Optimal taxation of a monopolistic extractor: are subsidies necessary?

In a standard partial equilibrium model of resource depletion, this paper charac- terizes and examines the solution to the optimal taxation problem when extraction is monopolistic. The main result is that the family of subgame perfect effciency- inducing tax/subsidy schemes may include some strict tax policies. This illustrates how the static trade-off between inducing effciency and raising tax revenues in the presence of market power is relaxed under exhaustibility.Exhaustible resources, Imperfect competition, Optimal taxation

Fossil fuels supplied by oligopolies: On optimal taxation and rent capture

This article investigates the optimal taxation of a polluting exhaustible resource supplied by an oligopoly in a partial equilibrium model. A single tax/subsidy scheme is sufficient to correct both distortions arising from market power and pollution externality. Moreover, there exists an infinite family of such optimal taxation instruments. Then, I study how this set is affected by the degree of concentration of the resource suppliers. In particular, the more concentrated the extraction sector, the less falling (or the more rising) over time the optimal tax rate. Finally, although concentration tends to increase the total rent of the extraction sector, it reduces the potential tax revenues to be earned by the regulator while inducing efficiency.

Taxation of Oil Products and GDP Dynamics of Oil-rich Countries

This article proposes a complementary explanation for why oil-rich economies have experienced a relative low GDP growth over the last decades: the proportion of taxes in the prices of petroleum products have been globally increasing for the four last decades, thus making oil revenues grow slower than output from manufacturing and yielding a low growth of oil-exporting countries' GDPs. This is illustrated in a two-country model of oil depletion examining why a net oil-exporting country and a net oil-importing country are dierently affected by increasing taxes on the resource use. The hypothesis is constructed on the theory of non-renewable resources taxation. The argument is based on the distributional effects of taxes on exhaustible resources, that are mainly borne by the suppliers. The theoretical predictions are not invalidated when put up against available statistics.Oil curse, Non-renewable resources, Taxes, Oil revenues, GDP

Taxation of Oil Products and GDP Dynamics of Oil-Rich Countries

This article proposes a complementary explanation for why oil-rich economies have experienced a relative low GDP growth over the last decades: the proportion of taxes in the prices of petroleum products have been globally increasing in the last four decades, making oil revenues grow slower than output from manufacturing and yielding a low GDP growth for oil-exporting countries. This is illustrated in a two-country model of oil depletion which examines why a net oil-exporting country and a net oil-importing country are differently affected by increased taxes on resource use. The hypothesis is constructed on the theory of non-renewableresources taxation. The argument is based on the distributional effects of taxes on exhaustible resources, which are mainly borne by the suppliers. The theoretical predictions are not invalidated by available statistics

Taxation of Oil Products and GDP Dynamics of Oil-Rich Countries

This article proposes a complementary explanation for why oil-rich economies have experienced a relative low GDP growth over the last decades: the proportion of taxes in the prices of petroleum products have been globally increasing in the last four decades, making oil revenues grow slower than output from manufacturing and yielding a low GDP growth for oil-exporting countries. This is illustrated in a two-country model of oil depletion which examines why a net oil-exporting country and a net oil-importing country are differently affected by increased taxes on resource use. The hypothesis is constructed on the theory of non-renewableresources taxation. The argument is based on the distributional effects of taxes on exhaustible resources, which are mainly borne by the suppliers. The theoretical predictions are not invalidated by available statistics