Edge-Fault Tolerance of Hypercube-like Networks

This paper considers a kind of generalized measure $\lambda_s^{(h)}$ of fault tolerance in a hypercube-like graph $G_n$ which contain several well-known interconnection networks such as hypercubes, varietal hypercubes, twisted cubes, crossed cubes and M\"obius cubes, and proves $\lambda_s^{(h)}(G_n)= 2^h(n-h)$ for any $h$ with $0\leqslant h\leqslant n-1$ by the induction on $n$ and a new technique. This result shows that at least $2^h(n-h)$ edges of $G_n$ have to be removed to get a disconnected graph that contains no vertices of degree less than $h$. Compared with previous results, this result enhances fault-tolerant ability of the above-mentioned networks theoretically

The observed charmed hadron Λc(2940)+\Lambda_c(2940)^+ and the D∗ND^*N interaction

In this work, we systematically study the interaction of $D^*$ and nucleon, which is stimulated by the observation of $\Lambda_c(2940)^+$ close to the threshold of $D^*p$. Our numerical result obtained by the dynamical investigation indicates the existence of the $D^*N$ systems with $J^P=1/2^\pm,\,3/2^\pm$, which not only provides valuable information to understand the underlying structure of $\Lambda_c(2940)^+$ but also improves our knowledge of the interaction of $D^*$ and nucleon. Additionally, the bottom partners of the $D^*N$ systems are predicted, which might be as one of the tasks in LHCb experiment.Comment: 8 pages, 6 Figures. Accepted for publication in Phys. Rev.

How Opportunity Costs Decrease the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game

This paper shows that the opportunity costs resulting from economic interdependence decrease the equilibrium probability of war in an incomplete information game. This result is strongly consistent with existing empirical analyses of the inverse trade-conflict relationship, but is the opposite of the conclusion reached by Gartzke et al. (2001), who reject the opportunity cost argument in a game-theoretic framework. As a result of this paper's findings, one cannot dismiss the opportunity cost argument as the explanation why trading nations fight less. Instead this study reaffirms the central position of opportunity costs as the basis for the inverse trade-conflict relationship, thus implying that one need not rely on signaling.war, conflict, trade, trade-conflict relationship, interdependence, incomplete information game, signaling