Burundi after the 2015 Elections: A Conference Report

Seit die umstrittene Wiederwahl von Präsident Nkurunziza in Burundi heftige Proteste auslöste, steht das Land ganz oben auf der internationalen Agenda; die Erforschung der erneut ausgebrochenen Unruhen steckt allerdings noch in den Kinderschuhen. Die Teilnehmer eines Workshops am 3./4. März 2016 in Freiburg befassten sich mit der aktuellen Krise und bemühten sich, über kurzfristige Erklärungen und Versuche zur Theoriebildung hinauszugehen. Mit besonderem Interesse widmete man sich der Wechselbeziehung zwischen Versuchen von außen, die Krise zu lösen, und Auseinandersetzungen im Inneren des Landes. Zu den diskutierten Fragen gehörte die Konstruktion Burundis als Beispiel für einen erfolgreichen Übergang zum Frieden, das vernachlässigte Erbe des Bürgerkriegs und die offensichtliche Inadäquatheit früherer Ansätze zur Bewältigung der derzeitigen Krise, wie Reform des Sicherheitssektors, Machtteilung und Amtszeitbeschränkungen. Diese Ausweitung der Thematik ermöglichte es den Teilnehmern, Ansätze neu zu durchdenken, die seit dem Jahr 2000 zur Erfassung des Friedensprozesses in Burundi entwickelt worden sind.The unrest in Burundi following President Nkurunziza's controversial re-election has put the country high on the international agenda, but research on the resurgence of turmoil is still in its infancy. A workshop held on 3 and 4 March 2016 in Freiburg, Germany, whose focus was Burundi after the 2015 elections, aimed to go beyond short-term accounts of the current unrests and extend past theorising in an attempt to address the current conflict. Special attention was paid to the interaction between external attempts to address the crisis and domestic contestation. The issues examined included the construction of Burundi as a case of successful transition to peace, the conflict’s neglected legacies, and the (perceived) inadequacy of past approaches to address the current crisis, such as security sector reform, power sharing, and term limits. This also allowed us to rethink approaches developed to understand peacebuilding in Burundi since 2000

Regional sanctions against Burundi: the regime's argumentative self-entrapment

This paper examines the impact of regional sanctions on the trajectory of the Burundian regime following the 1996 coup. Despite the country's socioeconomic and geopolitical vulnerability, the Buyoya government initially withstood the pressure from sanctions. Through a vocal campaign against these measures, the new government mitigated the embargo's economic consequences and partially re-established its international reputation. Paradoxically, this campaign planted the seed for long-term comprehensive political concessions. While previous literature has attributed the embargo's success to its economic impact, the government actually responded to the sanction senders' key demand to engage in unconditional, inclusive peace talks once the economy had already started to recover. Based on a novel framework for studying the signalling dimension of sanctions, I show how the regime's anti-sanctions campaign, with its emphasis on the government's willingness to engage in peace talks, backfired, with Buyoya forced to negotiate after having become entrapped in his own rhetoric

Ten Things to Watch in Africa in 2023

Russia's war against Ukraine has accelerated international competition for influence in Africa. Structural weaknesses and post-pandemic instabilities continue to threaten achievements in the fields of democratic governance, peace and security, as well as development. We present a select list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2023. Politics: Democratic quality will depend on the nature of polls, as the electoral calendar is heavily packed. Important general elections that could trigger social unrest are scheduled in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. Peace and security: Against the backdrop of continued structural-conflict risks, Jihadism and related ethno-regional tensions pose a major security challenge that may spill over to neighbouring states, especially from the Sahel to West African coastal countries. The recent ceasefire in Ethiopia's Tigray Region could be a first positive step towards peace. International arena: Amid Russia's war against Ukraine, many African governments were reluctant to join the international coalition condemning the Putin regime. Continued Western pressure on African countries to isolate Russia fosters African agency. At the same time, we expect to see an intensifying "new scramble for Africa" that includes both China and Middle Eastern countries. Socio-economic development: African countries will slowly rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic's socio-economic effects, but high poverty, inequality, and government debt hamper economic growth. Progress on joint efforts to counter the climate crisis remains slow. Western support for African countries in their struggle for democracy, peace and security, as well as development requires a "new start" that focuses on prevention rather than ad hoc responses to current crises. The European Union and United States should avoid lapsing into Cold War habits of only assisting African governments if they "break away" from Russia. Germany needs to formulate a sound Africa policy that balances values and national interests with realistic assessments of the policy's potential in light of bigger players like China

