Interdependent Pricing and Markup Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of GM, Ford and Chrysler

Our purpose in this paper is to develop and estimate a model of the US automobile industry that can be used to analyze the secular and cyclical strategic markup behavior and market structure of its three major domestic producers - - GM, Ford and Chrysler. The principal novelty in this paper is not such much in the underlying theory (we build on what Timothy Bresnahan has called the "new empirical industrial organization" literature), but rather in the actual empirical implementation of a multi-equation model sufficiently general to permit the testing of a variety of specific behavioral postulates associated with the interdependent strategic profit-maximizing behavior of GM, Ford and Chrysler. Using firm-specific annual data from 1959-83, we find that at usual levels of statistical significance, we cannot reject Cournot quantity-setting behavior, nor can we reject leader/follower quantity-setting behavior with GM as leader and Ford and Chrysler as followers; the parameter restrictions associated with leader/follower behavior are slightly more binding than those with Cournot, although the difference is not decisive. In terms of the cyclical analysis of market behavior, our most striking result is the great diversity of behavior we find among GM, Ford and Chrysler. Depending on which firm is being analyzed, there is support for the pro-cyclical "conventional wisdom" of markups (GM and Ford), as well as for the counter-cyclical "revisionist" literature (Chrysler). Diversity, rather than constancy and homogeneity, best characterizes firms in this industry.

Mergers, Deregulation and Cost Savings in the U.S. Rail Industry

The success of deregulation in creating a viable private rail freight system in the ?U.S. since 1979 is relatively undisputed. Deregulation has proceeded in three ways: (i) eased rate setting restrictions; (ii) simplified merger applications and approval procedures; and (iii) relaxed route abandonment policies. In this paper we attempt to disentangle the effects of deregulation on rail costs from those directly attributable to mergers and acquisitions. We employ a translog variable cost function, based on an unbalanced panel data set of annual observations for major U.S. Class I railroads from 1974 to 1986. We find that both deregulation and mergers contributed significantly to cost savings. However, of the accumulated cost savings achieved by the six major firms involved in mergers post-deregulation, we estimate that by 1986 about 91% of the reduction in accumulated costs is due to deregulation, and about 9% is directly due to mergers and acquisitions (which in turn were facilitated by regulatory reforms). In terms of factor biases, we find that both deregulation and mergers resulted in a substantial labor-saving bias; the point estimate of the deregulation labor-saving bias is larger than that for mergers, but we were not able to estimate this bias precisely. We conclude that mergers were not a prerequisite for railroads being able to achieve substantial cost and productivity improvements in our 1974-1986 sample period. Deregulation also had an enormous direct impact; indeed, its impact appears to have been much larger.

Rail Costs and Capital Adjustments in a Quasi-Regulated Environment

This paper reports on results obtained from the estimation of a rail cost function using a pooled-time series, cross section of Class I railroads for the period 1974-1986. An analysis is performed of short-run and long-run returns to scale, the extent of capital disequilibrium, and adjustments to way and structures capital in the heavily regulated and quasi-regulated environments before and after the passage of the Staggers Act in 1980. In general, it is found that there is considerable overcapitalization in the rail industry and that this has persisted in spite of the regulatory freedom provided by the Staggers Act.

Cost structure and technological change of local public transport: the Kaohsiung City Bus case

This study has developed a translog cost function for the Kaohsiung City Bus (KCB) to analyse its cost structure and economic characteristics, based on monthly data over the time period from January 1996 to December 2000. The empirical results reveal that economies of density in the provision of bus services in Kaohsiung do prevail. The estimated marginal cost, which is less than the average cost but greater than the current bus fare, indicates that the subsidy is necessary. Due to the existence of returns to density (RTD), the KCB could obtain cost-saving benefits by extending its output scale. The KCB production technology is also not neutral. The effects of technological change on the KCB costs suggest that over the period 1996-2000 technological progress did lead to cost saving; the pure productivity growth rate increased from 0.45% in 1998 to 3% in 2000.