The philosophy and principles of welding design

The welding designer requires a philosophy for his design responsibilities and a thorough understanding of the basic principles in the subjects covering his responsibilities. The education of the welding designer must provide a spectrum of studies which will define these responsibilities and which will help him to understand and apply the science and technology relevant to his work

John Robert Eyer: Entomological Work in Pennsylvania and Lists of Publications

(excerpt) John Robert Eyer died at Carlsbad, New Mexico, on January 30, 1976. J. G. Watts and W. A. Iselin (1976), his former colleagues in the Department of Botany and Entomology at New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, wrote an obituary and quite naturally focused on Eyer\u27s work at the University\u27s Agricultural Experiment Station. Since Dr. Eyer\u27s first positions in entomology were in Pennsylvania, we have prepared this biographical sketch to preserve the record of his early accomplishments

Boundary Terms for Causal Sets

We propose a family of boundary terms for the action of a causal set with a spacelike boundary. We show that in the continuum limit one recovers the Gibbons-Hawking-York boundary term in the mean. We also calculate the continuum limit of the mean causal set action for an Alexandrov interval in flat spacetime. We find that it is equal to the volume of the codimension-2 intersection of the two light-cone boundaries of the interval

Recover it from the facts as we know them

In Andrea Sangiovanni’s words, practice-dependent theorists hold that “[t]he content, scope, and justification of a conception of [a given value] depends on the structure and form of the practices that the conception is intended to govern”. They have tended to present this as methodologically innovative, but here I point to the similarities between the methodological commitments of contemporary practice-dependent theorists and others, particularly P. F. Strawson in his Freedom and Resentment and Bernard Williams in general. I suggest that by looking at what Strawson and Williams did, we can add to the reasons for adopting one form or another of practice-dependence. The internal complexity of the practices we hope our principles will govern may require it. However, this defence of practice-dependence also puts pressure on self-identified practice-dependence theorists, suggesting that they need to do more work to justify the interpretations of the practices their theories rely on

Participation in and responsibility for state injustices

This paper discusses the criteria for acceptably holding citizens partly responsible for wrongs their state or its agents commit. Some proposed criteria are not, it argues, appropriately sensitive to the particular coercive relation between state and citizen. Others, which are, conceive of it wrongly and fail to match our judgments about a range of cases. Alternative criteria of breadth and joint authorship, built around Christopher Kutz's account of participation, better match these considered judgments as well as linking them to a more powerful theoretical framework. Understanding citizens' responsibility will mean understanding these criteria more fully

The real value of equality

This paper investigates how political theorists and philosophers should understand egalitarian political demands in light of the increasingly important realist critique of much of contemporary political theory and philosophy. It suggests, first, that what Martin O'Neill has called non-intrinsic egalitarianism is, in one form at least, a potentially realistic egalitarian political project and second, that realists may be compelled to impose an egalitarian threshold on state claims to legitimacy under certain circumstances. Non-intrinsic egalitarianism can meet realism’s methodological requirements because it does not have to assume an unavailable moral consensus since it can focus on widely acknowledged bads rather than contentious claims about the good. Further, an appropriately formulated non-intrinsic egalitarianism may be a minimum requirement of an appropriately realistic claim by a political order to authoritatively structure some of its members' lives. Without at least a threshold set of egalitarian commitments, a political order seems unable to be transparent to many of its worse off members under a plausible construal of contemporary conditions

Consent and deception

Tom Dougherty has recently attacked what he calls the lenient view about sexual deception. The lenient view differentiates between different types of sexual deception, treating some as seriously wrong but excusing others. Dougherty instead claims that all deception about matters which would make a difference to whether consent is given invalidates consent, in part because doing so rejects inappropriate moralism about sexual behaviour. Dougherty’s position generalizes. All deception about deal-breakers invalidates consent. This, I suggest, is particularly troubling, given the important role deception plays in smoothing social relations. There are powerful reasons for allowing at least some deception both in sexual relations and social life more generally. I counter Dougherty’s two arguments. First, I provide an explanation of the seriousness of the wrongdoing involved in some sexual deceptions which does not turn either on consent to the sex involved or its harmfulness. This shows, contra Dougherty, that the lenient view can be defended without appeal to a moralized view about sexual consent. Second, I note that deception does not seem to invalidate necessary consent in a range of non-sexual cases. This can be explained without relying on a moralized account of the practice involved. Parallel explanations are available for why sexual deceit does not invalidate permissions necessary to make sex acceptable. This does not amount to a complete defence of the lenient view, which I agree is most probably wrong about at least some sexual deception. It does however give ample reason for scepticism about Dougherty’s alternative