Easier In Than Out: The Protracted Process of Ending Sanctions

With the proliferation of sanctions after the end of the Cold War, sanctions termination has also become a ubiquitous phenomenon. Of the 292 sanctions cases since 1990, around 85 per cent had been lifted as of 2018. Purportedly unsuccessful sanctions - such as the European Union's restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine - often provoke intense political debate about their potential removal. Less than half of imposed sanctions end with some degree of target compliance. For example, trade and financial restrictions imposed on Iran over its nuclear programme were lifted after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action significantly restricted the country’s levels of uranium enrichment. In contrast, the EU resumed development aid to Sudan even though the regime remained notorious for its human rights violations. Policymakers must thus regularly decide whether to hold onto measures that do not lead to a policy change or to capitulate and lift them. These considerations are not only influenced by rational, cost-benefit analyses. Instead, sanctions termination is a volatile and often inconclusive process shaped by multiple social interactions between senders and targets as well as their diverse logics of action. The removal of sanctions signals the end of the targeted regime’s visible international isolation. Such a symbolic act can be heavily contested, as controversies over the relaxation of United States sanctions against Cuba exemplify. Decisions regarding the design of sanctions during their imposition phase affect the eventual termination process. Some sanctions regimes contain revision provisions, expiry dates, and precise termination requirements, which ensures the regular assessment of the measures’ continued political usefulness

Talking past each other: regional and domestic resistance in the Burundian intervention scene

Peacebuilding attempts invoke a considerable amount of friction. In this article we argue that these frictional encounters can be made visible by focusing on articulations of resistance voiced by different actors in the intervention scene, including national elites and interveners. Departing from the discussion of the regionally led facilitation in Burundi, we show that the respective national elites and African interveners referred to different scales in order to legitimise their resistance: the Great Lakes Peace Initiative for Burundi resisted sedimented continental practices as well as international attempts to impose their conceptions of peace, whereas the Burundian elites repeatedly rejected regionally sponsored 'solutions' with reference to the domestic situation. Drawing on interviews with and statements by diverse national and regional forces, we show how claims to resist were articulated with respect to different spatial reference points and thereby explore how regional and domestic actors talked past each other

Ten Things to Watch in Africa in 2022

Two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, there are signs that sub-Saharan Africa will experience a modest recovery in 2022. Yet at least in the first half of the year, the region will continue to suffer from inadequate provision and administration of vaccines. In addition, violent conflicts and structural weaknesses constitute considerable challenges. We present a selective list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2022. Politics: Last year saw a number of military coups, which may foreshadow future takeovers by armies in Africa. Pivotal elections lie ahead that could trigger the outbreak of violence, for instance in Kenya. Political heavyweight South Africa is in a severe socio-economic crisis that is engendering growing public anger, and the governing African National Congress is experiencing increasingly deepening internal rifts. Violent conflicts: The civil war in Ethiopia puts the state’s integrity at risk and could further undermine stability in the whole Horn of Africa. Jihadism represents a major security threat on the continent that needs to be tackled by African and international actors. A focus should lie on addressing root causes and on preventing crises. Development: It will take years for African countries to rebound from the pandemic’s socio-economic repercussions. Structural problems such as high poverty, inequality, and government debt hamper economic growth and the effects of climate change are strongly felt in many African countries already. The year 2022 will be crucial for devising the next steps for continental economic integration. International arena: Africa is a sought-after international partner. Several actors including China, Turkey, the United States, and the European Union and its member countries are vying for political and economic influence. This competition will further intensify. African countries getting their full share of COVID-19 vaccines will be important. African and international partners need to expand support for the COVAX initiative and boost public health systems. The approaching EU–African Union summit in February represents an opportunity to step up cooperation to strengthen regional economic integration, democratic development, and the fight against climate change. Based on its coalition agreement, the new German government should be a main driver of this partnership

Sanctions can be counter-productive in instigating democratic reform in authoritarian regimes

International sanctions are one of the most commonly used tools to instigate democratisation in the post-Cold War era. However, despite long-term sanction pressure from the West, non-democratic rule has proven to be extremely persistent. Based on new research from 1990 to 2011, Julia Grauvogel and Christian von Soest provide new insights for the research on sanctions and on authoritarian regimes. Most significantly, sanctions strengthen authoritarian rule if the regime manages to incorporate their existence into its legitimation strategy

Ten Things to Watch in Africa in 2024

Democracy will remain under pressure in Africa, with key elections coming up in 2024. While conflict risks could intensify, the decline of Western influence will continue. Structural socio-economic challenges are likely to persist despite economic growth. The Africa Cup of Nations will be a highlight at the beginning of the year. We present here a list of "Ten Things to Watch in Africa" in 2024. Politics: With the recent wave of military coups, democracy has come under pressure. Further coups remain a risk, especially in countries with politicised militaries and political crises. Important general elections will, inter alia, be held in Ghana and South Africa where heavy losses for the ruling parties are expected. Peace and security: Coups are often connected to armed conflicts. The spillover of jihadism and related ethno-regional tensions in West Africa will be a major security challenge. In the Horn of Africa, the ceasefire in Ethiopia's Tigray Region seems to be holding but the country remains instable. Internationally: Similar to Russia's war on Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas conflict also divides African governments. The relative decline of Western influence is likely to continue, not least regarding military presence. Growing anti-immigration sentiment in Europe has made migration a salient issue in African-European relations. Socio-economic development: African economies are set to experience continued growth that will, however, vary across countries, while debt remains a formidable challenge. Green deals are likely to remain sluggish

