Axiomatic Characterization of the Mean Function on Trees

A mean of a sequence π = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) of elements of a finite metric space (X, d) is an element x for which is minimum. The function Mean whose domain is the set of all finite sequences on X and is defined by Mean(π) = { x | x is a mean of π } is called the mean function on X. In this paper the mean function on finite trees is characterized axiomatically

How Do Households Discount Over Centuries? Evidence from Singapore's Private Housing Market

We examine Singapore's fairly homogeneous private-housing market and show that new apartments on historical multi-century leases trade at a non-zero discount relative to property owned in perpetuity. Descriptive regressions indicate that new apartments with 825 to 986 years of tenure remaining are priced 4 to 6% below new apartments under perpetual ownership contracts that are otherwise comparable. We consider an empirical model in which asset value is decomposed into the utility of housing services and a second factor that shifts with asset tenure and the discount rate schedule. Exploiting the supply of new property with tenure ranging from multiple decades to multiple centuries, we estimate the discount rate schedule, restricting it to vary smoothly over time through alternative parametric forms. Across different specifications and subsamples, we estimate discount rates that decline over time and, accounting for the observed price differences, are of the order of 0.5% p.a. by year 400-500. The finding that households making sizable transactions do not entirely discount benefits accruing many centuries from today is new to the empirical literature on discounting and, with the appropriate risk adjustment, of relevance to evaluating climate-change investments

Adaptive Investment Strategies For Periodic Environments

In this paper, we present an adaptive investment strategy for environments with periodic returns on investment. In our approach, we consider an investment model where the agent decides at every time step the proportion of wealth to invest in a risky asset, keeping the rest of the budget in a risk-free asset. Every investment is evaluated in the market via a stylized return on investment function (RoI), which is modeled by a stochastic process with unknown periodicities and levels of noise. For comparison reasons, we present two reference strategies which represent the case of agents with zero-knowledge and complete-knowledge of the dynamics of the returns. We consider also an investment strategy based on technical analysis to forecast the next return by fitting a trend line to previous received returns. To account for the performance of the different strategies, we perform some computer experiments to calculate the average budget that can be obtained with them over a certain number of time steps. To assure for fair comparisons, we first tune the parameters of each strategy. Afterwards, we compare the performance of these strategies for RoIs with different periodicities and levels of noise.Comment: Paper submitted to Advances in Complex Systems (November, 2007) 22 pages, 9 figure

Utilitarian Collective Choice and Voting

In his seminal Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow stated that his theory applies to voting. Many voting theorists have been convinced that, on account of Arrow’s theorem, all voting methods must be seriously flawed. Arrow’s theory is strictly ordinal, the cardinal aggregation of preferences being explicitly rejected. In this paper I point out that all voting methods are cardinal and therefore outside the reach of Arrow’s result. Parallel to Arrow’s ordinal approach, there evolved a consistent cardinal theory of collective choice. This theory, most prominently associated with the work of Harsanyi, continued the older utilitarian tradition in a more formal style. The purpose of this paper is to show that various derivations of utilitarian SWFs can also be used to derive utilitarian voting (UV). By this I mean a voting rule that allows the voter to score each alternative in accordance with a given scale. UV-k indicates a scale with k distinct values. The general theory leaves k to be determined on pragmatic grounds. A (1,0) scale gives approval voting. I prefer the scale (1,0,-1) and refer to the resulting voting rule as evaluative voting. A conclusion of the paper is that the defects of conventional voting methods result not from Arrow’s theorem, but rather from restrictions imposed on voters’ expression of their preferences. The analysis is extended to strategic voting, utilizing a novel set of assumptions regarding voter behavior

Modularity and Optimality in Social Choice

Marengo and the second author have developed in the last years a geometric model of social choice when this takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, showing that by bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority has the power of determining the social outcome. In this paper we will tie the model above to tournament theory, solving some of the mathematical problems arising in their work and opening new questions which are interesting not only from a mathematical and a social choice point of view, but also from an economic and a genetic one. In particular, we will introduce the notion of u-local optima and we will study it from both a theoretical and a numerical/probabilistic point of view; we will also describe an algorithm that computes the universal basin of attraction of a social outcome in O(M^3 logM) time (where M is the number of social outcomes).Comment: 42 pages, 4 figures, 8 tables, 1 algorithm

Boolean delay equations on networks: An application to economic damage propagation

We introduce economic models based on Boolean Delay Equations: this formalism makes easier to take into account the complexity of the interactions between firms and is particularly appropriate for studying the propagation of an initial damage due to a catastrophe. Here we concentrate on simple cases, which allow to understand the effects of multiple concurrent production paths as well as the presence of stochasticity in the path time lengths or in the network structure. In absence of flexibility, the shortening of production of a single firm in an isolated network with multiple connections usually ends up by attaining a finite fraction of the firms or the whole economy, whereas the interactions with the outside allow a partial recovering of the activity, giving rise to periodic solutions with waves of damage which propagate across the structure. The damage propagation speed is strongly dependent upon the topology. The existence of multiple concurrent production paths does not necessarily imply a slowing down of the propagation, which can be as fast as the shortest path.Comment: Latex, 52 pages with 22 eps figure

The Limits to Sustainability Science: Ecological Constraints or Endless Innovation?

Ecological principles must govern sustainability, yet sustainability science is largely concerned with social-environmental interactions and barely considers physical limits on resource use. Whether it is possible to overcome such limits can be contested, but the issues raised by a macroecological perspective should be a fundamental part of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20)

Disclosing physician ratings: performance effects and the difficulty of altering rating consensus

I examine effects of a health care system's policy to publicly disclose patient ratings of its physicians. I find evidence that this policy leads to performance improvement by the disclosed, subjective ratings and also by undisclosed, objective measures of quality. These effects are consistent with multitasking theory, in that physicians respond to the disclosure by providing more of a shared input—time with patients—that benefits performance by ratings and underlying quality. I also find, as predicted by information cascade theory, that the ratings become jammed to some degree near initially disclosed values. Specifically, raters observe the pattern of initial ratings and follow suit by providing similar ratings. Finally, I find evidence that physicians anticipate rating jamming and so concentrate their effort on earlier performance in order to set a pattern of high ratings that later ratings follow. These results demonstrate that the disclosure of subjective ratings can benefit performance broadly but can also shift effort toward earlier performance

Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView