Understanding the effects of the merger boom on community banks

The merger boom in the U.S. banking industry has caused the number of banking organizations in the nation to fall by nearly a third since 1990. Most of this contraction has involved small community banks. ; A common perception is that most of these small banks are being absorbed by large banks. The disappearance of small banks is raising concerns in many communities because small banks are often a major source of personal services and relationship lending to local businesses and depositors. ; Jagtiani investigates the merger boom in detail and suggests that the merger boom actually has the potential to strengthen the community banking sector, as some community banks are taken over by other, more efficiently run community banks located in the same state. Thus, the community banks that have survived the merger boom may be in a good position to continue serving the local businesses and depositors who value personal service and relationship lending.Community banks ; Bank mergers ; Banks and banking

Risk and Market Segmentation in Financial Intermediaries’ Returns

This study examines both the quantity and price of risk exposure for different segments of financial intermediaries in order to determine whether market segmentation exists in the financial services industry in the United States. We distinguish between depository institutions, securities firms, insurance companies, mutual funds, and other financial firms using each company s SIC code. We find evidence of market segmentation in both market risk levels and market risk premiums. The results provide little evidence of interest rate risk exposure across all types of financial intermediaries, suggesting the prevalence of hedging programs using interest rate derivatives. However, the market prices interest rate risk exposure differentially by type of financial intermediary. We find that as a market segment, insurance companies were exposed to more interest rate risk particularly in the period late 1980 s to early 1990 s. The interest rate risk premium for banks was among the highest of all financial intermediaries. Overall, we find that securities firms, as a group, have the most market risk exposure, followed in order of descending market beta, by banks, other financial firms, insurance companies, and mutual funds, although the order is reversed when examining the market risk premium. Indeed, we find support for an inverse relationship between the quantity and price for market risk, but not for interest rate risk. When we investigate the impact of two regulatory policy changes, we find that (1) the shift in the conduct of monetary policy towards targeting of monetary aggregates induced banks to take on more market risk, probably due to a decline in their charter value; (2) bank market risk-taking increased further with the introduction of riskbased capital requirements which further reduce charter value for banks; and (3) insurance companies are subject to the highest interest rate risk premiums during the 1988-1994 subperiod, following by commercial banks, probably due to interest rate risk subsidy under the risk-based capital requirements. Overall, during the period 1974-1994, banks increased their market risk exposure despite the tightening of regulatory restrictions, insurance companies increased their interest rate risk exposure over the subperiods. We create synthetic universal banks comprised of portfolios of banks, securities firms, and insurance companies. We find that the synthetic universal banks have significantly positive excess returns, with lower market and interest rate risk exposures and higher expected returns than securities firms. This paper was presented at the Financial Institutions Center's October 1996 conference on "

Can banks circumvent minimum capital requirements? The case of mortgage portfolios under Basel II

The recent mortgage crisis has resulted in several bank failures as the number of mortgage defaults increased. The current Basel I capital framework does not require banks to hold sufficient amounts of capital to support their mortgage lending activities. The new Basel II capital rules are intended to correct this problem. However, Basel II models could become too complex and too costly to implement, often resulting in a trade-off between complexity and model accuracy. In addition, the variation of the model, particularly how mortgage portfolios are segmented, could have a significant impact on the default and loss estimated and, thus, could affect the amount of capital that banks are required to hold. This paper finds that the calculated Basel II capital varies considerably across the default prediction model and segmentation schemes, thus providing banks with an incentive to choose an approach that results in the least required capital for them. The authors also find that a more granular segmentation model produces smaller required capital, regardless of the economic environment. In addition, while borrowers' credit risk factors are consistently superior, economic factors have also played a role in mortgage default during the financial crisis.Capital ; Banks and banking ; Basel capital accord

Do markets react to regulatory information?

Stock market ; Bonds ; Stocks

How much would banks be willing to pay to become "too-big-to-fail" and to capture other benefits?

This paper examines an important aspect of the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) policy employed by regulatory agencies in the United States. How much is it worth to become TBTF? How much has the TBTF status added to bank shareholders’ wealth? Using market and accounting data during the merger boom (1991-2004) when larger banks greatly expanded their size through mergers and acquisitions, we find that banking organizations are willing to pay an added premium for mergers that will put them over the asset sizes that are commonly viewed as the thresholds for being TBTF. We estimate at least $14 billion in added premiums for the nine merger deals that brought the organizations over$100 billion in total assets. These added premiums may reflect that perceived benefits of being TBTF and/or other potential benefits associated with size.Bank mergers

