1,070 research outputs found

    Can knowledge be justified true belief?

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    Knowledge was traditionally held to be justified true belief. This paper examines the implications of maintaining this view if justication is interpreted algorithmically. It is argued that if we move sufficiently far from the small worlds to which Bayesian decision theory properly applies, we can steer between the rock of fallibilism and the whirlpool of skepticism only by explicitly building into our framing of the underlying decision problem the possibility that its attempt to describe the world is inadequate

    Interpersonal comparison of utility

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    Making decisions in large worlds

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    The origins of fair play

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    This paper gives a brief overview of an evolutionary theory of fairness. The ideas are fleshed out in Binmore's book 'Natural Justice' (Oxford University Press, New York, 2005.), which is itself a condensed version of his earlier two-volume book 'Game Theory and the Social Contract' (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994 and 1998)

    Economic man - or straw man?

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    Fairness as a natural phenomenon

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    Do conventions need to be common knowledge?

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    Do conventions need to be common knowledge? David Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann and others militates against Lewis’s approach, because it demonstrates that it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein’s Email Game suggests that coordinated action is equally hard for rational players. But an unnecessary simplifying assumption in the Email Game turns out to be doing all the work, and the paper concludes that common knowledge is better excluded from a definition of the conventions that we use to regulate our daily lives

    Interpersonal comparison in egalitarian societies

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    When judging what is fair, how do we decide how much weight to assign to the conflicting interests of different classes of people? This subject has received some attention in a utilitarian context, but has been largely neglected in the case of egalitarian societies of the kind studied by John Rawls. My Game Theory and the Social Contract considers the problem for a toy society with only two citizens. This paper examines the theoretical difficulties in extending the discussion to societies with more than two citizens

    Experimental economics: where next? rejoinder

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    Experimental economics: science or what?

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    Do we want experimental economics to evolve into a genuine science? This paper uses the literature on inequity aversion as a case study in warning that we are at risk of losing the respect of other scientific disciplines if we continue to accept the wide claims about human behavior that are currently being advanced without examining either the data from which the claims are supposedly derived or the methodology employed in analyzing the data
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