Operation of FDI caps in India and corporate control mechanisms

While India has generally been following an open door FDI policy, a few areas are still subject to caps on FDI and/or specific government approval. One of the justifications for the same is the need to retain a degree of control over the operations of the investee companies in Indian hands. Earlier this year, the government specified the methodology for calculating direct and indirect foreign equity in Indian companies in order to remove ambiguities in calculating the extent of FDI in a company. Based on empirical evidence this paper argues that percentage of shares or proportion of directors do not necessarily represent the extent of control and more direct intervention would be required if the objectives of imposing the caps are to be achieved.FDI; corporate control, veto powers, India, joint control, joint ventures, corporate governance

India's FDI Inflows: Trends and Concepts

India’s inward investment regime went through a series of changes since economic reforms were ushered in two decades back. The expectation of the policy makers was that an “investor friendly” regime will help India establish itself as a preferred destination of foreign investors. These expectations remained largely unfulfilled despite the consistent attempts by the policy makers to increase the attractiveness of India by further changes in policies that included opening up of individual sectors, raising the hitherto existing caps on foreign holding and improving investment procedures. But after 2005‐06, official statistics started reporting steep increases in FDI inflows. This paper is an attempt to explain this divergence from the earlier trend. At the outset, the paper dwells on the ambiguities surrounding the definition and the non‐adherence of international norms in measuring the FDI inflows. The study finds that portfolio investors and round-tripping investments have been important contributors to India’s reported FDI inflows thus blurring the distinction between direct and portfolio investors on one hand and foreign and domestic investors on the other. These investors were also the ones which have exploited the tax haven route most. These observations acquire added significance in the context of the substantial fall in the inflows seen during 2010‐11. In most countries, particularly those that have faced chronic current account deficits, obtaining stable long term FDI flows was preferred over volatile portfolio investments. This distinction between long term FDI and the volatile portfolio investments has now been removed in the accepted official definition of FDI. From an analytical point of view, the blurring of the lines between long term FDI and the volatile portfolio investments has meant that the essential characteristics of FDI, especially the positive spill‐overs that the long term FDI was seen to result in, are being overlooked. FDI that is dominated by financial investments, though a little more stable than the portfolio investments through the stock market, cannot deliver the perceived advantages of FDI. The net result is that while much of the FDI cannot enhance India’s ability to earn foreign exchange through exports of goods and services and thus cover the current account gap on its own strength, large inflows of portfolio capital causes currency appreciation and erodes the competitiveness of domestic players. The falling share of manufacturing and even of IT and ITES means that there is less likelihood of FDI directly contributing to export earnings. India seems to have been caught in a trap wherein large inflows are regularly required in order to finance the current account deficit. To keep FDI flowing in, the investment regime has to be liberalised further and M&As are allowed freely. Even at the global level, the developmental impact of FDI is being given lesser importance notwithstanding the repeated assertions to the contrary in some fora. International data on FDI and its impact has never been unambiguous. If FDI has to deliver, it has to be defined precisely and chosen with care instead of treating it as generic capital flow. India should strengthen its information base that will allow a proper assessment of the impact that FDI can make on its development aspirations

India's FDI Inflows: Trends and Concepts

India’s inward investment regime went through a series of changes since economic reforms were ushered in two decades back. The expectation of the policy makers was that an “investor friendly” regime will help India establish itself as a preferred destination of foreign investors. These expectations remained largely unfulfilled despite the consistent attempts by the policy makers to increase the attractiveness of India by further changes in policies that included opening up of individual sectors, raising the hitherto existing caps on foreign holding and improving investment procedures. But after 2005‐06, official statistics started reporting steep increases in FDI inflows. This paper is an attempt to explain this divergence from the earlier trend. At the outset, the paper dwells on the ambiguities surrounding the definition and the non‐adherence of international norms in measuring the FDI inflows. The study finds that portfolio investors and round-tripping investments have been important contributors to India’s reported FDI inflows thus blurring the distinction between direct and portfolio investors on one hand and foreign and domestic investors on the other. These investors were also the ones which have exploited the tax haven route most. These observations acquire added significance in the context of the substantial fall in the inflows seen during 2010‐11. In most countries, particularly those that have faced chronic current account deficits, obtaining stable long term FDI flows was preferred over volatile portfolio investments. This distinction between long term FDI and the volatile portfolio investments has now been removed in the accepted official definition of FDI. From an analytical point of view, the blurring of the lines between long term FDI and the volatile portfolio investments has meant that the essential characteristics of FDI, especially the positive spill‐overs that the long term FDI was seen to result in, are being overlooked. FDI that is dominated by financial investments, though a little more stable than the portfolio investments through the stock market, cannot deliver the perceived advantages of FDI. The net result is that while much of the FDI cannot enhance India’s ability to earn foreign exchange through exports of goods and services and thus cover the current account gap on its own strength, large inflows of portfolio capital causes currency appreciation and erodes the competitiveness of domestic players. The falling share of manufacturing and even of IT and ITES means that there is less likelihood of FDI directly contributing to export earnings. India seems to have been caught in a trap wherein large inflows are regularly required in order to finance the current account deficit. To keep FDI flowing in, the investment regime has to be liberalised further and M&As are allowed freely. Even at the global level, the developmental impact of FDI is being given lesser importance notwithstanding the repeated assertions to the contrary in some fora. International data on FDI and its impact has never been unambiguous. If FDI has to deliver, it has to be defined precisely and chosen with care instead of treating it as generic capital flow. India should strengthen its information base that will allow a proper assessment of the impact that FDI can make on its development aspirations