Strategic default on first and second lien mortgages during the financial crisis

Strategic default behavior suggests that the default process is not only a matter of inability to pay. Economic costs and benefits affect the incidence and timing of defaults. As with prior research, the authors find that people default strategically as their home value falls below the mortgage value (exercise the put option to default on their first mortgage). While some of these homeowners default on both first mortgages and second lien home equity lines, a large portion of the delinquent borrowers have kept their second lien current during the recent financial crisis. These second liens, which are current but stand behind a seriously delinquent first mortgage, are subject to a high risk of default. On the other hand, relatively few borrowers default on their second liens while remaining current on their first. This paper explores the strategic factors that may affect borrower decisions to default on first vs. second lien mortgages. The authors find that borrowers are more likely to remain current on their second lien if it is a home equity line of credit (HELOC) as compared to a closed-end home equity loan. Moreover, the size of the unused line of credit is an important factor. Interestingly, they find evidence that the various mortgage loss mitigation programs also play a role in providing incentives for homeowners to default on their first mortgages.Mortgage loans ; Default (Finance) ; Home equity loans

The potential role of subordinated debt programs in enhancing market discipline in banking

Previous studies have found that subordinated debt (sub-debt) markets do differentiate between banks with different risk profiles. This finding satisfies a necessary condition for regulatory proposals which would mandate increased reliance on sub-debt in the bank capital structure to discipline banks’ risk taking. Such proposals, however, have not been implemented, partially because there are still concerns about the quality of the signal generated in current debt markets. We argue that previous studies evaluating the potential usefulness of sub-debt proposals have evaluated spreads in an environment that is very different from the one that will characterize a fully implemented sub-debt program. With a fully implemented program, the market will become deeper, issuance will be more frequent, debt will be viewed as a more viable means to raise capital, bond dealers will be less reluctant to publicly disclose more details on debt transactions, and generally, the market will be more closely followed. As a test to see how the quality of the signal may change, we evaluate the risk-spread relationship, accounting for the enhanced market transparency surrounding new debt issues. Our empirical results indicate a superior risk-spread relationship surrounding the period of new debt issuance due, we posit, to greater liquidity and transparency. Our results overall suggest that the degree of market discipline would likely be enhanced by a mandatory sub-debt program requiring banks to regularly approach the market to issue sub-debt.Bank capital

How much did banks pay to become too-big-to-fail and to become systematically important?

This paper estimates the value of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) subsidy. Using data from the merger boom of 1991-2004, the authors find that banking organizations were willing to pay an added premium for mergers that would put them over the asset sizes that are commonly viewed as the thresholds for being TBTF. They estimate at least $15 billion in added premiums for the eight merger deals that brought the organizations to over$100 billion in assets. In addition, the authors find that both the stock and bond markets reacted positively to these TBTF merger deals. Their estimated TBTF subsidy is large enough to create serious concern, particularly since the recently assisted mergers have effectively allowed for TBTF banking organizations to become even bigger and for nonbanks to become part of TBTF banking organizations, thus extending the TBTF subsidy beyond banking.Bank mergers

How much did banks pay to become too-big-to-fail and to become systemically important?

This paper estimates the value of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) subsidy. Using data from the merger boom of 1991-2004, the authors find that banking organizations were willing to pay an added premium for mergers that would put them over the asset sizes that are commonly viewed as the thresholds for being TBTF. They estimate at least $14 billion in added premiums for the eight merger deals that brought the organizations to over$100 billion in assets. In addition, the authors find that both the stock and bond markets reacted positively to these deals. Their estimated TBTF subsidy is large enough to create serious concern, since recent assisted mergers have allowed TBTF organizations to become even bigger and for nonbanks to become part of TBTF banking organizations, thus extending the TBTF subsidy beyond banking.Bank failures ; Bank size ; Bank mergers ; Systemic risk

Do Markets React to Bank Examination Ratings? Evidence of Indirect Disclosure of Management Quality Through BHCs' Applications to Convert to FHCs

Certain nonrecurring circumstances associated with the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 have created a unique opportunity for the market to obtain bank examination ratings of management quality. We utilize this natural experiment in order to determine how the market views this heretofore private information. We find that the stock market utilizes bank examination ratings in order to reveal regulatory intent, rather than simply as information about management quality. Revelation of unsatisfactory M ratings (denoted “bad news”) causes BHC stock returns and market risk betas to increase, whereas revelation of acceptable M ratings (“good news”) causes BHC stock returns and market risk betas to decrease. The market thrives on “bad news” because unsatisfactory M ratings indicate that regulatory intervention is likely to occur, possibly benefiting both shareholders and creditors. On the other hand, revelation of acceptable M ratings (“good news”) indicates that bank regulators are unprepared to intervene in the near future. Moreover, we find lower bond spreads for a subsample of FHCs with satisfactory M ratings revealed upon conversion