product market. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of RJV-participating firms, which is also necessary and sufficient for a decrease in consumer welfare. Using information from the US National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors – created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time – are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market which reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among non-competitors are efficiency enhancing

Antidumping Protection and Productivity of Domestic Firms: A Firm Level Analysis

We analyze the relationship between Antidumping (AD) Protection and the productivity of EU domestic firms in import-competing industries. For this purpose we identify a panel of domestic firms between 1993 and 2003 that at some point during this period are affected by AD initiations. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find that AD measures result in improvements of measured productivity for domestic firms. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of protected firms increases by 2% in the short-run and by 5% to 13% in the long-run. However, there is substantial heterogeneity across firms. The effect of protection depends on the initial 'distance-to-the-frontier firm?in the industry. While protection raises TFP of 'laggard?domestic firms, it lowers TFP for 'efficient?firms that operate close to the efficiency frontier. These results are consistent with recent theoretical work supporting the view that trade policy, under certain conditions, can induce technological catching-up. While this paper evaluates the effectiveness of AD policy it does not engage in a welfare analysis

R&D Cooperatives and Market Collusion: A Global Dynamic Approach

We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, 1988) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal solution as well as initial marginal cost levels that exceed the choke price. Firms that collude develop further a wider range of initial technologies, pursue innovations more quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion could thus yield higher total surplus

Interpreting the Hours-Technology Time-Varying Relationship

We investigate the time variation in the correlation between hours and technology shocks using a structural business cycle model. We propose an RBC model with a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function that allows for capital- and labor-augmenting technology shocks. We estimate the model using US data with Bayesian techniques. In the full sample, we find (i) evidence in favor of a less than unitary elasticity of substitution (rejecting Cobb-Douglas) and (ii) a sizable role for capital augmenting shock for business cycles fluctuations. In rolling sub-samples, we document that the impact of technology shocks on hours worked varies over time and switches from negative to positive towards the end of the sample. We argue that this change is due to the increase in the elasticity of factor substitution. That is, labor and capital became less complementary throughout the sample inducing a change in the sign and size of the the response of hours. We conjecture that this change may have been induced by a change in the skill composition of the labor input