FDI in Multi-brand Retail Trade and the Safeguards

After a long and winding process, India opened the retail trade to foreign direct investment (RFDI) albeit with some caveats. The process, however, suggests that the case of RFDI provides a classic example of large global corporations succeeding in influencing public policy of developing countries and putting the regulatory system to stupor with the backing of powerful home governments. Starting from the mid-2000s when it started seeking to expand its global operations, there have been repeated attempts by Walmart to meet important relevant functionaries in India. Once the policy makers were convinced either on their own or due to the intense and sustained lobbying from abroad, the process has been unidirectional. The process also suggests that the protection offered by the safeguards could be illusory

Operation of FDI caps in India and corporate control mechanisms

While India has generally been following an open door FDI policy, a few areas are still subject to caps on FDI and/or specific government approval. One of the justifications for the same is the need to retain a degree of control over the operations of the investee companies in Indian hands. Earlier this year, the government specified the methodology for calculating direct and indirect foreign equity in Indian companies in order to remove ambiguities in calculating the extent of FDI in a company. Based on empirical evidence this paper argues that percentage of shares or proportion of directors do not necessarily represent the extent of control and more direct intervention would be required if the objectives of imposing the caps are to be achieved

The Tenuous Relationship between Make in India and FDI Inflows

“The Tenuous Relationship between Make in India and FDI Inflows”, analyses the empirical issues in measuring the FDI inflows and highlights the problems in attributing FDI inflows to specific policy measures. In view of major inaccuracies in the reported data, reporting delays and mis-classification, it finds that the surge in FDI inflows in the recent past cannot be really attributed to the ‘Make in India’ initiatives

FDI in Multi-brand Retail Trade and the Safeguards

After a long and winding process, India opened the retail trade to foreign direct investment (RFDI) albeit with some caveats. The process, however, suggests that the case of RFDI provides a classic example of large global corporations succeeding in influencing public policy of developing countries and putting the regulatory system to stupor with the backing of powerful home governments. Starting from the mid-2000s when it started seeking to expand its global operations, there have been repeated attempts by Walmart to meet important relevant functionaries in India. Once the policy makers were convinced either on their own or due to the intense and sustained lobbying from abroad, the process has been unidirectional. The process also suggests that the protection offered by the safeguards could be illusory

Indefinite Definition of FDI

The issue of differentiating between FDI and FPI is related to the functional aspects of the investments. The internationally adopted definition which relies on a numerical benchmark of 10% is thus of limited practical utility for policy makers. However, because of its widespread adoption and ease of identification, there could be preference for the 10% criterion especially because it removes the arbitrariness in identifying control/influence. There is a large variety in even within FDI and FPI. Definitions and classifications should therefore follow behaviour rather than the other way round. This note argues that while control/influence is a better indicator of the effectiveness of foreign association through investment in risk capital, since foreign investors’ objectives in exercising that control/influence could differ significantly between financial investors and others, a case-by-case approach is preferable in case of sectors where foreign control is seen to be inimical to national interests and sensitivities. Since control is unavoidable in many situations and if the policy makers are convinced that there is no alternative to have foreign investment, they will have to settle for some tolerable level of foreign control. The oft-used 49% foreign share in equity and majority in the board of directors by Indian partners do not guarantee local control

Indefinite Definition of FDI

The issue of differentiating between FDI and FPI is related to the functional aspects of the investments. The internationally adopted definition which relies on a numerical benchmark of 10% is thus of limited practical utility for policy makers. However, because of its widespread adoption and ease of identification, there could be preference for the 10% criterion especially because it removes the arbitrariness in identifying control/influence. There is a large variety in even within FDI and FPI. Definitions and classifications should therefore follow behaviour rather than the other way round. This note argues that while control/influence is a better indicator of the effectiveness of foreign association through investment in risk capital, since foreign investors’ objectives in exercising that control/influence could differ significantly between financial investors and others, a case-by-case approach is preferable in case of sectors where foreign control is seen to be inimical to national interests and sensitivities. Since control is unavoidable in many situations and if the policy makers are convinced that there is no alternative to have foreign investment, they will have to settle for some tolerable level of foreign control. The oft-used 49% foreign share in equity and majority in the board of directors by Indian partners do not guarantee local control