Trotz aller Widrigkeiten: Demokratie in Afrika

In vielen afrikanischen Ländern sind wichtige institutionelle, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Voraussetzungen für Demokratie nicht erfüllt. Dennoch ist seit 1990 eine Zunahme demokratischer Machtwechsel zu verzeichnen. Wo Institutionen allein zu schwach sind, um politischen Pluralismus sicherzustellen, haben zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen eine wichtige Vorbild- und Kontrollfunktion. In Subsahara-Afrika bilden stabile Demokratien die zahlenmäßig kleinste Staatengruppe. Deutlich größer ist die Zahl der Autokratien. Die Mehrzahl der politischen Regime bewegt sich aber in der Grauzone zwischen beiden Polen. Charakteristisch für diese Regime ist das Nebeneinander von formal demokratischen Wahlen und deutlichen Einschränkungen der politischen Opposition. Regelmäßige Machtwechsel durch Wahlen sind ein zentraler Baustein der Demokratie. Sie stärken das Vertrauen der Bevölkerung und der Eliten in die Verlässlichkeit politischer Institutionen und verhindern eine langfristige Monopolisierung der Macht. Allerdings haben Amtsinhaber im Allgemeinen größere Chancen auf einen Sieg bei Wahlen als Kandidaten der Opposition. Regimekritische Organisationen sind zunehmend von gezielten Einschränkungen betroffen. Durch neue Organisationsformen konnten sie sich bislang aber Handlungsspielräume erhalten. So hat sich seit 2009 die Teilnehmerzahl an Massendemonstrationen vervierfacht. Selbst autoritäre Regime halten Wahlen ab, um sich einen demokratischen Anstrich zu geben. Externe Akteure sollten daher auf die Einhaltung von Amtszeitbeschränkungen drängen und unabhängige Wahlkommissionen finanziell und technisch unterstützen. Zudem benötigen demokratische Graswurzelbewegungen angesichts schwindender Spielräume ("Shrinking Spaces") flexible finanzielle, vor allem aber politische Unterstützung

Burundi vor den Wahlen: Kontinuität statt Wandel

Trotz bestätigter Covid-19-Fälle hält Burundi bisher am Zeitplan für die Wahlen fest, die am 20. Mai 2020 stattfinden sollen. Der bisherige Präsident Pierre Nkurunziza tritt nicht mehr an. Stattdessen kandidiert sein Parteifreund, der General Evariste Ndayishimiye. Die Regierungspartei hat seine Nominierung als Zeichen der Demokratisierung des Landes dargestellt. Als Mitglied ihres Führungszirkels steht Ndayishimiye jedoch nicht für einen glaubwürdigen Wandel. Dem jüngsten Bericht der Untersuchungskommission der Vereinten Nationen zu Burundi zufolge stellen die Wahlen ein großes Risiko für das Land dar, das bereits im Jahr 2015 infolge der umstrittenen dritten Amtszeit Nkurunzizas eine politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Krise erlebte. Burundi hat sich in Richtung eines Einparteienstaates entwickelt. Die Arbeit der größten Oppositionspartei Congrès National pour la Liberté (CNL) wird systematisch behindert. Im Vorfeld der Wahlen bedroht vor allem die Jugendmiliz Imbonerakure CNL-Mitglieder. Die Presse-, Meinungs- und Versammlungsfreiheit ist stark eingeschränkt. Unabhängige Medien sehen sich mit Zensur oder Auflösung durch die nationale Medienkommission konfrontiert. Auch die Aktivitäten von in- und ausländischen Nichtregierungsorganisationen werden streng überwacht und für viele im Exil lebende Burundierinnen und Burundier ist eine Rückkehr nicht möglich. Trotz des zu erwartenden Wechsels an der Spitze des Staates ist die politische Entwicklung in Burundi von Kontinuität geprägt. Ndayishimiyes versöhnliche Rhetorik seit seiner Nominierung bietet dennoch die Chance einer Annäherung an die internationale Gemeinschaft. Die Einflussmöglichkeiten von außen sind begrenzt, da eine direkte Zusammenarbeit mit der autoritären Regierung die Glaubwürdigkeit des bisherigen Engagements für Demokratie und Menschenrechte unterminieren würde. Ein völliger Rückzug ist jedoch ebenfalls kontraproduktiv. Stattdessen sollten Zivilgesellschaft und demokratische Opposition weiter unterstützt und humanitäre Hilfe geleistet werden. Außerdem ist eine kohärente EU-Positionierung wichtig